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

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DISSENT is a journal devoted to radical ideas and the values of socialism and democracy. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

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The Problem with New York City

New York's slide toward default has created a "crisis of conscience" for many liberals. Perhaps for the first time, they are asking whether social spending can be overdone, whether public largesse inevitably breeds intolerable waste and corruption. Few are likely to agree with Gerald Ford's answers, but Governor Jerry Brown of California, who says the same thing, is gaining numerous adherents.

The Jerrys' argument is *not* sound. Social spending in New York has been inadequate, not excessive. Mass transit and housing have been allowed to deteriorate; the harbor has been abandoned; the highways were left to rot. Every year for two decades funds to maintain public facilities have been deferred—though deferral meant an escalation in future costs. Some vital projects, such as the Second Avenue subway and the Kennedy Airport rail link, were postponed so long that their costs skyrocketed; the City can now neither afford to build them nor to abandon them.

New York's fiscal starvation is not unique. Newark, Boston, Philadelphia, and Detroit are starving too and deteriorating in the process. Nor is all this new. The Depression marked the point when America realized its mature cities could no longer support themselves.

Though reactionary politicians like Senator Buckley and President Ford still live in a pre-New Deal world, the Revenue Sharing Act of 1972 proposed by a conservative president is more pertinent. Only the national government has a tax base sufficient to maintain social services and investment at an adequate level. And, equally important, American taxpayers are more fiscally conservative on local matters than on national ones. Ever since the Great Depression, it has been easier for a national legislator to vote for a multimillion dollar spending bill than for a state legislator to vote for a modest program. In recent years the Cold War and the War on Poverty have furnished suitable rhetoric to maintain federal spending at high levels. States and cities have found no such language.

Even Governor Rockefeller, easily the biggest spender in the history of any state government, was not able to finance his imperial programs through state spending. In order to expand the State University, to build the Albany Mall and the World Trade Center, to make the Long Island Rail Road the "best" commuter line in the country, Rockefeller had to invent a whole new type of borrowing technique—the "moral obligation" bond. Today many vital, and some foolish, New York City and State facilities exist only by virtue of public-authority borrowing that lacks the "full faith and credit" of the appropriate governmental sponsors. And New York is not alone. Throughout the United States, fiscally unsound public projects are teetering on the brink, for New York's exposure has uncovered a jerry-built debt system.

New York's budgetary gimmicks and the elaboration of unsound public borrowing techniques, fundamentally, stem from the same source —the starvation of state and local government. Of course, this is not to say that all governmental units have loaded themselves with debt; some have simply neglected public needs.

It is now clear that adventurous bank lending, unthinkable before the banking revolution of the 1960s, is no solution. The only way to solve New York's problems—and Detroit's, Newark's, etc.—is for the federal government to assume many of the health and welfare costs currently borne by localities. But even this shift would not be enough.

To reverse the decline of New York's economy would require massive investment to redevelop New York Harbor; to rebuild freight and passenger rail links; to replenish an aging housing stock; to improve mass transit.

Will the federal government take on these obligations? Even if a Democrat is elected in November and embarks on an ambitious social spending program, it is not likely that he would channel such spending to New York. For during the past 20 years, federal investment—as opposed to social welfare spending—has been concentrated in the South and Southwest, from Florida to Southern California. (Not coincidentally, private investment has gone there too.) It would take imaginative national plann.ng to rebuild New York and the rest of the Northeast. It is hard to believe we will get it.

DAVID BENSMAN □

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Spain: Let Freedom Come!

Well, we have outlived them all—all the tyrants who blighted the years of our lives, Hitler, Stalin, and now, it appears, that lesser tyrant, Franco. Not much of an achievement perhaps; yet when one thinks back over the last four or five decades, remembering the ghastliness of the age in which we were born, it seems wonderful that they should now all be gone, these larger and lesser tyrants, even though their bloody marks still disfigure the modern world.

It seemed at one time that the Spanish Civil War was the crucial event of the century. We could not imagine, we barely knew as yet, the magnitude of murder that the totalitarian states could achieve. Spain in the late '30s stood as the last defense against overreaching fascism, and the despair one felt in 1939 when Franco's armies entered Madrid can hardly be described. The bourgeois democracies—not least of all, Franklin Roosevelt's America—had allowed the fascists to win, systematically refusing to help the Republic even though Hitler and Mussolini poured arms into the hands of the Spanish fascists. Perhaps most heart-sickening of all, the Stalinists within the Spanish Loyalist camp had brutally encroached upon the freedoms of all who resisted the domination of Moscow—as if to parallel, in their hatred of democratic liberties, the work of the fascists. All that was dehumanizing and murderous in modern politics came together in Spain, the fascists from without and the Stalinists within, destroying the Republic and thwarting the efforts of the Spanish workers to create autonomous socialist—in some instances, anarchist—institutions.

Almost half a century has passed. Yet so deep and persistent is the hope of freedom even in the age of totalitarianism, it appears that, except for authoritarian fringes on left and right, all political groupings in the Spanish underground speak of reinstituting a democratic republic with civil freedoms, a revival of parties, an uncensored press, and an array of social reforms.

And, again with the exception of the authoritarian extremes who hope either for a violent suppression of the new Spain or a violent revolution that would replace the dictatorship of the generals with a dictatorship of the party, there appears to be a genuine concord that the transition to democracy must be peaceful. No country that has suffered a civil war like the one that occurred in Spain during the late '30s can possibly want a recurrence of bloodshed. Only brutal-minded thugs of the right and ideologically crazed adventurers of the left could now think of coups or countercoups.

But to insure a peaceful transition, there must be speed and forthrightness, not the "partial measures" proposed by those who have gathered around Juan Carlos, the Bourbon puppet who has "replaced" Franco. If Juan Carlos wishes to serve his country, he will make his reign a very brief one, by enabling a transfer of power to a provisional government resting upon the newly constituted democratic parties and preparing, in turn, for free elections in which the Spanish people can make clear their political desires. What could lead to violence in Spain would be a policy of temporizing deceit, whereby a pretense toward democratization would be enacted without its substance. Every political party must be allowed to function openly; the country must experience the ventilation of free opinion. That there will be risks in such a course is obvious, but these would be as nothing to a further attempt at suppression.

Once—if and when—political life can be freely resumed in Spain, we are likely to witness fascinat-

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ing new developments. All the leaders of the underground parties are young, relatively inexperienced, and untested; their ties with the country's political-historical past are necessarily problematic. Thus, the leader of the largest socialist group in Spain is a young man in his early thirties: what is the strength of his democratic convictions, the depth of his socialist knowledge? Such questions must always arise when a country faces the possibility of emerging from the darkness of repression.

At least as important is the character of the Spanish Communist party, apparently the best-organized among those that oppose the Franco regime. This party, also led by new and younger people, is politically close to the Italian CP—which is to say, strongly opposed to the Stalinist course the Portuguese party has taken. The Spanish CP declares itself to be committed to a peaceful democratic course, eager to cooperate with the other democratic parties.* If there is plenty of reason to be cautious and skeptical about such professions of democratic commitment (for reasons I indicated in the Fall 1975 *Dissent*), still, it would be dogmatic simply to rule out the possibility that at least some Spanish CP leaders have undergone major transformations of outlook and, in effect, are abandoning the outlook of "Marxism-Leninism." Were the Spanish CP actually to function along the lines its leaders promise, the possibility of a peaceful transition to a progressive and democratic republic would be greatly enhanced—indeed, the repercussions for the whole of European politics would be very considerable.

We can only wait and see. But in this gloomy historical moment, when democracy has suffered a major defeat in India and still remains imperiled in Portugal, it is inspiriting, even exhilarating, to think that the reign of Franco's fascism may finally be reaching its end and that the Spanish people, so vigorous in their political life during the '30s, may again speak and act freely. At least with regard to Spain, maybe we will soon be able to say: we have lived through the worst, now let us turn to a new freedom. I. H. □

*An underground leader of the Spanish CP, one Luis, is quoted in the *New York Times* of October 29, 1975 as follows: "We do not renounce a single one of the bourgeois liberties. If the bourgeoisie can dominate in freedom we want to provide more profound, more real liberties, not less. Socialism can provide the economic base for more complete liberty, without restricting a single aspect of bourgeois liberty."

Dennis H. Wrong

Auguries for 1976 — Will Ford Make It?

With the next presidential election only a year away, the time has come to examine the usual auguries. They are more uncertain than at any comparable time before an election since 1960.

Incumbents have nearly always been reelected even when they first reached the office by succession rather than election, but Ford is unique in not having even been elected to the vice-presidency. One of the two defeated incumbents in the present century, moreover, was Herbert Hoover. And the country remains in the worst economic recession since the 1930s. If the much-predicted economic upturn does not materialize in the next six months, Ford will surely be in serious trouble in an election dominated by bread-and-butter issues. The unions can be expected to work as hard as they ever have for the Democratic candidate and with even greater impact than in the past in view of the new campaign-spending laws. (I assume, of course, that the Democratic candidate will be neither Wallace nor McGovern.)

Ford has blatantly exploited the unpopularity of New York City in speeches to western Republicans, but he and his advisers may have been rudely surprised by the results of the first Gallup poll on this issue, which showed that opinion on whether the federal government should help New York or allow it to default was much more closely divided than had been believed—49 percent against federal aid and 42 percent for it with a margin of error of 3 percent. Ford's stand may strengthen him against Reagan in the primaries, but it is hard to believe that it will help him against the Democrats in the election. His New York-baiting is more likely to enlarge urban Democratic majorities in the big-city states that count so heavily in presidential elections —New York itself, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, and possibly California and Ohio, all states that the Republicans usually have a fair to good chance of carrying. However popular Ford's opposition to helping New York City may be in some parts of the country, it seems more probable that the urban identification of millions of voters will gain votes for the Democrats rather than that

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antiurban and anti-New York sentiments will switch votes that were otherwise unlikely to go to Ford.

Not since the early 1950s have I heard so much unvarnished old-fashioned rhetoric about free enterprise and frugality and the dangers of big government in the speeches of any president or any leading candidate as we have heard from Ford in recent months. Eisenhower now and then went in for it, but he also affirmed "moderate" or "progressive" Republicanism and was always most closely identified with foreign policy issues. Even Goldwater laid greater stress on the latter and on fancier libertarian ideology. And neither Eisenhower nor Goldwater ran for office in a period of economic decline when such pre-1933 bromides have an especially hollow ring. The prevailing assumption is that Ford's adoption of time-worn conservative pieties reflects his fear of losing the nomination to Reagan. There is even less reason today than there was in 1964 to think that a right-wing ideologue could conceivably win a presidential election; if Reagan is or is perceived as—and the two are perhaps not distinguishable—a major threat to a conservative Republican incumbent, this says reams about what has hap-

A Major Political Battle?

Give or take a candidate, what Dennis Wrong says in an adjacent column about the 1976 election seems essentially right. It might be worth adding a word about the political-ideological issues shaping up in American politics.

It's a paradox that in our insistently anti-ideological culture a man of such limited scope as Gerald Ford should be pressing toward an ideological confrontation. In saying this I'm aware that during the primary contests most Democratic candidates veer a little left and most Republican ones a little right. Primaries draw the more committed voters, those inclined to define their politics in ideological terms, which means: liberal among Democrats and conservative among Republicans. Later, having gained the nominations, the two winning candidates customarily move toward the political center in order to grab noncommitted votes. So goes the standard political wisdom.

We may therefore assume that Ford, if and when he defeats Reagan in the primaries, will attempt a similar adaptation. But it's not clear whether he'll be able to do this. For thus far he has acted with ideological intransigence, even truculence. He has vetoed bill after bill involving social appropriations; he has made of his anti-New York campaign a strategy of meanness. He has presented himself as a crusader for free enterprise, individual initiative, laissez-faire capitalism—ah, those glory days of McKinley, Coolidge, and Hoover! ah, the luminous simplicities of Ayn Rand and Milton Friedman! And Ford has surrounded himself with advisers possessing astonishing moral opacity, most notably Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, whom Mike Harrington has neatly described as the Savonarola of the American rich.

In effect, Ford has been preparing the way for an American counterrevolution—a systematic if gradual destruction of the welfare state (or as much of it as we have). This he cannot do through blunt proposals to abolish social security or unemployment insurance; the country would not stand for it. But the social services that we do have can be choked to death, deprived of the oxygen of money and commitment, so that the very inadequacy imposed on them by reactionary policies will enable the reactionaries to cry out against their inadequacy.

All of this presents the Democrats with a major opportunity. If they retreat to the high-minded "puritanism" affected by Jerry Brown of California, or indulge in the feeble waffling of some of the announced candidates, they will simply bore and bewilder people. Their one possibility—so far sensed mainly by Hubert Humphrey—is to meet Ford head-on: to defend the conquests of the welfare state while acknowledging the failures and weaknesses that have accompanied those conquests.

Well, if anything like this confrontation takes place, we may look forward to a major political battle, one that will be of genuine social and intellectual interest. No doubt, what seems clear in the primaries could be muffled in the election. Still, we owe Ford a wry gesture of thanks for insisting—as the liberals ought also to insist, though thus far they have not done so with sufficient force and passion—that the country faces a choice: back to Hoover or forward to an improved welfare state, beyond the New Deal. To socialists even the latter has grave deficiencies, but if the campaign looks even roughly as I'm suggesting here, we will want to line up with all those in the country who resist the politics of Ford and the economics of Simon.

I. H. □

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pened to the Republican party since 1964. Especially when one notes that moderate Republicans such as Case, Javits, Brooke, and others get reelected to Congress with monotonous regularity in eastern and some urbanized mid- and far-western states. That Rockefeller has withdrawn from the ticket because he foresees another 1964 debacle seems plausible and the possibility that he may back another Republican to the left of Ford, or even run again himself, cannot be discounted. Such a candidate would, I think, have a real chance of election, but his chances of winning the Republican nomination are another matter altogether.

This circumstance and the apparent strength of Reagan may indicate the return from the repressed of the famous Republican death wish of decades past. No doubt it has broken through again because of the evidence in 1968 and 1972 of an apparently unresolved Democratic death wish. Yet the similarities between those years and the present may turn out to be superficial. There is, to be sure, still the Wallace problem. The old scenarios of Wallace entering the Democratic convention with enough votes garnered in the primaries to block anyone else are still being written, but Wallace's support in the polls has begun to drop even earlier than in the past. He will win enough southern primaries to have some nuisance value, but—even more than in the case of Reagan in the other party—one must doubt whether delegates favoring him will stick with a man who has no chance of winning the election and only a faint chance of dealing with a possible winner emerging from the Convention.

The most popular current scenario for the Democratic convention is that there will be a deadlock among the Wallaceites and the supporters of the other (and for the most part still obscure) politicians competing in the primaries, and that a more familiar and acceptable national figure will be chosen as a "unity" candidate. For a long time Ted Kennedy was cast in this role, but his apparent determination not to run has led to his replacement by Hubert Humphrey, although Senators Muskie and Stevenson or Governor Brown of California are seen as outside possibilities. I do not think that this Convention scenario will work out even if Kennedy should change his mind, although that would somewhat increase its probability. The nominee is far more likely to emerge from the primaries as McGovern did in 1972, Robert Kennedy would have if he had not been assassinated in 1968, and John Kennedy did in 1960.

One of the many candidates now running will establish a clear margin over the others in the primaries—it may be psychological rather than statistical. It takes barely a week or two for the media to give someone instant celebrity and he will receive the full treatment: TV interviews, pictures on the covers of *Time* and *Newsweek*, etc. Other candidates will drop out because of demonstrated lack of support and lack of funds, some of them backing the leader. Jackson, the best-known of the present candidates and the longest in the field, will prove to be the Muskie of 1976, fading rather quickly.

My guess is that the "winner" of the primaries will be one of three men: Birch Bayh, Jimmy Carter, or Morris Udall. But the names are mere guesses this far in advance, when there may be other candidates announcing in the next few months. I feel far more certain that the nominee, whoever he is, will be the most successful vote-getter in the primaries. Unless Kennedy changes his mind, and quite possibly even if he does, the primary winner's momentum will bring him the nomination on an early ballot.

WHAT about the election? I have written as if Ford were extremely vulnerable and at this date he certainly looks it. But there is a lot of evidence that the public is still in a post-Watergate mood of "negativism" toward all parties and politicians and big government as well as big business. The New York fiscal crisis has undoubtedly deepened these feelings. I doubt that Ford's well-worn diatribes against government-spending and welfare are capable of capitalizing on this mood. Yet it weakens the appeal of an old New Dealer like Humphrey, however much the Democratic pols may love and respect him. Further, it helps Ford indirectly by accentuating the tendency to favor a Republican president and a solidly Democratic Congress, a condition that has prevailed for 13 of the past 21 years. The American system of separate presidential and congressional voting (not to speak of state elections) works to prevent the Democrats from being perceived as an opposition party to which the voters readily turn when dissatisfied with the Administration in office. And, of course, the personalization of presidential nominees gives enormous advantages to the incumbent.

Readiness to welcome new faces has been manifest in post-Watergate elections, which also favors the emergence of the Democratic nominee from the present crop of virtual unknowns. Perhaps the strongest candidates from the standpoint of popular appeal would be regular Republicans perceived as to the left of the party leadership and regular Demo-

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crats to the right of theirs (Wallace, of course, is not a "regular" in this sense). Yet the Republican challenge to Ford comes from the right, not the left. Rockefeller won't do—he's an "old face" and damaged by the New York crisis—but a Percy or Mathias candidacy might have raised waves although it is probably too late for that now. The Democratic profile suggests a Jerry Brown-type candidate, not to be ruled out if the primaries should produce no clear leader and more likely, I think, than a turn to Humphrey or Muskie in the event that Kennedy sticks to his noncandidacy.

But the state of the economy will be decisive. And in face of it, a little boldness in making innovative proposals on the part of the Democratic aspirants might be good politics as well as desirable in itself. □

Norman Penner

Socialist Gain — & Loss — in Canada

The Ontario Provincial elections last September caught everyone by surprise, and none more so than the principal candidates.

The New Democratic party, Canada's social democratic party, emerged as the official opposition with 38 seats, a gain of 18. The Progressive Conservatives held on to the government, which they have controlled since 1943, but with only 51 seats—and so they now are a minority government with an uncertain future. The Liberal party, which had appeared in many preelection polls as the possible winner, failed even to hold onto its position as the opposition, coming in third with 36 seats.

The seat distribution, however, had very little to do with the popular vote: Progressive Conservatives polled 36 percent, Liberals 34 percent, and the NDP 30 percent. The NDP made its biggest electoral gains in important urban and industrial districts, and there moved from second position to first. In these areas the Liberals took away enough votes from the Conservatives to enable the NDP to capture seats. In Metropolitan Toronto an important shift took place in the Italian working-class vote, which went from the Liberals to the NDP and accounted for at least five of the new NDP seats, three of them won by Italian candidates.

The electorate's major concern was the disastrous impact of inflation on living conditions, and while no party put forward a clear set of proposals to halt the spiraling prices, the government in power was regarded as the culprit. One specific issue that helped the NDP, particularly in Toronto, was the way rents there have skyrocketted to the highest level on the North American continent; the provincial government, which has the authority to do so, had refused to enforce any form of rent control. Stephen Lewis, Ontario's leader of the NDP, hit on this issue in the last phase of the election campaign, and received an overwhelming response.

Nearly all observers credit the NDP with conducting the best campaign. Stephen Lewis came through as the only leader who raised real issues and stuck to that throughout the campaign. By contrast, Premier William Davis and Liberal leader Robert Nixon engaged in a slinging match with each other, culminating in a TV debate that was an all-time low in political confrontation.

The elections confirmed the three-party system, which has operated in Ontario since 1943 when the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, predecessor to the NDP, burst on the scene with the support of the organized labor movement. Ontario is the only province in Canada that has three strong parties of almost equal strength. In popular votes and seats, the three parties have moved closer to each other; significant redistribution of this strength is not likely in the foreseeable future.

A MINORITY GOVERNMENT OFTEN results in a good deal of jockeying for position, with each party trying to decide when and on what issue it should risk precipitating an election. Stephen Lewis has indicated that he will avoid such games; instead, he will try to get the government moving on some legislation, such as rent control or rent review, which the NDP could support. Some influential Tories are suggesting that the Davis government provoke an election at an opportune time and raise as the central issue the specter of "socialist hordes." This worked once before, in 1945. There may be enough Conservative strategists who would want to try it again. Stephen Lewis is aware of this possibility and will try to look as "reasonable" as possible, which he finds not too difficult to do.

In mid-October, the federal government an-

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nounced a series of stringent measures to control wage and price increases, which it has asked the provincial governments to adopt as well. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that these measures give much more power to the federal and provincial governments to control wages than it does to control prices, and many fear this is the real intent of the anti-inflationary program. This presents the NDP with a challenge and an opportunity to take on the leadership of labor's strong opposition to wage controls, and generally to be the spokesman for those sections of the population that have been hit hardest by inflation and mass unemployment.

It is not yet clear that the NDP will rise to this challenge. The NDP's federal Members of Parliament have come out with a strong attack on the wage and price controls, whereas the NDP provincial governments—in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba—are hesitant about joining this attack. In fact, some among them have indicated that they may support, even if half-heartedly, the main thrust of the federal program.

The Ontario elections mark a further rise in the credibility of the New Democratic party nationally. □

P.S. Since the above report reached *Dissent*, news has come of a major defeat for the New Democratic party in British Columbia. The NDP provincial government there was voted out of office, despite its record of significant achievements. We hope to hear from our Canadian friends in a future issue, analyzing this development. — *EDS.*

On the "Anti-Zionism" UN Assembly Resolution

Inquiries have come to us from many readers concerning the resolution passed by a majority at the U.N. General Assembly against "Zionist racism." What is there to say—except that every decent person, Zionist, non-Zionist, and even anti-Zionist, can only regard this as one of the most disgusting events in recent world politics? Apart from the intrinsic falsehood and venality of the resolution, one is struck by the character of the nations voting for it—the totalitarian Communist countries, the dictatorial Arab powers, the military dictatorship of Brazil. That they should presume to pass judgment on the movement for reconstituting the Jewish nation strikes us as malodorous. I.H.□

Brendan Sexton

Lisbon: The Posters and the People

> Contra A Novo Censura
> Contra A Controlla Fascista & Social Fascista
> Do Informaco
> Vota List A
>
> *–A poster on Lisbon's walls*

Mid-October 1975

The visual propaganda barrage laid on in Portugal's streets may be without parallel. Mile after mile, along the principal avenues, everywhere, on building walls, fences, monuments, are plastered—sometimes to heights of 15 or 20 feet—vividly colored exhortations to crush not only fascism but *Social Fascista*, and advance "the Revolution."

The posters stand in lieu of real power. They were put there by the Communists—and also by Maoists and other far-left splinter groups—as a kind of Leninist-Madison Avenue device to persuade others that the fort is being held by the "left."

To walk the streets of Portugal, as I did day after day, and see Socialist posters defaced is to gain some sense of the hatred now stirring among the thwarted "Marxist-Leninists." The poster quoted above was directed toward Portugal's Union of Journalists, but it differed only slightly from thousands of others in union elections, calling for a vote against the "Fascista & Social Fascista." Sadly, the open revival of the pre-Hitler Stalinist theory of social fascism, according to which socialists were to be regarded as the principal enemies of the working class, may tell us what at least some of the Portuguese "left" has in mind these days.

In downtown Lisbon, young radicals (resembling their American middle-class and university-bred counterparts more than other people in Lisbon's streets) hawk idealized portraits of Mao and Stalin. More weirdly, street stands offer the same portraits for sale along with pornographic postcards and magazines. It is almost a counter-cultural scene. Only the young Trotskyists, aloof and austere, keep their

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distance from the pornographers. In these streets, the Socialists are not to be seen.

Having spent only a short time there, I can hardly pretend to be an expert on Portugal's revolution. It's not easy for anyone to figure out what goes on. The language is difficult, English-speaking people are rare, and influential activists naturally have only limited time for visitors.

I did, however, talk in Portugal at some length with a number of Socialists and trade unionists whom I had met only days before in Stockholm—fraternal delegates, as I was, to the Swedish Social Democratic Conference.

According to these and other sources, the Socialists enjoy general popular and union support. Socialist funds and resources, however, have been minuscule compared to the sums spent by the Communist and the bourgeois parties. Socialists bitterly deny receiving money from the CIA. Until recently, they claim, the French and American governments did everything they could to thwart Socialist influence. They are indignant and appalled that "liberals" and others should so easily be taken in by what the CIA, the "left," and the right say about their sources of support. The Swedish and West German Social Democrats have helped the Portuguese Socialists, but there is absolutely no evidence of other affluent angels.

Now it is said by the Portuguese far left, and echoed by Americans who accept that line, that Socialists polled many of their votes among rightists who look to Socialists as a buffer against the Communists. It is strange that no one foresaw such a happening until after the ballot count proved the Socialists the winners. Why should the right support us, the Socialists ask, when ideologically more attractive alternatives are open to them?

Socialists also point out that they won greatest support in the large urban centers (in Lisbon with more than 45 percent and in Oporto with more than 50 percent). They say: Isn't it precisely in such large metropolitan areas that working-class and progressive sentiment is normally found?

THE COMMUNIST PARTY, according to Socialists, has established a base in those small communities where peasants and laborers from the large estates are concentrated. Communists won the loyalty of these groups by leading them to seize the great estates on which many of them worked, and by promising that, under Communist rule, they would inherit the land as their own. They were not informed, of course, that this Communist party would be unlikely to turn over ownership of land or anything else to peasants and workers.

Socialists claim that such peasants and farm workers provide a traveling mass base for the Communist party. "I read in one of your papers," a Socialist said to me, "that thousands of people poured in from our countryside to support a Communist demonstration. Did the reporter who wrote that suppose that the poorest people in Europe came from the fields and foundries after a hard day's work, jumped into their fine Toyotas and drove 50 kilometers to Lisbon to march in a parade?" What really happened, Socialists say, is that thousands are transported, and move from meeting to meeting repeatedly, in trucks and other vehicles provided by Portugal's wealthiest political organization, the Communist party.

What is more, says Rudolfo Crespo, General Secretary of Portugal's Socialist party, every test of popular sentiment confirms that socialists can muster greater mass support than any other political organization. More people attend their meetings, read their paper, march in their demonstrations, and (most significant now) choose them as leaders of their unions.

The Socialists, Crespo claimed, had won all national union elections held to date (when I spoke with him in late September). Candidates supported by the Socialists won in the Postal Workers, Food Handlers, Retail Workers, Bank Clerks, and Dockers. They had won, in fact, every union election that had been held, Crespo said, and they expected to win every last one in the future.

The Communists, Crespo and other Socialists concede, were well organized under Salazar and emerged at the moment of upheaval with a functioning organization and a strategy for seizing power. Socialists, on the other hand, never solved the problems inherent in creating a clandestine organization that is at once democratic and resolute. Under fascism, the Socialists were fragmented, could reach only minimal agreement on policy, and lacked a developed strategy. Democratic socialism flourishes in the open, not underground.

The Communists supplemented the power of their underground organization with control of the highly politicized and militant Fifth Army Division. For some time following the overthrow of fascism, the Communists maneuvered to block the creation of an authentic Military Assembly, one that could exercise for the revolution the kind of power given the Communists by the Fifth Division. In this power

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vacuum, the Communist party was able to install its members in critical positions throughout Portugal.

Almost two-thirds of Portugal's industry reportedly was nationalized. The banks, it turned out, directly owned and controlled much of the nation's industry. When they were nationalized, Communist party members were given important posts therein and inherited enormous power. Most of the important newspapers, for example, were owned by the banks and have now become public property, largely under control of the Communist party and its allies.

According to the Socialists, the Communists overplayed their hand. They installed their people not only in the banks but in command of local radio and television stations, as local school principals, in city councils and mayor's offices, and (perhaps most important) in the leadership of the revived workers' syndicates or unions.

Here, the Socialists charge, the Communists and the so-called Marxist-Leninists found the existing style of organization to their liking. They changed not a single fascist rule or procedure but simply took over and manipulated the existing structures. The Socialists, on their side, have placed their bets on the free internal union elections, which they have been able to force in many places and are beginning to win hands down.

SO, WHILE THE SOCIALISTS are Portugal's largest party, they are far from dominant. They have not found a way to deal with the "left" ploy of disruption (economic, social, and political), which is easily mounted in such a period.

American unionists can certainly understand the Portuguese unionists when they say that any handful of "militants" can shut down a plant by simply posting a few pickets at the main gates.

What is to be done with the small and generally unscrupulous groups of Marxists-Leninists who in the name of revolutionary democracy assert their right to interfere with, even disrupt, Socialist and trade union meetings? What is to be done with groups who, after forcibly seizing control of the media, deny others access to it? As things now stand, Socialists seem to be excluded from most newspapers and almost all radio and television outlets. This is not the classic situation in which a majority denies the minority its right to be heard, but rather one in which a small minority uses muscle and fire power to deny a peaceful and democratic majority its right to be heard.

We are charged, the Socialists say, with trying to destroy workers' control when we oust those who, through seizure of a radio station or newspaper, exclude us from their use. At the same time, the same people denounce us for our "inability to rule" or to mobilize the power of workers in defense of the revolution.

That is the awful paradox of Portugal. Can the Socialists find the means to deal with the antidemocratic forces that beset them from both left to right? Can they hold out long enough to establish some measure of political and economic stability on their way to creating a new society?

No mistaking the notable humanity, intelligence, integrity, civility of the Portuguese Socialists. Ironically, these very qualities may make it difficult for them to survive. Certainly much of the "left" would like to see them go under. These "leftists" appear to be caught in the awful logic of social fascism, the same irrationality that led so many German Communists to believe Hitler's stay in power would be short-lived once the "hypocrisy" of the German Social Democracy had been exposed and destroyed.

Whether Portugal's Socialists will make it cannot now be foretold. It may be that democracy will suffer one more stunning defeat, but if the Socialists can hold on for even a few months, their power is likely to grow, nurtured by the Portuguese people's desire for an end to chaos, a few moments of peace. □

Stanley Plastrik

The Enemy Is ... Democracy!

Like flies to the honey pot, "revolutionary ideologues" are drawn to Lisbon. Dogmatists and ultras of all hues now have come to this turbulent yet hospitable city. They dash up and down its hilly streets, participating in the Maoist and Communist demonstrations that have become the daily way of life, interviewing innocent citizens about "the revolution," and are enthralled by the Maoists and

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Trotskyists peddling their huge posters of Mao, Stalin, Trotsky, etc. in Rossio Square.

After the usual three-week stay, and the mandatory tape-recorded interview of a revolutionary worker or soldier, they return home, experts all, to publish their pre- and misconceptions in one or another journal.

During one week last October, we could read three such accounts.* Each writer had his own slant or angle—Paul Sweezy was fascinated by the revolutionary military, Paul Cowan by "the people," and Bert Cochran by the sects. They all had one thing in common—a contempt for democracy and the democratic process (the word is never employed without a pejorative adjective: "bourgeois," "parliamentary," etc.)—and high disdain for the Socialist party and its leader, Mario Soares, which in the case of Cowan approached the point of downright slander.

Cochran, writing in *The Nation*, comes closest to describing accurately the atmosphere of Lisbon, but his report is flawed by brushing aside the issue of democracy. He writes:

> The Socialists broke demonstratively with the Communists not from fear of a Communist "people's democracy" but because they were convinced that if events were permitted to continue along the lines they were moving, the Socialist Party would be relegated to a shadow existence. The Communists had been systematically shouldering them aside in media establishments, unions, farm cooperatives, municipal bodies. It was immaterial to them that they were being squeezed out of leadership in many places because of Communist directives, in other places because of the zealotry of local Communist purists, and still elsewhere because unaffiliated militants held Social Democracy in scorn. As they saw it, they, the majority, were being denied their just representation, while the minority was grabbing more posts than its strength warranted.

Precisely, Mr. Cochran, except for the doubtful suggestion that the Socialists surely do not fear a "People's Democracy" in Portugal. In the early phase of the Portuguese revolution, the Communist party, by intimidation and terror tactics, grabbed posts and positions they could not have obtained in free elections. Once given the opportunity, the majority of Portugal's workers and professionals rejected the Communist party in each local and union election.

Cochran acknowledged that the Socialists had "the largest popular following, and were able to call out a demonstration of 100,000 in Lisbon, despite Communist obstruction." Yet he described the Socialist party as being "in the tradition of Portuguese parties: a coterie of lawyers, government functionaries and newspaper editors, held together by reciprocal logrolling and the rewards or prospects of patronage, etc."

Utterly false! The Socialist party, only a few years old to begin with, has a broad base of workers, peasants, students, and intellectuals. Anyone who has witnessed SP demonstrations in Lisbon or Oporto knows that its social composition is surely as broad as that of the Communists, and that it can rally as many union militants, etc., as any other movement in Portugal. Recent opinion polls indicate that, if general elections were to be held, the Socialist party would obtain about 50 percent of the vote, and that the Popular Democratic party, its moderate ally, would poll another 30 percent. The polls also suggest that the Communist vote would drop to about half of what it was in the April 1975 elections—from 12 percent to about 6 percent.

Now, does the fact that workers continue to support the Communists, even if in steadily decreasing numbers, prove the validity of the Communist viewpoint? Cochran, finally, undid his own comments by concluding that "a big part of the country's 8.5 million remain attached to traditional ways and associations." In other words, the country as a whole rejects the Communists!

Paul Sweezy's ecstatic discovery of the revolutionary MFA (Armed Forces Movement), at the very moment of its (still continuing) fragmentation and disintegration, extends to quoting favorably from the rhetoric of General Carvalho, the most notorious adventurer in Portugal. Sweezy informs us that the MFA made one serious mistake: it permitted the April 1975 elections to take place! Result?

> ... a heavy price had to be paid. The fact that nearly two-thirds of the votes were collected by two quintessentially bourgeois parties masquerading as "socialist" and "social democratic" has given invaluable ammunition to the enemies of the Portuguese revolution, both inside and outside the country.

Would it not be more accurate to say that two-thirds

*Paul Cowan, "Report from an Interrupted Revolution," *The Village Voice*, October 6 and 13, 1975; Paul M. Sweezy, "Class Struggles in Portugal," *Monthly Review*, September 1975; Bert Cochran, "Portugal: A Most Peculiar Revolution," *The Nation*, October 4, 1975.

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of the voting population committed this "crime" and should be reeducated, as were Sweezy's pals in China?

Sweezy also reproached the MFA for its now forgotten policy declaration of June 21, 1975. For the Revolutionary Council of the MFA included a passage stating that the path to socialism must take a pluralist route:

> • Pluralism means free expression and discussion of opinions ... in an open and permanent dialogue with all the Portuguese people.
>
> • Party pluralism, ... implies the recognition of the existence of various political parties and currents of opinion, even if they do not necessarily defend socialist options.
>
> • ... the MFA rejects the implantation of socialism by violent and dictatorial methods.

Sweezy rejected this statement of principles as "dangerous." The enemies of socialism will use it to "... sidetrack the revolution into a capitalist dead end." Pluralism is a sign of weakness and futility. How can one extend belief in pluralism to the socialists, for example? This intellectual totalitarian is always consistent: he hates political freedom wherever he encounters it.

Paul Cowan, in the *Village Voice*, proves to be the most outrageous of our self-styled "revolutionaries." He came for his three weeks in Lisbon expecting a Portuguese version of the Spanish Civil War, with the Communists playing the role of villain. Well, he found them pretty bad ("[the CP] has been crude and harsh, eager to seize power in the unions, in the press, in local newspapers, without expanding its popular base ..."). But Cowan's real villain is the Socialist party "... being used as a Trojan horse for Portugal's right wing—providing a respectable anti-Communist cover for people who oppose programs like land reform, decolonization, workers' control of industry. ..." Not content with this theory of the Trojan horse, Cowan hints that the party is also involved with CIA activities! He winds up approvingly with Isabel do Carmo, mistress of the adventurer-general Carvalho, head of the most violence-prone sect in Portugal (the Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat, Revolutionary Brigades—all 300 of them!), whose apocalyptic invocation of dire events, with blood flowing in the streets, he refers to as "plausible."

Cowan informs us that the democratic elections of April 1975 "confused matters still more." The reason? They had no connection with the process of governing. What does this mean? Approval of the fact that the results were for months discounted, until the Socialist-majority government was formed? Or approval of the shunting aside of the Constituent Assembly by the totalitarian parties and groups and by the military?

Portugal's present troubles stem precisely from the fact that this clear mandate of the people in support of Mario Soares and his socialists has *not* been carried out. But our ideologues indeed considered it clever and *advanced* to sneer at the young Socialist party, whose popular vote outstripped that of all the other political parties put together, in a free and democratic election; a party that is battling against strong odds to preserve the democratic spirit of the revolution.

The final chance of the Portuguese revolution in avoiding either a military regime of the Far Right (Chile), or a totalitarian dictatorship of the Stalinists (Cunhal) lies with the Socialists, at the head of a broad-based democratic coalition of workers, middle-class people, and farmers. The SP of course is not faultless—for example, it is badly organized and has neglected action at the popular level by contenting itself too strictly with conventional political action (elections, etc.).

Unquestionably, the SP has a broad popular base. It is the only party in Portugal whose political direction allows for a democratic development of the revolution, the only party that might resolve the present crisis and remove the lingering threat of civil war. The Socialists would work, internally, for a progressive process of socialization, and, externally, for the maintenance of the needed ties with Europe and the Common Market nations, plus American aid—all necessary for the development of the country's economy. This party is strongly anti-totalitarian; it has been the victim of an incessant smear campaign by the Stalinists and an assortment of free-lance authoritarian intellectuals looking for "a mass base." One would hope that the slogan of the Portuguese Socialist party—"Socialism in Freedom"—would evoke sentiments of solidarity from those who have reflected on 20th-century history, or read Solzhenitsyn, and know the dangers that face any revolution if it is appropriated by a military-bureaucratic-ideological apparatus of the "right" or "left."

All the rest is demagogy, and contempt for human freedom! □

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Repression in India

The material published below is excerpted from reports of Amnesty-International, the worldwide organization that defends prisoners of conscience; the period covered is from June 26, 1975, when the government of India declared the "emergency," through September 1975. Although Jayaprakash Narayan has since been released, probably on grounds of his diminishing health, the facts cited below still hold true. As we go to press, there is no indication that many others will be released or the emergency be lifted.

As of July 11, 1975, Amnesty estimated that perhaps as many as 6,000 persons were arrested, but later reports indicated that arrests may total 10,000. Hundreds more were later detained under a law barring left- and right-wing splinter groups, but arrests after July 11 continued daily. The prisoners detained under emergency laws constitute classic cases of prisoners of conscience.

Those arrested include opposition leaders and workers of most opposition parties, the most well-known among them the veteran leader Jayaprakash Narayan, commonly known as J.P. Mr. Narayan was one of the leaders of the independence movement against the British, worked closely with M. Gandhi, and was an intimate friend of India'a first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the father of Mrs. Gandhi. In 1974 he emerged as the leader of a widespread anticorruption campaign, and is presently Mrs. Gandhi's main political opponent. J.P., who is 72, suffers from a heart condition, diabetes, and a kidney infection. Others arrested include the 79-year-old Moraji Desai, a former Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Congress (Opposition) party; Mr. L. K. Advani, President of the Jan Sangh; Chandra Sekhar and Ram Dhan of Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party; Charan Singh, Chairman of the Bharatiya Lok Dal (Indian People's party); George Fernandez, leader of the Socialist party; and some members of the Communist party of India (Marxist) in West Bengal. All these parties took part in a campaign to remove the Prime Minister from office following her conviction of corruption before the High Court.

While the majority of arrests seem to have been carried out against the Jan Sangh party (all its leaders throughout the country are known to be detained), party officials and members of other parties and organizations such as the Socialist party, the opposition Congress party, the Indian People's party (Bharatiya Lok Dal), Gandhian workers, and members of the Communist party of India (Marxist) in West Bengal are also known to be detained. So far, only a few arrests have been made among members of the left-wing CPI (M), including the General Secretary for Delhi State, Jaipal Singh, and the Deputy Leader in parliament, Jyotirmoy Bosu. The party joined the movement led by J.P. Narayan, requesting that the Prime Minister resign pending her appeal before the Supreme Court. Detainees are reportedly held in prisons, as well as in special camps throughout India. Total censorship is in force and no protest will be reported or permitted under the emergency except in the states of Tamil Nadu (Madras) and Gujarat, where opposition governments are in power.

The last official figure of persons arrested since the June declaration of an emergency and the imposition of full censorship of the press was given by the Minister of Information, Mr. Shukhla, on August 23, 1975. He then stated that less than 10,000 persons had been arrested in the last two months. As of August 15, Amnesty-International counted, using the various official statistics of arrests published by the state governments alone, 17,483 arrested persons. However, the number of political prisoners was at the same time reliably estimated by various independent sources to be between 20,000 and 54,000, and the opposition claimed at the beginning of September 1975 that as many as 200,000 persons had been arrested since the emergency declaration. Arrests continue, but a small number of prisoners have been released.

Under the existing strict censorship rules, the publishing of names or places of detention of any persons arrested under the emergency is not permitted. As a result, families often do not know whether—and if so, where—a prisoner is being held. Visits by prisoners' lawyers may occasionally be permitted, but interviews may never be conducted without the presence of an official. Even prominent politicians are denied visits by members of their families.

Finally, an executive order issued by the President of India after the emergency declaration barred prisoners from their fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Constitution in seeking their release from courts. Specifically, the following constitutional safeguards were suspended by the order:

- Equality before the law.
- The protection of life and property of a citizen.
- Protection against arrest and detention without being informed of the grounds for arrest.
- The duty of the arresting authority to produce the arrested persons before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. □

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David Twersky

Political Shifts in Israel

The recent U.N. resolution, condemning Zionism as a form of racialism, ironically, has helped restore a sense of normalcy in Israel that had been upset by the agreement with Egypt and the polarization it revealed in the Israeli polity.

Once again, Israelis now can view themselves as the victims of an international conspiracy; those who counseled moderation in foreign policy and flexibility on border questions must answer to those who argued all along that no Israeli concessions would pacify countries whose ultimate aim is the destruction of the state. In the Knesset all the parties except the New Communists (Rakah) and the non-Zionist, orthodox Agudah voted to condemn the U.N. resolution. Israel's diplomatic isolation at the U.N. highlighted the Zionist consensus domestically, as well as the peripheral nature of the anti-Zionist or non-Zionist parties who sit in the Knesset like Bolsheviks in the prewar Duma, not sure of whether they are granting the Zionist state too much validity by participating in its institutions.

The near unanimity of the Knesset's response to the U.N. resolution belied the country's deep split over foreign policy, which had been revealed during the national debate on the Agreement, a debate that took place as much in the streets as in the Knesset and cut across party lines.

The Knesset vote approving the Agreement revealed only the opposition of the right to what they consider an "American Diktat." Many of the deputies who voted with the government had in fact deep reservations; some voted for it only because slim majorities in their parties instructed them to do so.

The sources of their opposition (among both doves and hawks) are complex, yet grounded in several shared assumptions about Israel's needs. From these assumptions vastly different conclusions are reached: (*a*) both doves and hawks bemoan Israel's growing dependence on the United States, though neither advocates clear alternatives; (*b*) both are critical of a policy that encourages Israel to give up territory for very limited (or nonexistent) political gains; therefore, (*c*) both doves and hawks speak about the "preferred road of overall settlements," even in stages, rather than the Via Americana of partial, step-by-step agreements leading nowhere.

These common assumptions should not mask the fact that each side has its different motives and reaches different conclusions. To understand these motives and conclusions, one must become for a while an archeologist, that most Israeli of pastimes, digging in the mountain range of ideology.

Generally, one locates the hawks among the right parties, in the Likud parliamentary bloc. The Likud (Union) party is comprised of Menachem Begin's Herut (Freedom) party and of the Liberals, the party of the high bourgeoisie. Herut is ideologically committed to the retention of all territories occupied during the 1967 war, and on this question exerts a major influence over their more pragmatic Liberal partners.

By and large, the left is identified with a dovish point of view. But the breakdown is not quite so neat: there are bourgeois doves and socialist hawks,[1] and the position of the National Religious party, and especially of the extraparliamentary Gush Emonim (Bloc of the Faithful), add a new variable to the equation.

Gush Emonim is indirectly tied to the Young Guard faction of the National Religious party, which has now put forward one of its leaders, Zvulun Hammer, to fill a cabinet vacancy. This

[1]The Achdut Ha'Avoda (Unity of Labor) faction of the ruling Labor party, based in the Me'uchad kibbutz federation, has a strong annexationist tendency, despite the presence among them of such moderate comrades as Foreign Minister Yigal Allon and of such radical doves as ex-Secretary General of the Histadrut Yitzhak Ben-Aharon. Benyamin Halevy, a former Supreme Court justice elected as a Herut deputy, broke with Herut shortly after the elections in a genuine conversion to a dovish foreign policy. He remains an implacable bourgeois in domestic affairs and has resisted offers from more leftish doves for close cooperation.

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group organized the street demonstrations against the Agreement, which they viewed as a preview of eventual calls for "abandoning" the Golan Heights and the West Bank. They regard the territories as part of "Greater Israel" and their retention as tied to the idea of messianic redemption.

Thus hawkish opposition is not based on strategic considerations alone but grounded in romantic (one might add, pessimistic) nationalism, a sense of Jewish isolation and mystical messianism. No one really argued for the strategic importance of the Gidi and Mitla passes *per se*, though the loss of the Abu Rodeis oil field will be felt this winter.

WHAT THE LEFT critically calls "creeping annexationism"—the policy of encouraging Jewish settlement in the occupied territories—has not been the result of right-wing pressure on the government. It grows out of a policy articulated and carried out by the labor movement itself. Yitzhak Rabin, when addressing Labor audiences, has repeatedly expressed irritation with Gush Emonim for advising the government to settle the West Bank, as well as for the extralegal nature of their acts. "Who are they to tell us?" he asks. The labor movement, historically, first advocated the policy of *dunam achar dunam* (acre upon acre), of erecting kibbutzim and other settlements in order to establish a Jewish presence in the land. This policy, successful before 1948, was the basis for the continuation of settlement in the areas occupied after the Six-Day War. This has become the issue, more than anything else, around which the dovish left has crystallized its opposition and has achieved whatever fragile unity it possesses.

The ruling Labor Alignment—a kind of Popular Front of Labor social democrats and Mapam, a Marxist party not unlike Allende's Socialist party—has its roots deep in the Zionist and social democratic traditions. The early *halutzim* (pioneers) reacted in their various leftist colorations to the entire spectrum of the European left; their Zionist-socialist vision was qualified depending on whether they favored Tolstoy or Djugashvili, Kautsky or Mehring. They were communards, social democrats, anarchists, and Communists (especially after 1928 when Hashomer Hatza'ir, the base of Mapam, embraced Marxism). This passionate and politically fervent generation sired many feuds, splits, and convergences.[2] The result of these convergences, and of the shrunken influence of the labor parties on the country as a whole, is the Ma'arach (the Alignment), a center-left alliance pushed into dead center by its coalition partners, the lower-middle-class (and anticlerical) Independent Liberals, and the National Religious party (source of what clericalism there is).

Opposition to the government's settlement policy has been voiced in the labor parties too. This opposition has proposed a number of basic points: first, an announced freeze on settlements in the occupied territories and, second, a unilateral recognition of the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination. There has also been, within the Alignment as well as in the opposition left groups, hostility to the growing (officially encouraged) private sector of the economy, with the attendant rise of a "neobourgeoisie" and a large economic and social gap.[3]

Within the Labor party, Arie Lova Eliav, at times during recent years Labor's secretary-general, became a focal point for this "loyal opposition." From the outset of the Alignment, small groups on the left fringes of Mapam could not swallow the pill of being part of the government and therefore taking responsibility for the *status quo*, and consequently drifted away from Mapam. The Mapam majority argued, though with decreasing zeal, that without their moderating influence as junior Alignment partner, Labor would swing way to the right, led by its own right wing.[4]

These extraparliamentary left groups coalesced into the Blue-Red, a Zionist-socialist group. Just before the Yom Kippur War, the Blue-Red formed a two-faction party together with Maki, Israel's non-Zionist, independent Communist party. This new bloc, Moked (Focus), did quite well in the Histadrut elections that preceded the war. The war, and the threat of wholesale gains by the right, limited their vote in the parliamentary elections to one seat, actually a seat and two-thirds.[5]

[2]As well as a more tight-lipped and less colorful generation of descendants. Rabin's parents, for example, were Social Revolutionaries in Russia.

[3]Recent strikes have played into the hands of the right who want the right to strike severely limited and who pretend that their patriotic obligation is to make high profits, which they call "developing the country."

[4]Labor's right wing is usually identified with the ex-Rafi faction of former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and present Defense Minister Shimon Peres. Peres and Dayan—and the ex-Rafi faction—split over the Interim Agreement, with Peres supporting it, and Dayan breaking party ranks to vote against it.

[5]Under Israel's proportional election law, the public votes for a party's entire list. If a party obtains, say, 10 percent of the total vote, it receives 12 of the Knesset's 120 seats. Whatever fractions of a seat a smaller party gets are divided up among the largest parties. Thus, Moked almost

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THE YOM KIPPUR WAR also witnessed the entry into the country's political life of an entire generation of largely middle-class, well educated, native born Israelis. On a national level, this was expressed by the death of David Ben-Gurion and the retirement of Golda Meir, two events symbolizing the passing of an older generation of Labor leaders. The new people, symbolized by Rabin, have a strong belief in the modern, liberal state and in secularism (or, at least, anticlericalism) as an important component of that modernity; in a more efficient bureaucracy; in a more open, democratic, and responsive party, and parliamentary structure.[6]

As to models for the modern state they wish to emulate, there are some who look northward to Scandinavia (i.e., the Protestant Socialist countries where the Communist parties are not strong), and others who gaze westward to Lady Liberty. The latter have moved to a center-right position and, to the extent that they have found a new organizational expression, have grouped themselves around Shinui (Change), a nonparty affair headed by Tel Aviv University Professor of Law Amnon Rubenstein. The former group has spread out and found a new outlet in Shulamit Aloni's Civil Rights movement (CRM). Aloni is a former Labor member of the Knesset (MK), whose frequent clashes with Golda Meir led to her losing her place on the 1973 party ticket. She hastily summoned a coalition of consumerist, electoral reform, and feminist groups and ran on her own ticket.[7] Each of these three tendencies were represented in the top three candidates on the CRM's list and each won, surprising everyone including themselves.

The CRM (or RATZ, after its election line initials), has since merged with some more leftish elements into a new party, Ya'ad (Target). Arie Lova Eliav was the catalyst for bringing together Ya'ad. In January 1975 Eliav began to tell friends that he was planning to leave the Labor party. He is famous for many things in Israel, not least his early advocacy of an Israeli recognition of the Palestinian people's national rights.[8]

Citing "socioideological disagreement," Eliav announced his resignation from the Labor party last February. "I am now setting a new course in my public work with the aim of renewing the labor movement, the Zionist vision, and Israeli society." While advocating that there be a restoration of moral leadership in the country and a return to basic labor Zionist values, he worked one day a week moving beds in a government hospital.

Eliav's resignation forced a political recrystallization of sorts, that is, it was both indicative of a deep shift already under way and a cause for further change. He was aiming for a large political grouping, including the CRM, the leftish elements of the Labor party, Moked, and the Black Panthers—the latter a group of young people from the largely disenfranchised community of North African Jews living in the urban slums.[9] The Panthers are decidedly dovish, although they spend little time talking about foreign policy. The CRM majority and Chug Libun—a dovish Labor-affiliated group of intellectuals and assorted individuals following Eliav—decided to go into a new party. The CRM, which contains many middle-class elements, has consistently opposed a further merger with Moked

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elected its second nominee, but those "extra" votes, together with the "left over" votes of other small parties, went to the Alignment and the Likud.

[6]There are constant proposals to combine various ministries or at least some of their overlapping functions. The recently enacted Ben Shachar tax reform, called "The Reforma," is basically an attempt to eliminate loopholes enjoyed by the professional class and the privileged sectors of the "working class." An interesting example of this antibureaucratic tendency is the current discussion to eliminate costly government subsidies on staple food products in favor of a food stamp program that would benefit *only* the poor. The struggle for more openness within the parties is not limited to the opposition. Younger branch chairmen in the Labor party have used this slogan to express their opposition to a leadership-inspired plan to guarantee 25 percent of the seats in the forthcoming Labor party convention to party leaders and veterans. These men argue instead for elections in the party branches, and some for more rank-and-file labor participation.

[7]The CRM fa led as a consumerist party, but its failure is illustrative of an essential difference between Israel and America. By being a political party and not a nonpartisan organization—a revolutionary idea in this country—they were forced to define stands on the full spectrum of issues affecting Israel. Thus, by being feminist, they alienated more traditional male supporters; by being anticlerical, they have alienated religious consumers and, by being dovish, hawkish consumers who want to purchase safety from Abu Rodeis to Kuneitra.

[8]As Eliav put it to me: "I was saying all this when Rogers was an obscure New York lawyer, and I'm still saying it when Rogers has returned to being an obscure lawyer in New York."

[9]The sympathetic—or even hostile—American reader would be well advised not to confuse this group with the Seale/Newton/Cleaver crowd. As in most cases, Israel has borrowed political language from a very different American context. This is also the case with the universally employed "hawk" and "dove": the similarity in words obscures the political differences.

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("too leftist") and the Black Panthers ("well, there is a social gap, but do we really have to sit with *them* in the same party?"). In this they have been helped by two factors: the historical baggage of the Maki-wing of Moked, and the genuine reluctance on the part of some of the Panthers who do not wish to sit in the same party with well-to-do "white" Jews. These questions are far from resolved; many of the Chug Libun intellectuals, and Eliav and his closest followers, are very close to the leadership circles in Moked, and discussions continue on how to promote closer cooperation.

Moked, in order to do its share in the effort to reunify the left, cut the chain and stopped carrying the burdensome Maki albatross; in a spring convention, Maki dissolved as a separate faction and agreed to a Zionist set of principles for the new, unified Moked.[10] This was the price they had to pay for admission to the arena of larger mergers.

Ya'ad, meanwhile, has struggled to achieve a clearer direction and vocabularly. Its more recent political arrivals are somewhat loath to employ the dominant social democratic vocabularly—too tainted, they feel, by the Establishment's use. The consumer-protection part of the Ya'ad personality runs into conflict with the more leftish elements; consumerism is often (legitimately, not for reactionary purposes) aimed at shoddy craftsmanship or services in the socialized (Histadrut) sector of the economy. In Israel, and in quite a reversal of the traditional view, the liberal middle class sees itself as the class that has inherited the proletariat's role in shaping society.

WHEN THE RABIN GOVERNMENT began to press, in early July, for ratification of the Interim Agreement it had worked out with Kissinger and Sadat, the doves fell into disarray. Those in the Alignment, starting with Labor MKs Abba Eban and Yossi Sarid, pronounced loudly their opposition to the entire method of peace-making the Agreement represented, while almost immediately adding their reluctant support for it. These Laborites and their dovish allies in Mapam began to press Ya'ad and Moked to step into line.

The two dovish parties began an intense series of internal discussions in which much opposition to the Agreement emerged. These discussions, despite their final approval of the Agreement, contradict the right's contention that the entire affair represented a government capitulation, internally to the doves and externally to Washington and Cairo. Basically the following views were offered: (*a*) the Agreement is based on Egyptian and Israeli understandings with and through America, rather than with each other; (*b*) the Agreement—according to which Israel gives up the Gidi and Mitla passes and the Abu Rodeis oil field—gives Israel next to nothing in return. Thus it reestablishes the premise that Israel can be coerced into relinquishing territory for vague assurances made to a third party. Sadat's recent approval of the U.N. majority's breakthrough in understanding the *Judenfrage* hardly reassures even those Israelis who want to believe him when he says all those other, more moderate, things.

This objection must be contrasted with the same critique pronounced by the right, which would be opposed to accepting Egyptian promises (read: political concessions) even if made face-to-face, because they believe the Arabs to be monolithic and unchanging, sometimes the mystical quintessence of eternal anti-Semitism.

Basically, the doves added, the Interim Agreement is (*c*) a step-by-step approach to nowhere, as opposed to an overall peace plan, implemented in stages, which has a total settlement in mind; and (*d*) it ignores the central question of Palestinian national rights, substituting for it the defusing of the Arab world's most powerful country, Egypt.

Here, too, the desire of the left for an "overall settlement" approach must be differentiated from the identically phrased statement of the Likud. The right, through its territorial intransigence and its pessimistic and romantic concept of nationalism, places demands on their agenda that render peacemaking virtually impossible.

In the meantime, Gush Emonim forced everyone's hand. Because they "seized the day" in the streets, it became imperative to "oppose the opposition." When debating how to cast its four Knesset votes, the national council of Ya'ad heard many speakers—in the end representing the majority—denounce Gush Emonim and claim that the orthodox demonstrators had precluded any other kind of opposition to the Agreement. Others, including the four Knesset members, argued for an abstention on the government motion in order to begin to create a third force, a peace camp. Knesset member Marcia Freidman insisted that there was little difference between the government and the right, and that

[10]Before the merger, Maki agreed to see "progressive" as well as "reactionary" elements in the Zionist movement. The Zionist leadership of Moked insisted that the party see itself as being within the Zionist movement and not just in alliance with "progressive" Zionists.

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claim, General (Res.) Mati Peled added, was the *sine qua non* for being in opposition.

Two days later, however, Moked voted overwhelmingly to support the government. Having waited to see what Ya'ad would decide, they were forced to choose not only between the above-mentioned viewpoints, but also between voting with Rabin or abstaining with Rakah, the pro-Soviet, Arab nationalist-Communist party. This is not the political community they wish to create.

It would be wise to describe the mood at the time, in order to understand the pressures on the doves. Labor party leaders were openly using the word "fascism" to describe the right opposition in the streets, and one even compared Ya'ad's reluctance to support the Agreement with the kind of left factional in-fighting that contributed to the rise of Hitler. A demonstration of the kibbutz movement, called for the day of the vote, was not in support of the Agreement but in support of the *government's right to make the Agreement*, that is, of parliamentarism. It was genuinely feared that the right might "peacefully storm" the Knesset and not permit it to ratify the accord.

HAVING FEINTED to the left by agreeing to be flexible in Sinai (according to the conventional wisdom), the government must now be firm elsewhere. It has received help, unexpectedly, from the National Religious party. The NRP's Minister of Welfare Hazani died a few months ago. The question of his succession is now being resolved as I write. The head of the Young Guard faction, Zvulun Hammer, has been nominated to replace Hazani. Hammer and the Young Guard have very close ties with Gush Emonim and probably (speculation is rife) aid in their financing. Thus, as Shulamit Aloni has pointed out, the government is turning into a National Unity coalition without bringing in the Likud. At any rate, the Golan Heights presents problems that the Sinai doesn't, and it will be much harder to arrive at an interim agreement with Assad.

The left continues to assert that two crucial factors must be brought onto the stage: the Russians and the Palestinians. And they continue to hope that the hostile rhetoric that still emanates from PLO circles—the change from "throw them into the sea" to "a secular democratic state" to a "Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip"—is evidence of a shift in understanding the nature of the Jewish presence in Israel on the part of PLO intellectuals.

Mati Peled has argued that Israel can either accelerate or retard the process of moderation that is unfolding in the Arab world. Further Israeli settlement in the occupied territories hardly constitutes encouragement to Arab moderates. The recent moves by Defense Minister Peres (who broke with his long-time mentor, Moshe Dayan, over the Agreement) to encourage a kind of home rule on the West Bank may be too little, too late.

The vote in the U.N. has reminded many here that not everything is in our hands to decide. To find the balance between what Israel itself can control and what she can be forced into doing remains the central task of Israeli statecraft.

The left continues to insist on a national debate to define, roughly, what the country is prepared to give back in return for what. The fact that Labor has yet to undertake such a debate, with the excuse that Israel must not tip its hand in advance, is an example of the dead-center the government occupies.

It is the crucial task of the doves—those within the Alignment and those in the opposition—to insure that this debate takes place intelligently. □

Debunking Food Stamp Myths

"Simon Myth No. 1—Recently, Treasury Secy. Simon, a millionaire bond salesman from Wall Street, charged that the 'food stamp program began as a small $14 million experiment in 1962' and 'by 1976, it will cost $6.6 billion—a 47,000 percent increase.'

"The Facts—Mr. Simon failed to mention that in 1962, according to the Department of Agriculture, the food stamp program was experimental and covered only eight counties. Some 7.4 million Americans were being fed under the government's surplus commodity distribution program, and Mr. Simon forgot to include the cost of this program. The Simon estimate of 1976 food stamp costs is considered by USDA an exaggeration of nearly $1 billion.

"Simon Myth No. 2—Mr. Simon said that 'the food stamp program is a well-known haven for chiselers and ripoff artists.'

"The Facts—The USDA found fraud to have been committed by only 8/100ths of 1 percent of food stamp households in 1974.

"Simon Myth No. 3—Mr. Simon declared that 'only a few weeks ago a national magazine advertised a booklet that told people how to obtain food stamps even if they earned as much as $16,000 a year.'

"The Facts—USDA has asked the Federal Trade Commission to consider bringing charges of deceptive and false advertising against the ad's sponsor."

—*AFL–CIO* PRESIDENT GEORGE MEANY □

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David M. Muchnick

Death Warrant for the Cities?

The National Urban Policy

Running against New York has emerged as a Ford administration campaign strategy, symbolizing middle-American contempt for the Eastern Establishment and spendthrift politicians, as well as central cities, blacks, and welfare recipients. The presidential demand for and surveillance of municipal belt-tightening appeal to conservative budget-balancers and corporate borrowers. Federal support for southern and southwestern urbanization suits the Republican "southern strategy" and regional banks. These policies, together, have imposed a heavy share of the burden for the recession, uncertain recovery, and restructuring of American life-styles and expectations on northern and eastern central-city residents and workers. And now they threaten to sever traditional Democratic party loyalties. The new breed of fiscally conservative Democratic governors and mayors, who are dependent on Washington and private banks for financing, have been forced to levy new taxes, cut popular services, and break the municipal labor unions. New York's unions are expected to make up their city's budget shortage by accepting massive layoffs and a wage freeze, by investing their pension funds in risky bond issues, and by renegotiating their pension benefits. In 1976, there may be sufficient disenchantment with *all* politicians for many traditional and young Democrats to stay home in November and deny their party's presidential candidate many habitual votes. Shades of 1968!

Presidential politics are a necessary but insufficient explanation of the city's plight. As a matter of policy, long before Jerry Ford's presidential fate depended on it, the White House decided that America's immediate future no longer resides in her older central cities in the North and the East.

This policy not only reveals the transparency of the Administration's hardening-softening line on New York's fiscal crisis; it also dispels the major anomaly in current political posturing—the presidential golf partner of U.S. industries and multinational corporations campaigning as prairie populist, defending America's working people against the "large investors and big banks" who "bankrolled New York City's policies for so long."

What this policy is, however, has never been "perfectly clear." Law and order, the new federalism, benign neglect and impoundments have been misinterpreted by liberal critics as the absence of domestic vision. Economic and diplomatic crisis-management has seemed to preoccupy Washington. Nor is there a strong personality with whom to identify a coherent program—there is no domestic Kissinger. Instead, responsibility has rested with dispersed and unglamorous operatives, primarily in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Domestic Council. Many White House outsiders, special interests, congressional staff, and local officials still doubt the existence of a national urban policy. So far, because of this uncertainty and the narrow, partisan explanations of what happened in New York, the opposition has failed to seriously confront the Administration.

Three programs reveal the contours of executive thinking and the new limits of American democracy: community development, housing assistance, and welfare reform.

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These three programs, involving upward of $50 billion annually in federal outlays and income tax subsidies, embody a centrally determined, not-so-neglectful national urban policy. This policy limits federal investment in metropolitan social needs, shifts development priorities in favor of growing cities and suburbs (especially in the South and Southwest), and hampers the emergence of a political coalition able to challenge these decisions with alternative national goals. The Administration's stand on New York City's financial catastrophe not only follows this policy but strengthens it.

The Community Development Revenue Sharing program is a keystone of the Administration's national urban policy and new federalism. It was introduced by President Nixon in March 1973 and signed into law by President Ford only 13 days after he assumed office. It provides relatively unrestricted grants for the development of public facilities to states and so-called metropolitan cities—to each central city, each suburban city of more than 50,000 people, and to about 70 urban counties in the country's 243 metropolitan areas. As a result, a city's planning and development process has gained almost complete administrative discretion and nearly total freedom from federal red tape and supervision. Said President Nixon (in a radio message on March 4, 1973), "The time has come to reject the patronizing notion that federal planners, peering over the point of a pencil in Washington, can guide your lives better than you can." Presidential rhetoric is deceptive.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) never surrendered power to dictate the amount and regional allocation of federal investment in local communities. Their determination of the program's $2.3 billion first-year level ignored not only inflation and the advice of the U.S. Conference of Mayors but also a grass-roots survey of over 200 communities that estimated a national need for $5.5 billion in fiscal 1974 alone. OMB and HUD have shifted federal capital away from the redevelopment of older, eastern and northern industrial central cities in favor of the development of growing, prosperous suburbs and cities, especially in the South and the Southwest.

Excepting New York and Chicago (which, because of their sheer size, will fare better financially than they have in the past), the next 17 biggest central cities in the North and the East eventually will lose an estimated $168 million yearly, compared to their combined average yearly receipts between 1968 and 1972 under previous programs. From a five-year average of $378 million, their funding will be sliced almost in half, to $210 million yearly in fiscal 1980. Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Boston, and Cincinnati will lose over $97 million annually among them. By contrast, Houston, Dallas, Memphis, New Orleans, Phoenix, Jacksonville, Fort Worth, Miami, El Paso, and Birmingham together will gain over $71 million annually. Although ten other large southern and southwestern cities will suffer a 32 percent cut by fiscal 1980, these cities will enjoy a 140 percent increase, and the total grants for these 20 cities will rise to $211 million.

To finish the illustration, Massachusetts' 14 central cities will lose $46 million annually by fiscal 1980, while aid for its suburbs and rural areas will increase by $15 million and $1 million respectively—a net annual statewide loss of $30 million. Alabama's 18 central cities will gain $5.4 million annually, while funding for its suburbs and rural areas will increase by $23 million and $6 million respectively—a net annual statewide increase of $34 million. Nationwide, central cities will lose $276 million annually by 1980, while federal investment in suburbs and rural areas will increase by $757 million and $291 million respectively.[1]

[1]Fiscal 1980 estimates use the $3 billion appropriation projected by the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, *Directory of Recipients: Housing and Community Development Act of 1974*, 93rd Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1974).

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This regional distribution occurs because all metropolitan cities are "entitled" for the first time to funds as a matter of right. A technical mechanism was needed to provide an automatic basis for dividing the national pie. Population, poverty, and overcrowded housing are three relevant census characteristics of all of these localities and so provide the national data base for the allocation formula. The older central cities dispute the validity of these factors as measures of local needs. They prefer more direct indicators, such as the age or deterioration of an area's physical housing stock or a community's past redevelopment efforts. Local officials of these older central cities argue that the consequences of universal entitlement on the basis of population result in the loss of dollars by cities with declining populations, in the provision of scarce funds to wealthy communities with no poor and no overcrowding, and in the financial, administrative, and political reinforcement of those suburbs that deny residential and occupational opportunities to lower-income workers, poor people, and minorities. Both the Nixon and the Ford administrations have rejected these objections as matters of national development planning, rationalized budget procedure, and local self-determination.

The limit on metropolitan investment and the shift in regional priorities express the fear of a capital shortage and the decision to invest federal money where it will be "profitable" in the future. That is, scarce public capital should subsidize private economic and demographic growth in a mutually supportive way rather than be wasted in decaying centers already abandoned by business and the middle class. As early as 1972, former HUD Secretary Romney warned the annual convention of the nation's Mortgage Bankers Association that "America faces investment decisions more critical—more consequential—than at any previous time in our history. They will have a direct impact on money and credit for housing and community development." In addition to capital for energy and environmental needs and economic expansion, he advised

> population migration, despite decreasing population growth, is forcing major new investment in housing, retailing, superhighways, water and waste disposal systems, hospitals, schools and all the rest of the community physical structure—but now in more dispersed geographical areas—a dispersal that raises the per capita cost of facilities.

Among the trends, Romney noted, were not only the apparent stabilization of growth, and possible decline, in the New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles/Long Beach metropolitan areas, but also interregional migrations from north to south, from east to west; from hinterland to coastline; from smaller metropolitan areas to those between 1 million and 2 million —the "dynamic growth centers of the next several decades."

> One thing is clear [he cautioned], these population shifts stimulate and also force major new investment in growing areas—and endanger previous investments in declining areas. ... We must avoid at all costs 100 billion dollar public and private investment mistakes. For we cannot afford gigantic waste in any area. The pressure and demands on our economy in the next decade will not permit such a luxury.

At the national level, universal entitlement according to an objective formula rationalizes previous federal funding practices. It weakens the power of senior congresspeople to influence commitments to particular localities. It automatically provides funds to many cities that for political, ideological, or other reasons stayed away from the earlier grant programs, and it reduces the significance of "grantsmanship" by enterprising municipalities. The Domestic Council argues that none of these factors is reasonably related to a distribution on the basis of need, and that their control is necessary to avoid waste and fiscal irresponsibility. One consequence is the reduction suffered by most northern and eastern central cities.

Another effect is more curious—the increased aid anticipated by New York City under this particular program, from $101 million the first year to $157 million by fiscal year 1978. Previously, the city had been "under-

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funded'' relative to any measure of need because of longstanding congressional and executive hostility to meeting what are thought to be the city's unique problems. New York appears to place unlimited demands on the Treasury, and mid-American congresspeople and executive decision-makers are unwilling to tax their constituents or distort their priorities to pay for the city's troubles. Universal allocation by formula recognizes New York's needs somewhat less arbitrarily and constrains the provincial hostility a bit by providing funds to all localities. The city remains starkly underfunded, however, relative to its own determination of needs—an estimated $240 million for community development in the first year alone. As recent events testify, the antagonism persists whenever the city's needs are made to appear special.

At the metropolitan level, fiscal rationalization has had to be imposed because of the failure of the reform movements for metropolitan government and planning. Metropolitan agencies were to have coordinated community development activities of central cities and suburbs, ending the inflationary pressures of waste, duplication, and unnecessary spending. But traditions of localism proved too strong, and the Administration's fiscal planners had to act. Their technique is straightforward. After OMB determines the national funding level, the community-development allocation formula makes its first apportionment to each census-defined metropolitan area. Only then are the central city and each suburb alloted their shares from the metropolitan pot to use as they see fit. From a federal budget perspective, the simple step of allocating the first sum to the statistical metropolitan area transcends local boundaries and rationalizes the *aggregate* level of spending in each metropolis.

Because the community development program implements a national development policy and rationalizes the fiscal planning process, the details of local administration are essentially irrelevant to Washington. Therefore, they can be delegated to municipalities under the rhetoric of returning power to local communities. As Ford's Deputy OMB Director Paul O'Neill put it, ''[ours is] a national perspective of what the Federal role is, what is happening in the country, what the other levels of government are doing, what the private institutions are doing and where our legislative thrust should be.''[2]

Housing is the second element of the national urban policy. In January 1973, the White House unilaterally suspended the country's four subsidized housing programs. The *Washington Post* subsequently revealed government memos indicating the cut-off was for fiscal, not programmatic reasons. ''We had to save a half-billion dollars,'' said Nixon HUD Secretary and Ford OMB Director James Lynn.[3] Concerned about the federal deficit's inflationary consequences, the budget planners slashed the $500 million programs as part of a $10 billion domestic cut in fiscal year 1974, and, as O'Neill later testified, to avoid being locked into a 40-year obligation for over $17 billion.[4]

Nine months later, President Nixon outlined the Administration's thinking on housing—continued support for private homeownership, termination of production subsidies for low- and moderate-income housing, and initiation of housing allowances, starting first with the elderly poor. He proposed an interim subsidized construction program (now known as Section 8) to be terminated on December 31, 1975, after which direct-cash assistance would become the nation's *exclusive* assistance policy. (In the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act, Congress refused to ratify the cessation, insisting first on a feasibility report on allowances *early in 1976*. The ''interim'' program is in effect, and local communities fear to protest the switch to allow-

[2]Quoted in John Herbers, ''The Other Presidency,'' *New York Times Magazine*, March 3, 1974, p. 36.

[3]Susanna McBee, ''Subsidized Housing Frozen Before Justification by H.U.D.,'' *Washington Post*, Sunday, December 3, 1973, p. 1.

[4]U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *Hearings on the Nomination of Paul O'Neill*, November 20, 1974, p. 66.

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ances too strongly lest their applications for subsidies be adversely affected.)

The support for homeownership follows the historic thrust of U.S. housing policy—accounting for about $10.2 billion of the almost $15.3 billion in direct expenditures and tax revenues foregone by the federal government for housing in 1972—but now it takes on an additional dimension. This policy will underwrite the residential and industrial development of the rapidly urbanizing South and Southwest. In the 70s, 17 southern and southwestern cities are projected to grow by more than a third, and most smaller southern cities by nearly 20 percent. (Only four northern and eastern metropolitan areas are expected to increase by a third).[5] In 1972, two out of every three new private homes in the country were built in the South and West, and the South and Southwest accounted for more than 50 percent of all federally insured mortgages on new dwellings. The southern and southwestern real estate industry's contribution to the GNP reached more than $41.6 billion in 1971, providing nearly 2 million jobs in the nonagricultural sector.[6]

In the North and the East, this policy will continue to provide subsidies for suburban homeowners and secure transfers of ownership in the existing stock of private homes. More than nine out of ten federally insured mortgages in the northeast in 1972 covered such transactions, compared to 75 percent nationally. In that year, New England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania accounted for only 5 percent of the FHA-insured new homes. Only on the fringes of metropolitan areas are new federally insured units likely to be built. Elsewhere in the metropolis, the higher costs of land, construction, and financing have pushed prices of new single-family dwellings to the limits of federal insurance ceilings, and, more important, beyond the financial reach of more than four out of five American families.

Consequently, access to established communities will be crucial, and competition for reasonably priced housing in better neighborhoods should intensify. Because of higher costs, pressures for new apartment complexes and lower-quality homes on less land should continue. Resistance can be expected not only from homeowners in wealthy suburbs but also from moderate-income groups who, feeling trapped in their present neighborhoods, will seek to protect themselves from encroachment by lower-class and minority people.

In its shift to housing allowances, the Administration provides support for the strategy of residential exclusion. The termination of production subsidies eliminates the most direct method for supplying low- and moderate-income housing in the better parts of the metropolis. It also circumvents the legal requirements that federally subsidized developments be located on sites fostering integration. No longer should residents of exclusively white or wealthy communities have to fear federal housing programs—notwithstanding HUD claims that allowances will achieve its "first" urban policy goal, "a fairer and more even distribution across the metropolitan area of the central city's basic social and economic problem . . . the artificial concentrations in the city's core of low-income populations."[7]

Allowances represent a significant technical innovation. Instead of subsidizing new production, Washington would add to its system of "invisible" supports for the residential market an income supplement for low-income elderly households, enabling them to pay the costs demanded by the private sector. The change appeals to conservatives because, in the words of HUD Deputy Assistant Secretary William Lilley, III,

> We have accepted Banfield's counsel to let nature take its course. We have accepted the ulti-

[5]Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, *America's Housing Needs: 1970 to 1980*, pp. 3–6 ff. and Exhibit 3–1.

[6]Norman B. Ture, Inc., *Real Estate in the U.S. Economy*, report for the National Realty Committee, Inc., tables XVII, XX, XXV, XXVIII.

[7]William Lilley III, H.U.D. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Development, "Toward a Rational Housing Policy," speech delivered at the 1973 Congress of Cities, San Juan, Puerto Rico, December 3, 1973.

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> mate futility of state-administered allocation decisions ... in favor of a strategy that emphasizes *free choice* and promises to achieve the goal of a decent home in a suitable living environment for all, not by crashing through the barriers that stand in the way but by subverting them through the *essentially peaceful* bargaining of the marketplace.[8]

This technique receives support from many housing experts who stress the need for the maintenance of existing housing—not for new construction—in older cities with decreasing population and increasing abandonment.

The Administration's version most likely will curtail its residential investment in declining areas, maintain residential segregation, and provide a strategic link with national welfare reform. For fiscal reasons, HUD and OMB apparently are planning a low-cost program that will provide a small allowance payment to a limited class of eligibles, the elderly poor. The Nixon administration criticized the budgetary impact of the production subsidy programs whose annual costs reached slightly over $2 billion in 1973. By contrast, housing experts estimate costs between $5 and $10 billion for alternative allowance programs covering all families with incomes below $5,000, $7,000, or $10,000. Restricting the plan to the elderly with incomes below $7,500 (not just the elderly poor) would still require an estimated $3.7 billion to $4.8 billion.[9]

Since the White House has little enthusiasm for spending a lot of money, and since most of the country does not need the deep subsidies that New York and a few other big cities do, the eventual program is unlikely to provide payments high enough to increase the supply of low- and moderate-income housing in high-cost metropolitan areas. Rehabilitation and better maintenance are also unlikely because individual allowance recipients will have little bargaining power, especially in tight rental markets. Rather, there will be more dollars chasing existing low-rent units and, therefore, an increase in rents. Whether this rise will at least stem abandonment in the short term is problematic; but collective pressures for tenants' unions, rent control, code enforcement, building maintenance, and the legalization of rent strikes seem necessary to do much more.

The priority on the elderly poor will promote neither residential improvements nor mobility. The elderly poor are probably the least mobile group in the metropolis for numerous reasons unaffected by rent supplements. Many of them live in fear or passivity and may be unable to bargain with their landlords for repairs. Or, in this inflationary period, they may be forced to neglect their desires for home improvements and have to use their increased buying power for food and other essentials. A substantial increase in the number of eligibles and the amount of payments is unlikely. Not only the budget but politics too would work against it.

Were the allowance program extended for all the poor, opposition would come from the approximately 11 million families, above the poverty line but below the income level necessary to purchase a new home, who would be omitted from the Administration's housing policy. If the extension were large enough to permit all the poor residential mobility, the impact would fall on this group, especially those somewhat above the allowance eligibility level, e.g., with incomes between $5,000 and $10,000.[10] Since the allowance recipients could only afford their housing, since the competition would raise costs, and since they have lost the chance for homeownership to inflation, they will be forced to protect their homes from potential competition by "mobile" allowance recipients. One tack would be to limit the program. The Administration would be sensitive to this pressure—judging from then HUD

[8] *Ibid.*, (italics in original).

[9] See, e.g., General Accounting Office, *Observations on Housing Allowances and the Experimental Allowances Program* (Document B-171630, March 28, 1974, Washington, D.C.); Henry Aaron, *Shelter and Subsidies* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1972), pp. 168–70.

[10] See Ira Lowry, "Housing Assistance for Low-Income Families: A Fresh Approach," in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, *Papers Submitted to Subcommittee on Housing Panels on Housing Production, Housing Demand, and Developing a Suitable Living Environment*, 92nd Congress, First session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).

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Secretary (now OMB Director) Lynn's 1974 refusal to reactivate the subsidized homeownership program because middle-income groups would not look favorably on subsidies to modest-income homebuyers when they could not get mortgage money and housing.[11]

Should the political and budgetary constraints fail, there could be a final irony—further metropolitan segregation. Allowances would enable many white recipients to flee the stable, integrated central city neighborhoods in which they are now "trapped" by low incomes. But these allowances would not necessarily foster black migration into white communities. Providing blacks with equal residential purchasing power is itself insufficient to achieve integration.[12] For allowances to do so would require the uncustomarily strict enforcement of open housing laws; and this, as a matter of state and local politics, is improbable.

Since allowances provide neither residential investment nor mobility, what do they offer the elderly poor? The answer is income maintenance. In New York, for example, only 6 percent of the city's more than 2 million rental units are occupied by potential allowance recipients, and therefore the impact on the housing stock would be marginal. But, in human terms, 132,000 elderly poor households—more than a third of the city's impoverished renters—would receive aid. According to economist George Sternlieb, the city's elderly have "largely been dependent upon the protection of the old rent control law and their relative immobility to keep down housing costs."[13] Yet, in 1970, more than two out of every five of the city's elderly paid over 25 percent of their incomes for rent; fewer than three out of ten paid less than 20 percent. Therefore, the elderly poor will probably not move even with allowances, and the payments should provide some relief for those most oppressed by rising housing costs. Nor is this scenario unique to cities with rent control. In most areas, continued occupancy of their present dwellings may be the elderly poor's best protection against inflation. Adding the social reasons for the elderly's stability suggests that income maintenance will be the human contribution of housing allowances.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the allowance strategy provides an important link to national income maintenance; the coordination of these programs would lessen objections to welfare reform. Conservatives opposed the Nixon-Moynihan Family Assistance Plan (FAP), warning that

> a uniform minimum national income guarantee that might do relatively minor harm in California or the northeast would be so high compared with prevailing incomes in the deep south as to tempt a third or more of the population to quit their jobs and climb aboard the welfare wagon. . . . A uniform minimum welfare handout, in a nation with divergencies of up to 138 percent in median family incomes among the states, would create far more serious problems than any it might solve.[14]

One suggested compromise was a federal minimum that took into account regional variations in the cost of living. Housing allowances could effect this compromise because, on a regional basis, the cost of housing varies most of all of life's necessities and provides an index for differential payments. Tying a variable housing allowance to a relatively low national minimum income could provide the necessary device for conciliation.

Overcoming southern conservative opposition is critical since it is the legacy of the "old," rural, agricultural South. National income maintenance, by contrast, represents the future of the "new," urban, industrial South and Southwest. The federal government and national corporations now have made the decision in favor of urban industrialism and its ancillary investments in human resources and

[11]Housing Affairs Letter, May 17, 1974, p. 2.

[12]See, e.g., U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Homeownership for Lower Income Families* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971).

[13]George Sternlieb, *Housing and People in New York City* (City of New York Housing and Development Administration, Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance, January, 1973), p. 209–10.

[14]Henry Hazlitt, "Compounding the Welfare Mess," *National Review*, February 24, 1970, p. 205.

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welfare supports. As a 1967 report for the Twentieth Century Fund concluded,

> Large public investments, both from within and from without the region, will be needed for some time, if the south is to make its full contribution to national progress. Public investments [in manpower training, employment counseling, education, housing, health care, and income supplements] will yield returns to the nation as a whole and to the south much higher than those commonly earned in many private endeavors. We can only hope that the traditional values and beliefs of southern people have changed sufficiently in recent years to permit them and their political leaders to join wholeheartedly in such large and continuing national efforts to develop the south's full potential.[15]

Accordingly, the Ford administration's Income Supplement Program (ISP)—as was its predecessor, Nixon's and Moynihan's FAP—is a critical element of the national urban policy. In October 1974 it commanded wide backing; former HEW Secretary and OMB Director Weinberger, OMB's Lynn and O'Neill, and the Labor and Treasury secretaries had expressed support.[16] (Since then, there has been little public comment on ISP by the Administration. As the election day approaches, they seem to have put it aside lest they offend conservative and middle-American Reagan sympathizers before the convention; if the nomination is secured, they may let sleeping dogs lie, remembering McGovern's ill-fated welfare scheme.)

The income supplement proposal would provide $21.6 billion worth of income supports to 42.2 million Americans.[17] Since it would replace three of the largest welfare programs—Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Food Stamps, and Supplementary Security Income—it would add only $3.3 billion in new federal outlays in the first proposed year of operation, 1978. It would give a guaranteed minimum income to every low-income American citizen including, for the first time, working-poor fathers. The basic benefits for a family of four without any income would be $3,600. The amount would decline as a family's earnings increased until, at an earned income of $7,200, the family would receive no supplement. ISP would establish a modern welfare system in the 20 states that pay an AFDC family of four less than its basic benefit; of these, 16 states are southern and southwestern.

ISP—as did FAP for the first time—would provide benefits to rural male laborers who are low-paid but working at the top of their skill levels. According to an Urban Institute paper, more than half of the working-poor fathers eligible for FAP worked full time and full year, and nearly nine out of ten full time for part of the year; over 60 percent lived in rural areas, only 20 percent in central urban areas; 50 percent lived in the South; 72 percent were white; 60 percent had three or more children, and almost 29 percent had five or more; 52 percent had less than a grammar school education. "All of this suggests," the author concluded, "that most of these men are probably working at about as high a productive level as their capabilities and any reasonable amount of manpower investment will allow."[18]

ISP support for male rural laborers is crucial for the orderly development of southern and southwestern cities. On the one hand, an influx of low-skilled rural workers that exceeds the employment opportunities available in these centers could threaten political unrest.

National income maintenance could lessen the possibilities of migration. It would reduce the financial pressure on rural labor brought on by continuing mechanization or a major dislocation in the agricultural sector, and it would

[15] E. Maddox, *et al.*, *The Advancing South: Manpower Prospects and Problems* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1967), pp. 216–17.

[16] J. K. Iglehart, "Welfare Report/H.E.W. Wants Welfare Programs Replaced by Negative Income Tax," *National Journal*, October 19, 1974, pp. 1559ff.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] J. T. Allen, "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Welfare Reform," Urban Institute paper, January 1972; reprinted in U.S. Senate, "What should be the role of the federal government in extending public assistance to all Americans living in poverty?" U.S. Senate Doc. No. 93–12, 93rd Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 23.

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lessen the pulling power of higher urban wages by subsidizing life in more "comfortable" rural areas. (Consequently, its underwriting of rural wages would stabilize the agricultural labor force for agribusiness.) On the other hand, these rural male migrants would probably lack the qualifications to obtain better jobs since they are working at the peak of their capabilities. Their alternative would be welfare. Without the proposed reforms, this could require a man to desert his family and lead, according to the Moynihan perspective, to family breakdown and the ancillary social problems that would plague the new cities.

In the North and East, the federal assumption of state welfare costs up to the national payment level would relieve some pressure from state and local treasuries. Also, it is argued, the migration of poor people from regions with archaic welfare systems might abate, and reverse migration might even begin. Poor whites and blacks might leave the slums and ghettos of the industrial cities for the more pleasant environment, albeit lesser benefits, of southern and southwestern states. This argument, however, is probably rhetoric. Its premise—that the poor migrate in search of welfare—is disputed as a "welfare myth."

Nonetheless, for poor people in the North and the East the reforms are of dubious benefit since state welfare levels usually exceed the proposed federal standard; indeed, many may even have to bear the cost of developing a new system. According to an Institute for Research on Poverty comment on a HEW study paper,

> The Administration is not likely to propose, nor is Congress likely to pass, a program that leaves no beneficiary less well off. What is more likely is that a new universal program would provide more generous benefits to many of the poor, particularly the working poor, than they are now receiving, but less generous benefits than they are now receiving to other poor groups, particularly aid to families with dependent children beneficiaries in the high-benefit states.[19]

[19]I. Garfinkel, "Toward an Effective Income Support System: An Overview Paper," in Barth, *et al.*, *Toward an Effective Income Support System: Problems, Prospects and Choices*, H. E. W. staff paper (Madison: Institute for Research on Poverty, 1974), p. 162.

A housing allowance tied to the high living costs in these areas would be a useful supplement to limit the political opposition and human suffering induced by an inadequate income maintenance plan.

In sum, reflecting fears of inflation and a capital shortage, the national urban policy underinvests in the country's metropolitan development and redirects its limited investment priorities in favor of suburban, southern, and southwestern growth. The President's position on New York's financial dilemma extends this policy.

New York's fiscal crisis has given the White House the opportunity to force a reduction in the spending and capital investment of state and local governments and a curtailment of the "diseased" borrowing practices that sent the nationwide state and local debt over $200 billion in 1975 and threaten to drain off scarce capital in the near future. The President's preference for bankruptcy and a subsequent emergency loan to the city—the "Drop Dead" message to New York and "every other city that follows the tragic example of our largest city"—left the municipal bond market uptight, uncertain, and closed to all but the most prosperous or fiscally conservative cities. Given the federally reinforced strictures on the public fisc, higher interest rates, and marketing difficulties, most cities face hard decisions on critical services and projects; northern and eastern central cities with declining populations and economies, the hardest.

In New York, according to the President, the Administration's "firm" position hastened the state and city action that default and bankruptcy would otherwise have necessitated: raising additional revenues from taxes and pension-fund loans, restructuring the city's short-term debt, refinancing the city's pension plans, and cutting hundreds of millions more from state and city budgets. After these "concrete actions" were taken, the President softened only on the timing of federal aid, offering $2.3 billion in short-term, seasonal loans under "stringent conditions" and Treasury Secretary Simon's continuing surveillance in order to

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avert default and maintain essential services during the next two-and-a-half years. The basic objectives had been accomplished.

The foundations of the national urban policy and the White House's tightfistedness on New York rest not on a particular presidential incumbency but on an increasingly unquestioned, neoconservative vision of America's future and the role its leaders should play in planning the nation's future. Amid the growing concern about a "debt economy" and a capital shortage, Treasury Secretary Simon has emerged, according to *Business Week*, as "Washington's No. 1 Capital Gap Crusader," and the capital demands of private economic expansion, independent energy production, and military modernization have downgraded the priority on metropolitan development and social needs. Moreover, within the new limits on metropolitan investment, the Administrations' support for urban, industrial growth in the South and Southwest has wide backing among economists, corporate interests, Cabinet departments, and the Presidential Commission on Population Growth. Arguably, it will alleviate the pressures of migration on northern ghettos, provide urban and rural southerners with opportunities for a decent income in a pleasant environment, and avoid the uncontrolled and wasteful growth characteristic of the northern metropolis. (Whether it can be achieved is another question.) Therefore, given the dictates of national economic, political, and social realities, the declining northern and eastern central cities must accept their fate, reduce their standards of living, lower their "swollen expectations"—as *Time* labeled New York's—and live within their newly "shrunken means." They are not to question the national and international forces that have shrunk their means; they are but to do *and* die.

Underlying this new urban realism, furthermore, is a particular conception of the past decade's urban crisis. Ignoring the widening inequalities between central city and suburban life, the Nixon and Ford administrations declared the 1960s urban crisis over because the explosive features of that period had disappeared. The perspective is Edward Banfield's.[20]

> Most of the "problems" that are generally supposed to constitute "the urban crisis" could not conceivably lead to disaster [Banfield wrote in 1968]. They are—some of them—important in the sense that a bad cold is important, but they are not serious in the sense a cancer is serious. They have to do with comfort, convenience, amenity and business advantage, all of which are important, but they do not affect either the essential welfare of individuals or what may be called the good health of the society. ... One problem that is both serious and unique to the large cities is the existence of huge enclosures of people (many, but not all of them, Negro) of low skill, low income, and low status. ... [T]he existence of huge enclaves of people who are in some degree alienated from it constitutes a kind of hazard not only to the present peace and safety but also to the long-run health of the society. ... Unlike those who live on farms and in small towns, disaffected people who live in huge enclaves may develop a collective consciousness and sense of identity. ... In the shortrun, however, they represent a threat to peace and order. ... This political danger in the presence of great concentrations of people who feel little attachment to the society has long been regarded by some as *the* serious problems of the cities—the one problem that might conceivably produce a disaster that would destroy the quality of the society.[21]

If it contains this political danger, the national urban policy need not pay the price for *all* cities to be comfortable, convenient, amenable, and economically advantageous. If it arrests the cancer, it need not treat the fatal complications of pneumonia.

Finally, the national urban policy enacts the administrative structure that enables the White House to fulfill its world role and frees the president for the personal triumphs of international diplomacy. As Melvin Laird and Daniel Patrick Moynihan once argued,

[20] In his 1973 speech, Lilley named Banfield, Moynihan, and Jay Forrester as setting the "intellectual framework which, necessarily, must define the present discussion of future policy options."

[21] E. Banfield, *The Unheavenly City* (1968), pp. 6; 12–13.

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> The biggest problem of running the nation from Washington is that the real business of Washington in our age is pretty much to run the world. An American national government in this age will always give priority to foreign affairs. A system has to be developed, therefore, under which domestic programs go forward regardless of what international crisis is preoccupying Washington at the moment.[22]

Within the budget priorities of this global mission, new federalism's techniques of revenue sharing and income supplements delegate administrative discretion and market choices to state and local governments and individuals, freeing the federal executive from the time, cost, and political conflicts of domestic details. They do not resolve the social, economic, and political conflicts of metropolitan development; but they seek to insulate Washington from direct involvement. Following new federalism's decentralist rationale, therefore, President Ford and Secretary Simon repeatedly labeled New York's and any city's financial distress a local responsibility, avoiding any direct national accountability until, interestingly enough, a short time after West European leaders expressed their fears of the international effects of default.

Whether or not new federalism's administrative delegation will revive democratic participation in local development conflicts remains to be seen in most cities. But its response to the fiscal crisis has hastened the death of political democracy in New York, and, nationwide, it has not increased the public's right to participate in national decision-making. For, cloaked in the ideology of restoring power to local communities and freedom of choice to individuals, new federalism rationalizes and legitimizes the centralized political power and economic planning that produced the national urban policy and the fiscal quarantine on New York City. New federalism is Tenth Amendment federalism turned upside down: all effective power not specifically delegated to states and localities is reserved by Washington.

[22]M. Laird, "The Case for Revenue Sharing," in Laird, *Republican Papers*, pp. 63, 73; quoted in D. P. Moynihan, *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income*, p. 207.

What then is necessary for change? Once upon a time, municipal default and bankruptcy appeared to be the ultimate mayoral weapon to force Washington to provide more aid to the cities, assuming major banks and private investors pressed for protection of their holdings. But the White House's reaction to New York indicates otherwise, using default to extend the national urban policy. As vital as its predefault loans and the liberals' predefault loan guarantees are for the uninterrupted provision of essential services and the ongoing administration of New York city and state governments, their enactment would not change it. Even the loan guarantees were conditioned on state tax increases, local budget cuts, restructuring of the city's debt, and renegotiation of municipal employees' wages and pensions—all under the monitoring of a nonelected board of federal officials. No proposal challenged federal disinvestment from the central cities. No proposal would soothe the municipal bond market sufficiently to empower political democracy in New York and other troubled cities to challenge the national political and economic forces of decline.

Central city riots may break out again, but, as with bankruptcy, the White House can accommodate them. Rioting would not only generate coercive measures but could also push enactment of national income maintenance (albeit after the election). Nevertheless, although nationalization of welfare would anger old-line political conservatives and ease an estimated $700 million annual burden on New York City, it is a part and not a reversal of the national urban policy. Following the Administration's view of the urban cancer, national income maintenance is more than humanitarian. Its political objective is civil order in the cities. Not only would it defuse the rural poor's migration to the hard-pressed cities; it also maintains a monetary pacifier for the "critical mass" of poor people already there. It would directly attack the locus and political danger of the urban cancer—the hearts and minds of the city poor.

At a minimum, all Americans, regardless of

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race, class, region, urban, suburban, or rural residence, share a common interest in a stronger federal investment in the quality of domestic social life, public and private. To realize this requires a united national polity able to press Washington for the curtailment of unnecessary military spending, an end to favoritism for irresponsible private capital accumulation, and the elimination of budget ceilings dictated by the economy's inflationary potential and the government's inequitable tax structure rather than by human needs and public choices.

Nonetheless, the national urban policy divides the country. It not only channels capital into the South and Southwest where recently attained urban affluence and lingering conservatism make demand for reform least likely, but Washington's paramount concern for strong armed forces supports the South's military heritage and its economy's continuing reliance on defense installations. It must seem too good to be true that all this can be accomplished under a new governmental structure that appears consistent with states' rights and eliminates the Great Society's links between Washington and local black, poor, and liberal activists.

In northern and eastern states, this policy reinforces metropolitan segregation and political divisions. It accepts racial and economic inequalities as natural, inevitable, and just, and it gives local governments, with whose boundaries these differences often coincide, a principal role in their defense. It provides financial support, administrative discretion, and political legitimacy to present municipal structure and practice, enabling many localities to continue their denials of equal residential, educational, and occupational opportunities by invoking the heretofore neutral value of localism. In the process, the American democratic ideal of an integrated national community of equally participant individuals is abandoned.

Struggling among themselves to protect their communities, to obtain better homes, or to slice meager local and household pies, middle-class, working-class, and poor families continue to define each other as enemies. Suburbanites fear integrationists. Middle- and working-class taxpayers fear the poor's economic and residential threat. The poor feel the others as the albatross upon their necks. And the President's condemnation of New York's local politicans as solely responsible for the city's fiscal catastrophe polarizes these suspicions and divides communities from one another. Thus the power of a potential domestic coalition is turned inward upon itself.

The national urban policy not only sets priorities for urban development and *dis*development; it also restricts unified, effective public participation in national choice-making. Ironically, perhaps, two conservative Republican presidents have brought the United States to the point where national planning is an emergent institutional reality. Their concern for world affairs is intimately connected with the structure of domestic planning. Regardless of its local consequences, new federalism has turned American democracy into a national technocracy free to plan and manage its domestic and foreign objectives from a global perspective without effective popular participation. Or—to draw on President Nixon's characterization of the American people as children in need of a strong father—under the new federalism, Washington's technocratic patriarch retains the power over critical national choices and leaves America's children to play, more or less democratically, with an allowance of local toys. If the patriarch decides that any city has overspent its allowance, its spanking will be severe, its democratic privileges will be suspended and its allowance will be "seasonally administered" and terminable at will. As Secretary Simon told the Senate Banking Committee, he should be put in charge of any New York aid "to determine that the city was irrevocably and unalterably on the path to fiscal responsibility. Such aid should be so punitive in its terms and so painful that no other city not facing absolute disaster would think of applying for help." □

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Judith Walzer

Women in Recent Fiction

Novels of Rebellion, Novels of Experience

There has been fiction about women for as long as there has been fiction, much of it in the past two centuries written by women themselves. In the 19th century they worked in the corner of the parlor in a country house or in a cold manse on the moors as they reflected on their "lesser" lives. The vantage point was especially their own, but otherwise there was nothing sexually specific about their occupation; it was what novelists did. These English novelists (Austen, the Brontës, Mrs. Gaskell, George Eliot) did not bemoan the plight of women in bourgeois society, although the dilemmas are apparent enough in Jane Austen's fireside marriage market and George Eliot's village intrigues. Women novelists taught accommodation to the hard facts of social life. Their heroines had to adapt themselves to necessity and marry well, even if without affection, for the sake of a secure place in society.

Accommodation was no mean feat, nor was it presented as such by these writers. For they were serious observers of society and knew how many disasters intervened between good intentions and the achievement of order. Accommodation was worthwhile because respectability and stability were worth having. They protected you from the miseries of poverty, personal disgrace, and isolation. Affection too, was a good, but one had to be perpetually on guard against romantic ideals, for these, unsupported by good sense and virtue, led to destruction. One might die a romantic death, but it would be final all the same.

The attempt to fulfill oneself to the limit of one's capacities was not really in question. Heroines, unlike heroes, did not risk overreaching the bounds of decorum in order to learn more about themselves. Even that most ideally equipped of heroines, Dorothea of *Middlemarch*, beautiful, brilliant, and good, accepts a conventional destiny as wife and mother. It is a plausible enough solution but will hardly tap the reserves of Dorothea's mind and spirit. Nothing society could then have provided would have sufficed to realize her special talents. Not, at least, were she to remain at home in it, and no one knew more about the dangers of exile than George Eliot herself.

When, later in the century, Hardy's Sue Bridehead did break the rules, fate could not have been harsher, nor more doggedly predictable. She is doomed from the start. There is hardly the chance of experiment for a woman (not much more for a man) and no possibility of real independence. A feminist might easily argue that Sue was the creation of a man, as were several other daring heroines. But men and women have conspired together to forge our accustomed ways, even if these have favored men, and Hardy seems fully to have understood the desperation of his heroines. Perhaps women writers in the 19th century were more conservative because they knew most intimately the personal devastation visited on the rebellious.

In our time the awareness of inequities between the sexes has become increasingly acute, although the conclusions many writers draw about women have not entirely changed. For current writers there are aspects of the

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picture of women in society that are universal. Women still find their grasp of themselves denied by the pressing demands made on them. They must be attractive and stimulating but also cheerful, equable, and ultimately self-effacing. They do this for the "subjects" in their lives: husbands, children, parents, or in the more liberated framework: lovers, colleagues, bosses. No wonder there is such confusion; the claims on the psyche conflict radically. And what happens when one discovers one might sensibly deny them and make a new start?

The old demands, besides being contradictory, may not be what's wanted after all. Society doesn't provide an easy berth even for those who conform to its standards. Devoted domestic women grow too needy, too dependent, too uninteresting. Husbands and children who've relied on society's creature soon enough find other creatures more engaging and flee the nest. Or if women have not paid attention to the demands of the common experience they are likely never to be anyone's "objects," and their lives will be empty of ordinary joys.

Fiction by and about men has for decades confirmed this view of things. No theme is more central to Bellow, Mailer, Roth, and many others, than the search of bourgeois man to recapture his youth and to be reborn into a more authentic reality. Novels have for years been dominated by heroes determined to change their lives because the world has constricted their vision of the possible. They strike out alone, in defiance of social expectations they have acquiesced in, and leave behind a host of responsibilities (jobs, wives, children), accumulations no longer useful in their search. These men and their existential desperation have become a central image in modern fiction of the struggle for freedom.

To be a woman writer, even now, seems to necessitate a bit of back-tracking from this position. Having been historically so much more restricted than men, women begin by working on more fundamental matters. How does one get a separate sense of oneself and what effect does that have on one's life? I am going to consider a group of writers who confront such problems and try to move on from them. None of them are major novelists, although almost all of their work is vital and interesting, and several of the novels are very good. Their work consistently captures a great deal of social and ideological energy, though the best of them transcend the immediate demands of the woman's movement and create an image of women experiencing the dilemmas common to modern life.

I have divided the novels into three groups. In the first the character confronts the fundamental question of how to determine her own life, using bits and pieces of ideas and ideologies and struggling against old restrictions. She tries to break away from the rules set by parents, or by men who want to mold her, or she tries to escape from society altogether and lives with people who are creating a new environment. The second group is more interesting; here the authors wrestle with the next step. If a woman has broken away from the usual patterns, how can she become a truly independent, "liberated" person? The ideology of this "liberation" is often not explicit; it is simply the way the character expresses herself. The third group focuses less obviously on the development of the character's ego (as a woman) and more on the world with which she must struggle in order to realize herself. Here the characters cease to be representatives only of their own sex. The power of their engagement with the world and the obstacles it throws in their path transforms them into "representative men." The particular ideology of the woman's movement is set aside, as the ordinary goal of a decent life becomes increasingly difficult to attain. Women begin to contend, as men have often done in novels, with all kinds of bewildering and uncertain realities. The characters who emerge are women whose goals are unmuddled by any illusions, whose strength is equal to society's constant changes.

In the novels that take the first step and consider women in their struggle for self-determination, a common pattern emerges. A potentially attractive, smart, sensitive young

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woman can't cope and begins to break down. She is at war with the narrow expectations of her family, bringing to the hostilities her persistent intelligence and undefined longings. Zany, slightly unconventional, although always acutely perceptive, she becomes a female *schlemiel*, her weight zooming, her hair straggly, and her clothes chronically wrong. None of this behavior is deliberate and opposed to convention or the overbearing anxiety of her parents that she be presentable (and marriageable); it represents her profound self-contempt and confusion. The novel charts her way out of these self-destructive schemes and at the same time her discovery of a reasonable life for herself, negotiated more on her own terms. It is yet another version of the story of "growing up," this time as a woman who wants some measure of confidence in herself.

Therapy is the instrument of her rescue, insofar as she can be rescued, and it plays an important part in all the novels of this type. Elizabeth in Susan Fromberg Schaeffer's *Falling* survives an early marriage that has been a colossal disaster—no communication, no sympathy, only a desperation to be together that has turned into a permanent enmity. After it, all she has left is her survival. A good psychiatrist, as sophisticated as she is, helps her to see herself more clearly. She works her way to an ordinary happy ending: a fine husband (also once married) who tells her, "'You'll have everything you want,'" and then, "'...we'll have children, everything.'" Not unrealistic, because it *is* what Elizabeth wants and the point of the novel is that she can get it by her own means and not by performing rituals that don't work for her.

Her family is the bearer of those rituals. Typically, for this sort of novel, they are a large second-generation Jewish clan, oppressively intimate, mingling strife and self-deception, and all of it too intense. They pull children down at the same time that they push them toward success. Elizabeth won't ever break with them; but she will try to make peace with them, and with their love for her, and then proceed to her own life. *Falling* is the most honest novel of its kind; it does not pretend to any notion of great freedom. Yet the idea of accommodation here does differ from the Victorian one, for the heroine must start from her *own* valuing of herself and will go to some trouble to be sure of it.

If therapy is a useful tool in *Falling*, in Erica Jong's *Fear of Flying* it is the very world itself and holds the key to everything. Isadora, when she isn't being analyzed, is sleeping with analysts and/or marrying them. None of it cures her, but it does serve to express her drive to find out the truth about herself. The truth is what she wants, and she also wants a way to live. Given these simple aims, *Fear of Flying* is not nearly as revolutionary a novel as the blurbs claim (she has not written about women in a "completely new way") and not as bad a book as some critical readers have charged. Jong writes glibly with an habitual wise-cracking about all the obstacles to Isadora's growing up unafraid, all the impossible conflicts of her upper-middle-class family (Jewish again and New Yorkers) and all the pitfalls of those therapies that are supposed to save her. She tries to joke too, about the sexual expectations and ambitions of her heroine, but here she fails, for she takes them all with a desperate seriousness. In order to credit the worth of Isadora's continental junket (with a charming but not very effective lover), one is forced to lose a great deal of confidence in her unappeasable sexual appetite and her supposedly liberated imagination. The irony of her lover's selfishness and condescension (isn't this just what she hates in her husband?) is hardly amusing enough to compensate for the disappointing trip.

If Jong's sexual encounters are not much fun, what she is good at, and what is worth the whole tortuous proceedings, are the countless details of female life centered on self-recognition, which at least half her readers will be delighted by: the descriptions of her menarche aboard the Ile de France; the detailed fantasies of the perfect lover; her first, mad, nonstop-talker husband; or her musings on where as a woman writer she might fit into the scheme of things (they've all been either spinsters or suicides). All of this is vivid comedy

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and testimony to the conflict between society's expectations and our own intentions as we see them.

Isadora—like Elizabeth, having worked through to a version of herself that she may respect—at the end says: "But whatever happened, I knew I would survive it. I knew, above all, that I'd go on working. Survival meant being born over and over.... I knew for sure I wasn't going to grovel." And so she returns to her husband, the inscrutable Dr. Wing. She will probably stay with him, even if it takes a series of sporadic flights to complete their arrangement. Most important of all, as she herself notices, when she is offered that quintessential of sexual experiences, the "zipless fuck," in precisely the form of her own fantasy (in a train compartment as she travels alone across Europe), she rejects it with anger and a surprised revulsion. A respectable grown-up woman lurks somewhere behind those clamorous desires and may even be called upon to prevail. How superb a comedy it might have been had Jong been willing to countenance her own observations!

It isn't always possible to make a bargain with society as workable as Isadora's or Elizabeth's. In Alison Lurie's *The War Between the Tates*, the humor is there, but no possibility of a tolerable solution. The work is taut with mockery, consistently overplayed, hammering away at all the characters, even the sensitive housewife, so that there is little left of anyone. And unfortunately, what's destroyed by Lurie's wit is never revived by her insight; the reader is cast adrift to think what she will. A satirist can work very well without sympathy for others, but not without some sympathy for herself, for that unseen narrator who must suffer all the fools and knaves of this world. And she must be able to give us some sense that she is in possession of a better, more reasonable standard against which the world is being measured.

Lurie's satire only works thoroughly with respect to the children, those mythic teen-aged beasts described as "nasty, brutish and tall" who represent a total reversal of the simplicity and affection with which they were raised. The heroine has given her soul to their upbringing and what a reckless waste it has been! Nothing else in the novel is as pointed and sure, not the weak and easily seduced professor husband, not his ridiculous colleagues, and certainly not the poor, haphazard graduate student for whom her husband leaves her. It is a mean and impossible little world Lurie presents to us. Things are so bad, there's little to do but cynically get on with it.

Sometimes the problem is to remake one of these bad bargains, to get out of the sort of trap that Jong's and Schaeffer's characters have been so wary of and that has stymied Lurie's. Marriage, though universal, is not forever. In *The Maze* Eileen Simpson traces the progress of a young and impressionable woman married to a mad poet who finally becomes so impossible that she must leave him. This departure becomes the foundation of her attempt to live a decent life according to her own values. Traditionally, in this situation (mad genius/devoted spouse) a woman's capacity for suffering has been prodigious, elevating a necessity to a moral good. The suffering wife collected credits toward a better life after this one, and if she could do so gracefully she might have universal admiration. But such sorrow and anger as she felt would have to be firmly repressed. Retaliation was only possible if heavily veiled and disguised as something else.

However ancient and reputable this pattern, it goes against the modern grain. Women have become unwilling or unable (at least in fiction) to glory in being taken advantage of; that in itself has transformed the conventional way of looking at these marriages. Rosy, in *The Maze*, gropes for the strength to disentangle herself. Her poet-husband has taken advantage as much with his drinking habits as with his fiendishly clever way of avoiding responsibility for their lives. His genius, according to the romantic formula, should excuse all, but in this novel it is curiously beside the point.

That is the book's problem; the poet seems not fascinating enough for her to have become so powerfully attached to him and not impossible enough for her to divorce—not yet. The

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book is so finely controlled and admirably restrained that we find it difficult to grasp Rosy's outrage and suffering. The story comes, we are told, from Simpson's own experience as wife of a poet notorious for the failings attributed to the Benjamin Bold of the novel. Perhaps the writer was depending on our familiarity with those facts to determine the extent of our sympathy with her heroine.

Despite this crucial weakness, Rosy struggles with her dwindling loyalties. Finally she realizes: "'... you must decide what you want.'" The possibility of having a child is something she will not give up, not even for Benjamin's sake, and this need becomes a crucial, determining choice.

In Simpson's novel the heroine finds an exit from her maze, a personal solution less general even than Schaeffer's or Jong's rapprochement with marriage. It has little to say about changing the basis on which such contracts are made; Rosy's exit is for herself alone. The only moral to be drawn is that one can leave when one must. For some writers, however, an exit becomes the occasion for a theory of escape, and they envision a different world, a utopia to replace the trap of marriage. For Judith Rossner's Margaret (*Any Minute I Can Split*) this new world of the commune is only a temporary respite from the nuclear family to which she and her husband finally decide to return. But for some of Marge Piercy's characters in *Small Changes* it is a precious opportunity. Piercy sees communal life as a real release, for everyone but for women especially, from responsibilities that drastically limit personal growth. It frees one too from the falsity of rigid sex roles—man working and learning, woman caretaking.

Piercy, more than any of these writers, is prone to be dogmatic; the nuclear family *must* destroy all real independence for women and men are *all* (finally) either irresponsible or tyrannical. Such ideas weaken the credibility of characters and story, even if one has some sympathy with the feelings behind them. What is worthwhile in *Small Changes*, though, is the picture of communal life. Piercy has her finger on the frequent driftings in and out of these communities, their complexity and fluidity, and conveys the relief people in them feel from pressures they can't tolerate. She makes an interesting case for the value of these arrangements for women, but she is the only one of all these novelists to be convinced of it. They are otherwise firmly committed to either old or new versions of individualism. When they venture on new ways of life, it is for the sake of the individual woman and her new vision of herself.

One is impatient while reading these novels to see what will happen next, how a character who has settled some of the basic issues can really alter the shape of her life in society. Those books about "new" women have begun to be written in the past decade and many of them have an energy and strength that none of the books I've discussed up to this point have had. They deal with characters who intend to construct their lives for themselves and not according to a "male"set of expectations. They avoid imitative impulses, those that would lead to an acting out of other women's lives or the mere translation of men's routines into their own. It's not only independence they're after, but their own sort.

Women writers have, of course, taken their characters seriously for a long time. What is different in these recent writers is an eagerness to locate for their character a new frame of mind, one in which she demands more of herself, expects to satisfy her need for a full life, and refuses to be limited by old formulas. This woman is not, as Isadora (*Fear of Flying*) or Elizabeth (*Falling*) or Rosy (*The Maze*) or countless other earlier characters (in much of Doris Lessing's work, for example) trying in some way to live differently while coming to a reasonable compromise with social expectations. She tries instead to change a great deal. There is great strain in her life often very productive for the novelist, but attention is focused on those attempts at newness rather than on the manners and mores that held back earlier efforts. Unlike Jong's and Schaeffer's books, these novels cut the characters loose

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from family life; once they become adult their past fades into the background.

It is a striking fact about this group of novels that they come from different countries at more or less the same time, as if women in a variety of situations have been experiencing the same phenomenon. I have picked a few examples: Margaret Drabble from England, Margaret Laurence from Canada, and Gail Godwin from the U.S.A. As different as the settings of their novels—London's academic and BBC circles, the prairies and towns of western Canada, and a midwestern university town in the U.S.—the central characters have reached the same state of things. They fend for themselves; their ties to men are temporary and incomplete. In both Drabble's *The Millstone* and Laurence's *The Diviners*, women decide to have children outside of marriage and value this experience as one of the determining centers of their lives. In Drabble's *The Waterfall*, the main character sends her husband away just as she's about to have a second child, thereby making the family her own personal property. The novels share another circumstance; each of their central characters is either a writer or a scholar (as were Isadora and Elizabeth). But in these books the talent of the woman, her individualistic bent, her ability to be self-absorbed and self-involved, plays a special part in the story of her life. And as in the case of many modern novels by men since Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist*, the writer-intellectual serves as a prototype of everyone else. She is more sensitive to the complexities of life, more expressive, and likely to suffer more severely from the social ills that beset us all.

Drabble's method is to submerge us in the close, methodical presentation of the character's consciousness. In both *The Millstone* and *The Waterfall* there is only one event that matters, and this makes the novel. Formally these books are perhaps much like plays done in a classical style, or short stories, so complete is the concentration on one crucial occurrence in a person's life. For Rosamund (of *The Millstone*) it is having a baby and living with her, after having been a solitary and rather detached person, incapable of much interest in anyone else. It is this experience, rather than a sudden self-discovery, like doing a certain sort of work or having a love affair, that makes her an independent human being. Work she has always been able to manage—it has been life that has eluded her. "Lucky in work, unlucky in love," she reflects early in the novel: "Love is of a man's life a thing apart, 'tis a woman's whole existence, as Byron mistakenly remarked."

She has been raised by "leftish" parents on an ideology of independence, her mother advising her that, like Queen Elizabeth, she must be ready to do whatever she wants to do, no matter where she were "turned out in her petticoat." Rosamund has her baby, not because she wants to from the start, but because she can't seriously focus on getting rid of it. After her one attempt at abortion fails, she begins to like the idea of a child and mocks her old way of life.

> ... it would serve me right ... for having been born a woman in the first place, I couldn't pretend that I wasn't a woman could I, however much I might try from day to day to avoid the issue?

She is resolute once she has made her decision, refusing to involve the father of her child, making the responsibility her own. The novel's point is that through what she experiences she discovers herself, and being what she is, it is a wholly original way to make that discovery. Then her devotion to her daughter, as common as that might be, underlines the changes she has already undergone.

When she finally shows her child to its father (without telling him the truth) and he is politely impressed, she understands his distance from "real life":

> I neither envied nor pitied his indifference, for he was myself, the self that but for accident, but for fate, but for chance, but for womanhood, I would still have been.

In *The Waterfall*, Jane starts from a similar complex of feelings although her circumstances are different. She cares too little about her worthy and accomplished husband even to hate him. She just wants him gone. She is as

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remote from him as from all the world, content to have her second baby by herself and settle into an isolated life in her big, cold house. What rescues Jane from her detachment is not her baby, but James, her favorite cousin's husband, who insists that she fall in love with him. Their love would seem to be the human equivalent of the torrential waterfall they visit at the end of the novel, having by then gone through a variety of disasters and having managed to keep the relationship intact. It's a common enough claim to make for romantic love; the character has been awakened by it, made vulnerable, full of needs and angers. Jane argues more openly than Rosamund did against the coolness, restraint, and subterfuge that characterized her earlier life and praises instead an intensity of vulgarity as well as badness. She attacks Jane Austen's work and world as an example of all that she had been schooled to:

> How I dislike Jane Austen. How deeply I deplore her desperate wit. Her moral tone dismays me: my heart goes out to the vulgarity of those little card parties that Mrs. Philips gave at Meryton, to that squalid rowdy hole at Portsmouth where Fanny Price used to live, to Lydia at 15 gaily flashing her wedding ring through the carriage window, to Frank Churchill, above all to Frank Churchill, lying and deceiving and proferring embarrasingly extravagant gifts. Emma got what she deserved, in marrying Mr. Knightley. What can it have been in bed with Mr. Knightley? Sorrow awaited that woman: she would have done better to steal Frank Churchill, if she could.

Refinement, social grace, and manners mean to her a basic denial of all that is alive, although a good deal of that, as both Jane Austen and Drabble know, may be quite unpleasant. But the real difference between Austen and Drabble is that the latter sees women as having to fight through to their own identities in much the same way that men (in modern fiction) have had to do. That is, they learn only through experience and not through decorous reprimands to their breaches of social conduct, as Jane Austen's characters did. What is new about Drabble's women is that they use their own sort of experiences to make their lives—not necessarily work or wandering or involving oneself with a variety of people—but experiences common to all women: having a baby, falling in love. And they make every claim for these experiences that has been made for the experiences that men typically have in modern novels.

Gail Godwin, an American, deals in *The Odd Woman* with a lonely scholar, past the dissertation stage and employed as a teacher of literature at a midwestern university. The title of the novel is meant as a paraphrase of George Gissing's novel of 1893, *The Odd Women*, which describes those Englishwomen at the turn of the century, single because there was a shortage of men in society, without a sufficient income to sustain themselves. Improverished and unskilled, frequently raised to expect a life of gentility, they lived a miserable life in London, preyed upon by men, often driven to drink. Godwin claims that Jane Clifford (her heroine) is also an odd woman, but it is an oddness of a different sort. She has *chosen* her state: she has her work, her friends, and, according to her doting grandmother, she is not constructed to tolerate all the compromises that marriage involves. Her mother, with whom she is contrasted, has married twice, making all sorts of public concessions, silently manipulates her second husband so that their marriage continues, although he is demanding, tyrannical, and boorish.

Jane feels that she cannot be permanently connected to anyone, having refused earlier the option of the "nice young man" and having then concentrated on herself, her education and her job. The "nice young man" as described in the novel is no more attractive than her boorish stepfather. Nor is her current lover admirable (an art historian at another university whom she sees on ocassional hurried weekends when he goes to professional conferences). He has been married for 25 years and will give up neither his wife nor his mistress because that would be rather like choosing between "apples and oranges" (and who would do *that*?). Jane finally finds their relationship disturbing, runs away from a weekend

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with her lover, and decides to continue her life alone.

Jane feels that in her own "oddness" she is outside the ordinary game of marriage. But it is never clear in this novel what satisfactions are to be drawn from her originality and difference and whether indeed she enjoys it at all, or whether it is a matter of habits, some bad and some good, that she can't break. The novel is long and detailed, but nothing in it reveals how the author values Jane and her life.

In Laurence's *The Diviners* the author strongly approves her character's choices and there can be no doubt about her views. The novel has traditional structure, looking backward to the heroine's childhood and giving a history of her life to middle age. Laurence is not afraid to use a host of time-honored fictional conventions: the harsh, poor origins, the desperate search for enough education to get out of the prairie town, the misadventures and mistakes along the way, the false starts and unfruitful interludes. Even when occasionally sentimental, it is so genuine a story that the conventions are more alive and useful than a host of clever innovations. They convey the absolute determination of the character to "come through."

This is not simply the 20th-century man's story now told about a woman who is just like him; Laurence's story is shaped to the needs of her heroine. The decision to have a child (with a man she feels very close to but whom she will not marry) is again crucial, and the most basic of the steps she takes to build her own kind of life and not one that others determine for her. Morag Gunn decides to have a child while in the process of extricating herself from a marriage in which she has remained childless, the constant student, loved but also condescended to, by a husband who was once, in fact, her teacher. She is the first of all the characters I've discussed to grow to heroic proportions, through her mistakes, even her selfishness, through what she achieves, and in the comprehensiveness of her story. For she raises her child, travels, and successfully writes and publishes novels.

Margaret Laurence's special talent is to make all the feminist theories come alive in her story while never for a moment recognizing them. She writes as purely as she can from the spirit of her character, Morag, shouldering her burdens and creating herself out of them. Her life shows the possibility of an enviable independence as well as what it has cost in the loss of security and comfort. The novel is gratifying too, for what it shows of the rest of the world outside of the central character's thoughts. The life of the poor prairie towns, the misery of the harassed Métis (half-Indian, half-French), the boarding houses of Vancouver, the loneliness of foreigners in London, the life of the river towns beyond the Ontario metropolis, all are depicted with a strong taste for reality. Her book is the story of a woman who becomes her own person while moving through a rich and complex landscape. It is probably the best of the novels that deal with women who have a new image of themselves to enact in their lives; it is certainly the least self-conscious and most believable of them.

There are some very recent novels, written since 1970, that deal with women who are as independent as the women in Drabble's, Godwin's, and Laurence's fiction, but by authors who are even (if possible) less overtly concerned than Laurence is with ideas about independence and self-determination. They are in implicit agreement with a good many of the first principles of any feminist creed but do not look at women's lives from this point of view. Laurence had at least a strongly intuitive sense for how much independence changes women's lives. Diane Johnson in *The Shadow Knows* and Paula Fox in *The Western Coast* know perfectly well what it's like for a woman to make her way alone in the world, but it is the consequences of the interaction between character and society that intrigue them, as well as the way in which society's powers remain unavoidable. Their imaginations are gripped by the ruthlessness of what the modern world does to people, how it continually impinges upon whatever attempts we make to be our-

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selves, frequently threatening to overwhelm and destroy us.

Johnson's novel deals with today, Fox's with 30 years ago, and although their works differ in important matters of technique, they share some ways of approaching their subject matter and most significantly a similar setting. The approach is to see how one carves a self out of rough and damaging encounters with an unfriendly world. The scene they have in common is the California of the poor, that outpost of our society quite different from the popular image of a sunny and rich Promised Land. It's a world of tacky plywood slums, rooming houses and housing projects, and old cars continually banged up on the freeway. It's a world into which the suburban Californian can easily sink if she takes but one false step. If N. in *The Shadow Knows* has any distant past, she has forgotten it. This loss of memory is accentuated by her obsessive dwelling on the present and the future, both of which are fraught with danger and uncertainty. The novel is a record of a week of terror N. lives through in her housing project "unit" expecting to be murdered by a presence she cannot identify. The violence of that week is the familiar violence of our society as well as the violence in N.'s own married life (documented by the many flashbacks woven into her story). First her door is hacked at and smeared with oil, a dead cat is left in the front yard, her tires are slashed; then Ev (her black housekeeper) is beaten up in the laundry room of the project (and dies several days later); her former maid, Osella, who is mad, threatens her over the phone as does a "phantom" phone-caller and, in a final anticlimax, N. herself is raped.

The technique of *The Shadow Knows* is a *tour de force*. It's narrated in the first person in N.'s voice, consistently dense and imagistic yet colloquial, a modern cryptic sort of poetic prose. At the start N. tells us:

> Last week our lives were all right here. Things haven't been going exactly well for me lately—not well at all really—but we were safe, and we try to keep believing in love and harmony. But now I think we are going to be murdered. Just like that. It's not what you'd expect living quietly in North Sacramento.

Nothing could be more simple and direct yet suggest more complicated consequences. The character of N. is also a *tour de force*; her many faults and the author's honesty about them don't impede our liking for her. She's needy, selfish yet loving, careless, jealous, vengeful—the raw human creature with none of the natural gentleness we've come to expect of any fictional woman who isn't a bitch-goddess. The fierce quality of her feelings, loving Andres (her lover), Ev (her housekeeper), her children, and hating Gavvy (her ex-husband), Cookie (her lover's wife) and Osella (the ex-maid) doesn't destroy our response; her vulnerability because of these feelings redeems her extreme view of things.

Hostility fills the air these characters breathe, and society punishes all of them, the most innocent most harshly. After she is raped by a man she can't see in the dark, N. actually feels relieved, perhaps because *IT* has finally happened (the attack she's been expecting) and she has survived, perhaps because nothing worse seems possible. She claims:

> I feel better. You can change; a person can change. I feel myself different already and to have taken on the thinness and the lightness of a shadow. ... You can join the spiritually sly, I mean. Well, maybe I'm making too much of this. I mean your eyes get used to the dark, that's all, and also if nothing else you learn to look around you when you get out of your car in a dark garage.

If anything, the novel ends in a far more ambiguous way than it has begun. Reality promises nothing; it's tough and unbudgeable, but if you are canny and brave you may be able to live with it. It's hardly a moral to make one congratulate oneself for one's small bit of freedom, but it takes some of the mystery out of things and that is a satisfaction. Women, once purported to be very special sorts of characters, have edged into the position of Everyman in our frightening modern world, taking upon themselves all the fears of uncertainty, the trials of anomie that modern people suffer.

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This is true in still another sense for Annie of Paula Fox's *The Western Coast* who learns from experiences as tough as any earlier hero's.* The novel in which she comes to life is a big one, arrestingly full of characters, places, scenes, as if the writer cannot resist the chaos constantly flying into one's path. Annie moves back and forth through the different segments of California society grasping hungrily at all of it. There's a feeling of tremendous substance here, of one person's life as part of a complex society as troubled, uncertain, and impoverished as is the heroine at its center.

There is a sure realization in the novel of the nature of experience, of that intricate meshing of events and individuality through which you learn what you are and become a person. This is an old-fashioned enough subject for fiction, but not one often used to portray a woman's life. Annie is not a woman artist, she has no special work that might offer the key to her self-knowledge and direction. It is the intense concreteness of her personal experience that give the work its special quality. As a heroine Annie can be utterly passive and then active, accepting what is thrown her way and yet aware and eager for new things. Always, she is the one who experiences, who learns painfully on her ragged course how to decide, how to take care of herself, how not to be merely passive. This last is most important. Finally her lesson is that she need not always be one of the victims who live hopelessly poor at the bottom of the barrel; she is not necessarily fated to those furnished rooms, that bad food, those old, cast-off clothes. She can work, earn money (times might get better), and move.

At the end, her friend Max (whom she has silently loved for most of the novel) asks her, "'What happened to you?'" and she answers: "'I was taken to California. After a while I escaped.'" It's a reticent answer; there's no heralding of the future here, no project, just the end of one chapter and the possibility of confronting the next. Yet Annie has something more at the end of the novel; she possesses her self, and with it a large sense of what will be possible for her. She is as strong as any woman we've encountered in these novels, substantial enough to meet whatever comes. Her struggle with what's real has been slow, but tenacious—as persistent as her struggle, at one point in the novel, with the tapeworm that has gotten inside her—and it's not likely that she will ever be defeated.

There is probably no less conclusive story than *The Western Coast* in this group, yet none more effective. As in all the best fiction, the analysis of society that may have been in the back of the writer's mind (or in the front of it), has fallen away like the useless, ornamental cover of an important book. What remains is the heart of the matter: a vital version of the world become more genuine, the less ideology there is to explain it. Fiction by women and about them is no different in this way from fiction with any other subject. The writer who is most perceptive, and has come closest to a complete and complex version of a woman's situation in the world, paradoxically needs the "liberationist" ideology least, for she is able to go beyond it and offer us a fully embodied version of all that ideology might encourage us to attempt in our lives. □

*For another discussion of this novel, and of Annie, see Pearl K. Bell's essay, "American Fiction: Forgetting the Ordinary Truths," *Dissent*, Winter 1973.

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Henry Pachter

Is the Third World Coming of Age?

This article closely follows the arguments presented to the United Nations by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. While the ICFTU supports most of the demands presented by the caucus of underdeveloped and nonaligned countries, it also criticizes them for being narrowly nationalistic, aiming at the redistribution of power between states without also redistributing incomes among the common people, concentrating on projects that might increase the prestige of national governments while neglecting the consumer industries and the raising of living standards. I fully support this criticism of the so-called second development decade, but I also recognize and appreciate a significant shift that occurred in the Seventh Special General Assembly of the U.N., held last September, in the attitude of Third World representatives toward interdependence between their nations and the industrially advanced countries. There was a noticeable turn from confrontation to cooperation, opening up the hope that in future consultations the statesmen will turn their attention to the problems of people, too.

The document can be obtained from the Office of Nongovernmental Organizations at the U.N. *– H.P.*

Nothing is as elusive as the term Third World, yet everybody knows what we mean: countries that are laggard in their industrial development, have low per capita incomes, often export only raw materials that are subject to heavy price oscillations, and frequently buy more than they can pay for. They are dependent on the import of capital, technology, and know-how for the development of their resources. Frequently this need has resulted in domination and exploitation by foreign interests or even the alienation of sovereign rights, in national humiliation, in corruption of political morals.

Unfortunately, however, the evils of colonialism cannot be conquered by simply eliminating its most visible symbol, the multinational corporations. Neither the substitution of government aid for private foreign investment nor the nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises has brought noteworthy improvements to the Third World. Domestically, national revolutions have failed to create an independent middle class capable of taking over the tasks of development; illiteracy and birth rates are still high; the gap between modernistic cities and traditionalist countryside is wide, and that between rich and poor grows wider. In matters of international trade, the poorest countries now are probably worse off than before: they owe $120 billion to advanced countries, and the debt service takes away more than half of the assistance they receive; some of them even have a negative balance of cash flow. Moreover, 25 percent of their grants and loans have tacit or acknowledged political strings, and much of the money is squandered on costly military projects and prestige. Consequently, instead of catching up, the poorest nations are falling even farther behind the most advanced societies, both economically and politically.

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Some critics have argued that foreign aid has contributed to the perpetuation of corrupt and oppressive governments and that it has discouraged native efforts to build modernization upon traditional foundations and indigenous resources.[1] (This is being done only in Tanzania, with deliberate disregard for "growth rate" and "power" considerations.) This failing is particularly blamed for the slow development of a modern farm economy—a prerequisite of the middle-class revolution that unfortunately is lacking in many of the new countries.

It has been estimated that a minimum of $12 billion to $15 billion yearly must be invested to bring the least-favored nations at least up to the subsistence level—to wit, over a period of ten years: $42 billion for food,[2] $25 billion for education, $28 billion for water supply, $16 billion for housing, $8 billion for urban transportation, $6 billion for health services. There is no industrial development included in this bill; nor are provisions for roads, canals, communications, and other parts of the infrastructure that must be built for the "takeoff." A realistic development program that would not leave the underdeveloped countries as far behind the firstcomers as they are today would require $25 billion in additional funds yearly—a sum that is nowhere available.

Frustrated in their efforts to raise development capital either from domestic sources or export earnings, underdeveloped countries have vented their impotent rage against the international monetary system and its managers, against multinational corporations and the industrial nations in general, charging them with exploitation of their resources and demanding "reparations" for unrequited services and lost opportunity for income in the past. In 1971, at the UNCTAD meeting in Lima, 77 nonaligned countries formed a caucus. A year later, in Santiago, President Echeverría of Mexico called for a "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States," which was hailed as a "Declaration of Economic Independence" for the Third World. The formation of OPEC, in 1973, provided the muscle to its demands, and in 1974 the 77 rammed an "Action Program" for a "New Economic World Order" through the Sixth Special Assembly of the United Nations, under the dynamic leadership of Algeria's President Boumédienne. Boumédienne's strategy clearly aimed at a redistribution of both economic and political power in the world.

Because of its revolutionary rhetoric, the "New Order" was rejected by the industrial nations. But under close inspection it cannot be called new. It called for a revision of the Bretton Woods agreements—and ever since August 1971, when the dollar was severed from gold, everybody has known that they had to be overhauled and were, for many practical purposes, inoperative. This New Economic Order demanded stabilization of raw-material prices—and the world was full of national and international cartels, from Franklin D. Roosevelt's AAA to the coffee, cocoa, wheat, and tin agreements. It proclaimed every nation's sovereignty over its national resources and over the operations on its soil of foreign companies—well, though the principle of expropriation had not been fully conceded, practically no compensation has been paid in many cases, and the Marines stopped collecting bad debts 50 years ago. (The Soviet Union repudiated the Czar's debts; Germany never paid reparations; India's debts, amounting to $3 billion, were annulled; a parley to settle Chile's debt was being prepared when Allende was overthrown.)

Finally, the 77 demand access to the management of the world's monetary machinery. Undoubtedly this might create problems. But the expansion of credit has been a resource of modernization policies everywhere and some transfer of liquidity (a compensatory flow of funds into countries that must import new

[1] Mahbub ul Haq, "Toward a New Framework for International Resource Transfer," in *Finance and Development*, September 1975. See also my essay, "Paradoxes of Foreign Aid," *Dissent*, Spring 1960.

[2] Over the next 15 years, world grain consumption will increase by over 400 million tons, or 33 percent of its present yearly volume. Underdeveloped countries will experience a grain deficit of 100 million tons.

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equipment but have little to export for the moment) is needed precisely to maintain the market economy on a world scale—as was done in the Marshall Plan and, less successfully, in the Alianza para el Progreso. Otherwise such countries must strive for autarky—which is undesirable from the American point of view. It is difficult to see what is "revolutionary" in such attempts to restore some balance to the international exchange of goods and services, or to include all countries in the government of the World Bank.

The New Economic Order merely called for cooptation of a few new members into the Directorate of the World Bank (Thierry de Montbrial, of the Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, suggested India, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria, Brazil or Mexico as co-managers); the transfer of some resources from have to have-not nations; and an opportunity for fair competition by the latter in the former's markets. It aimed at redistribution of the game's gains without changing its rules. But this modest purpose was accompanied by an ideological drumfire that caused some Western commentators to foresee doomsday, and some of the projects were phrased in language so provocative that they seemed to have been designed to be rejected.[3] Neither the proposal to issue SDRs (paper gold) in connection with development tasks, nor the proposal to stabilize raw-material prices in relation to finished-goods prices—"indexing"—is bad in itself. (Selective indexing is being tried out in Brazil.) But the whole package was presented as a nonnegotiable ultimatum and created the fear, in Western banking circles, that a committee of underdeveloped countries was being set up to engineer an inflationary spiral on a world scale. Together with a demand to transform UNCTAD into a huge cartel administering, distributing, pricing, and storing 18 great commodities, these shibboleths became a tricolored flag under which the "New Order" assailed Bretton Woods, the Bastille of the old order. In practice, of course, the underdeveloped countries will support rules that prevent inflationary abuse of SDRs; they will conclude specific commodity agreements, and they know that technical progress or changing consumption patterns make arbitrary price relations illusory.

Incidentally, it is a mistake to equate raw material exporters, UDCs, and nonaligned countries. Only a dozen UDCs depend on one or a few raw materials for more than 30 percent of their exports; but 80 percent of the world's population, including many in the Third World, would suffer from the rising price levels that few welcome—including, paradoxically, some multinational corporations and some of the most wealthy countries. More important, from any long-range view of development, the present patterns of world trade are highly undesirable and should be overcome; it is precisely the aim of the "U.N. Development Decade" to make UDCs less dependent

Abbreviations Used in this Article

Bretton Woods — Place in New Hampshire where the system of currency relations was established in 1944, defining the $ = 1/38 oz. of gold and all other currencies in terms of the dollar.

ILO — International Labor Office.

IMF — International Monetary Fund.

SDR — Special Drawings Rights, a sort of "paper gold" that the IMF, under rigid conditions, supplies to countries whose currency reserves are threatened.

Terms of Trade — The price relation between import and export goods.

UDC — Underdeveloped countries. I reject the hypocritical term "developing countries."

UNCTAD — U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. □

[3]Tom Farer of the Council on Foreign Relations wrote in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1975: "Their furious persistence must reflect more than shrewdly calculated economic claims. What it does reflect is the claim to autonomy, to insulation from appraisal, let alone intervention, by Western governments—a collective cry of defiance." The author, who is close to Dr. Kissinger, thinks that psychological concessions to UDC pride are more important than handouts.

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on commodity exports and to expand both their consumer industries and their domestic markets.

(The share of UDCs in manufacturing is supposed to rise from 8 percent of world output now to 25 percent by the year 2000. This development may create some displacement problems in the old industrial countries. While this is only a repetition of what has been happening since the end of World War I, only the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions [ICFTU] has given thought to the problem and has submitted to the U.N. concrete proposals to mitigate the impact.)

This was the situation when the Seventh Special General Assembly was to meet last fall. A new confrontation was threatening, unless the issues could be purged of their rhetorical accompaniment and slogans be replaced by practical transactions. Especially the Western nations had reasons to be conciliatory.

(Dr. Kissinger's strategy, trying to divide the "77" into a "Third" and a "Fourth World"—the latter comprising countries with per capita average incomes under $200—has failed. Although the so-called Fourth World countries have suffered most from the OPEC action, have experienced severe famine and setbacks in their development plans, they don't like to be singled out as low men on the totem pole. Naming them Fourth World was the surest way to assure their continued allegiance to the "radical" leaders who exploit them both economically and politically. To quote Mr. Farer again: "Universal support of OPEC is only one sign of the subordination of economic interests to political preoccupations." In fact, the 77 swelled to more than 110, and its unity lasted through 1975. The applause Mr. Amin, a murderer and thief, received at the 30th U.N. General Assembly bears out the theory that something much more than economic reparations for past exploitation is at stake.)

Not even the oil sheiks were happy with the profits they did not know how to use while their hungry brothers were pointing fingers at their bank accounts. Their price hikes had not brought down the Western powers—which somehow managed to even out their payments balance—but had backfired and ruined part of the Third World. The United Nations enlarged the list of desperately exigent countries. They were in urgent need of help, and neither the oil sheiks nor the Eastern bloc offered them anything but revolutionary rhetoric.

(Soviet "aid" is strictly selective, provided with "strings," bilateral, and repayable even where the material investment, as in the Sinai wars, has been physically lost. The sheiks boast that they have given 2 percent of their GNP and have set up a solidarity fund. But again, this must be looked at as the Arab League's war chest and bears no resemblance whatsoever to the multilateral development grants they demand from the "imperialists." The Shah of Iran has promised $1 billion, but his own armament and development programs are so ambitious that he may not be able to keep his word *and* buy himself plants in Europe.)

Moderate leaders in both camps recognize the complexity of the situation and the need for action, and have come forward with concrete, practical proposals. One year of confrontation taught them that it does not pay.

When the Seventh Special Assembly met in September 1975, there was considerable inclination to avoid another debacle.

The industrial nations had no taste for another round of psychological and economic warfare. If only to facilitate the Sinai agreement and to initiate serious negotiations about the price of oil, the Western powers had to show concern for the underdeveloped countries. (European statesmen too have voiced genuine concern to close the gap between rich and poor. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt quoted Herbert Hoover as saying, "World peace means peace of bread.")

Both the Common Market and the United States were ready to meet the underdeveloped countries' demands halfway—provided the proposed reforms can be realized within the framework of the market economy.

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For those who were there, the Seventh Special Assembly was memorable. The Europeans, the Americans, and the Japanese, the 77 and their three dozen followers, all were negotiating in earnest, from rigid opening positions but flexible in approaching each other, seeking formulas to patch over the differences, the moderates lobbying with their radical friends (often so loudly that the caucus proceedings could be heard through closed doors), and trying to convince the diehards that the unity of their bloc would be broken if they insisted on doctrinal points. Some delegates had to wait through the last long and anxious night session until, shortly before it was too late, their governments agreed to the last concession that enabled them to adopt a consensus resolution. The United Nations again had become a bargaining center.

The consensus necessarily had to be patchwork. No side can claim victory; rubberlike wordings will launch the next meeting into acerbic debates about their interpretation. The industrial countries will insist that most items have been disposed of in a procedural way, referring the problem to an appropriate body for "study." The underdeveloped countries will insist that the procedure was to lead to some result soon, and if it does not, they will again knock at the door with the same demand. Nevertheless, both sides are now negotiating about these demands, and the Western powers know that they have to deliver. (They also registered a nice gain when for once the Russians could not look on as *tertius gaudens* at the Third World denouncing the "imperialists" but had to stand on the sidelines in great embarrassment, unable to offer the underdeveloped countries anything or to influence the negotiations.)

The concessions made to the underdeveloped countries may be divided into the following categories:

1. Acceleration of tendencies that are under way, such as industrialization and modernization, transfer of science and know-how, education of new cadres.

2. Emergency aid and humanitarian aid, notably establishment of new agencies to fight famine and disaster.

3. Expansion of aid in the framework of the existing institutions, notably an international self-taxation amounting to 0.7 percent of GNP. Only the Dutch are now exceeding this quota; most other countries do not contribute half the amount and refuse to agree to a date when that "target" should be reached. This measure is, of course, far from the "redistributive taxation" originally demanded.

4. Measures designed to increase the export earnings of underdeveloped countries, such as buffer stockpiles that put a floor under the price of raw materials; price and quota agreements that are to assure a steady rise in the price of raw materials; a compensation fund to make up for unforeseen declines in export earnings.

(The Lomé Convention of 1975 between the European Community and 46 associated underdeveloped countries of Africa, the Pacific area, and the Caribbean does this for selected tropical products. We might call this a system of export subsidies paid by the importing countries. The IMF also has made available one-sixth of its gold for such purposes—$2.5 billion to be loaned to underdeveloped countries under certain conditions.)

5. Measures designed to accelerate the underdeveloped countries' industrial development, above all unilateral tariff concessions enabling them to export industrial products. In Gunnar Myrdal's words: the advanced nations must "discriminate against themselves" and make room for newcomers even if that means painful adjustment for some of their own people.

THESE last two groups of measures may be impinging on the principles of a free market system. Yet they are not simply a return to old-fashioned protectionism or self-sufficiency. They aim at the establishment of an orderly framework of international exchanges, assuring to both producers and consumers a fair price and a stable supply.

(The exorbitant and high-handed price decrees of the oil cartel will hardly be models of

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future commodity agreements. No other commodity can be cartelized on a similar basis of sudden political solidarity, and even this cartel is now giving indications of disintegration, as most previous cartels have done. Boumédienne's radical heyday is passed, if the Western powers know how to respond creatively to the world's changing political and economic relations.)

Whatever adaptations the market system must undergo need not be identified with a new ideology. After all, the theory of discriminating trade practices has been elaborated by Keynesian economists, New Dealers, and social democrats. If there is one characteristic that stands out in the New Economic Order, it is its aim to *increase* international exchanges. It neither encourages self-sufficiency nor favors barter agreements.

Taking a socialist point of view, I would like to conclude with a few remarks. Nowhere does the New Economic World Order mention the welfare of the common people or a project in which the UDC governments will use their additional income to raise the wage level in their countries. The New Order, it seems, will provide redistribution of income *not* among *people* but at best among governments; it enhances and generalizes the prerogatives of sovereignty instead of preparing their abolition, and it falls far short of any idea that the resources of the earth belong to all mankind.[4]

Speaking for the world's industrial workers, the ICFTU has endorsed most of the UDC's demands but declared them insufficient to bring about those social changes that would allow the world's poor to benefit from the proposed redistribution of the world's income. The New Economic Order may establish new rules in the fight for distributive shares among the old and the new elites. It now seems necessary to think of a "new order" that will do more than increase the membership in the club of managers.

P.S. Irresponsible forces are trying to scuttle the mood of conciliation at the U.N. Their absurd resolution on Zionism was but one of many attempts to raise the noise level of the General Assembly; but the temptation to answer in kind should be resisted. Ambassador Moynihan—otherwise known for his sense of humor—might have made use of a comment by the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, on a similar scurrilous poster: "Hang it low enough so that the dogs can read it." □

[4] "From the standpoint of a higher economic form of society, private ownership of the globe by single individuals will appear quite as absurd as private ownership of one man by another. Even a whole nation or even all [nations] taken together are not the owners of the globe. They are only its possessors, its usufructuaries" (Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. III, p. 757, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962).

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Terrence Des Pres

Victims and Survivors

Thirty years after the Holocaust our attitudes toward the victims have not altered in the least. Those who died "went to their death like sheep." Those who survived are tainted with something called "survival guilt." The dead are implicated in their own destruction, and survivors bear the stigma of irreparable moral damage. We take it for granted that in the concentration camps everyone died, if not in body then in spirit. But they were neither sheep nor monsters who burned down Treblinka and Sobibor, who blew up the crematorium at Auschwitz, who succeeded in taking command of Buchenwald during the war's last days. And the many smaller revolts, mentioned repeatedly in reports by survivors, although they ended in death did not end without fierce fighting against odds that from the beginning were impossible. A survivor of Auschwitz describes one small event of this kind:

> One night we could not sleep; we heard constant shooting outside. There was loud screaming, running and driving back and forth. New transports had arrived from Poland. . . . They attacked the SS men with knives. Some of them even had revolvers, and used them, and six SS men were killed. But soon the SS received help, and twenty truckfuls of Jews were shot with machine guns that night.

Such things did not occur every day, of course, but they happened many times in many camps. Yet our unwillingness to consider them remains strong. It amounts to a need to think otherwise, as if some unconscious conspiracy of silence were working to keep the victim in his appointed place. This tendency, which might be called the *spectator syndrome*, operates toward all kinds of victims—those who suffer poverty, rape, acts of violence not officially approved—and it becomes especially virulent when we confront crimes that awaken, in ourselves, demonic wishes and dread.

By saying men and women died like sheep we say that they collaborated in the administration of their own deaths, and therefore *they* are responsible for the crimes that occurred. And because survivors are obsessed with a need to bear witness, to "let the world know," as they say, we have concluded that this abnormal behavior can only be fueled by guilt. Not horror, not fear, not the desire to scream out warning. The argument is that anyone who insists upon remembering horrible things is neurotic. Conscience is thereby reduced to confession, concern to fixation; and to madmen such as these we need not listen. For if the survivor is guilty he or she is infected and must be shunned. If survivors are guilty, then the world they saw and suffered is theirs and not ours. Terrible events are thus reduced to acts of self-infliction. Violence has its origin and outcome in those to whom it happens, and the moral symmetry of the universe is upheld.

This tendency to blame victims is compounded by others, the behaviorist bias, for example, which assumes that environment is the final determinant of behavior. If the environment happens to be a death camp, then on the principle that monstrosity breeds mon-

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strosity we conclude that prisoners must have allowed the pressures of that time and place to dictate their actions. The psychoanalytic point of view, likewise, has followed Bruno Bettelheim's claim that in the camps all prisoners (except, however, himself) were reduced to "infantile" modes of behavior; in other words, that they were destroyed as men and women able and willing to resist.

The concentration camps thus confirm our belief that man is essentially a victim, that victimization is the lot of everyone in this disastrous age. They evoke and legitimize the nihilism so thoroughly a part of "modern" consciousness as to hold suspect all positive action and value. And finally, as the historical embodiment of our own worst fears and wishes—as demonic imagination erupting into fact—the camps and their victims compose a world from which we strive to separate ourselves at almost any cost. Perhaps, too, the prejudice against "merely" surviving, against life not justified by something "higher," generates real if muted moral objection. Anti-Semitism no doubt plays its part, and with such arguments and needs to sustain us, we feel fairly convinced that in the concentration camp—in that "hell on earth" as we say—there could be none but the damned, none but the spiritually maimed unto death.

Millions died, yes, and many became brutes. But many did not. Tens of thousands of men and women survived the concentration-camp ordeal, and they did it in human ways. Not only in the drama of open uprising, but every day through a multitude of activities, all of them covert, most of them collective, and all informed by a resistance rooted in the struggle for life. Contrary to the prevailing notion, survival in extremity *depends* on staying human, depends first of all on active resistance to dehumanizing pressures and conditions. Such behavior is the concern of this essay, although here I can examine only a small but fundamental part of it. The conclusion is this: in order to survive, in body *and* in spirit, the victim must refuse to be a victim merely. In extremity men and women are forced to resist in order to live, and through acts of resistance their victimhood is transcended, their humanity is affirmed and upheld.

In *Night*—the story of his boyhood in Auschwitz—Elie Wiesel records two moments of advice, two prescriptions for survival. The first came from an "old" prisoner to the new arrivals: "The same smoke floats over all our heads. Help one another. It is the only way to survive." The second was an anonymous inmate's comment: "Here, there are no fathers, no brothers, no friends. Everyone lives and dies for himself alone."

Help one another. Every man for himself. The contradiction is classic, and nowhere more starkly stressed than in the concentration-camp ordeal. For as soon as survivors wake to the reality of their predicament they must choose. They must decide which view will govern behavior and their perception of camp life as a whole. In extremity the claims of radical self-interest seem sounder, more logical; and the second prescription—help only thyself—dominates the description of events in Wiesel's books: men fight among themselves, fathers contend with sons to the death. The rule of war was total, or so he implies. Yet Wiesel did not abandon his father, and the prisoner who gave the new inmates kind advice was, after all, a man living in Auschwitz.

There is a contradiction in Wiesel's view of the camps, a contradiction that occurs so often in reports by survivors that it amounts to a double vision at the heart of their testimony. In *The Holocaust Kingdom,* Alexander Donat describes Maidanek as a world in which "the doomed devoured each other," but he includes another kind of evidence as well, for instance his near death from a beating he received for refusing to beat others, and the help he was given when, desperately in need of time to recover, someone found him a clerking job. Likewise, in his account of survival in Auschwitz Sim Kessel says: "Intelligence, courage, knowledge, vitality, the desire to live—all counted for nothing ... common misery reduced everyone to the same level, erasing all

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values, breaking down all wills." He sticks to this assessment, despite examples of courage and quick-wittedness, despite his own slow coming to terms with the knowledge of how to survive. He says all concern for others vanished; yet one morning when, like countless others, Kessel collapsed in the snow and could not get up, "two neighbors leaned over me, saying that I was feverish and they would help me. And so they did; they supported me, almost carrying me at times." They never knew his name, nor he theirs.

Acts of care and decency seem so out of place in the camps that survivors themselves are perplexed. In his description of the Soviet camps, Jerzy Gliksman states that "the conditions in which we had to live aroused the worst instincts in all of us. All trace of human solidarity vanished." But here again the principle of jungle rule is belied by events Gliksman describes in the course of his story. Most striking, perhaps, is the moment when night-blindness (a frequent illness among vitamin-starved prisoners in the northern camps) made his predicament "most desperate":

> One evening as I was walking ... with my arms stretched out in front of me, like a real blind man, an unknown individual took me by the arm and conducted me to a spot that had more light. ... "Don't you recognize me? ... I am Berg ... don't you remember me from Kotlas?"

Kotlas was the transit camp where they had met and briefly talked. Berg knew his way around better and was able to get a job for Gliksman in one of the innumerable GULAG file rooms, with an improvement in shelter and light that saved his life. Gliksman concludes the episode by saying: "To the present day I do not know why this man, almost a total stranger, did me such a good turn."

Incidents like these seem exceptional, as indeed they were, and yet they happened *all the time*—a fact that does not negate the savagery of existence in the camps but qualifies the view of "all against all" and needs accounting for. Reports by survivors regularly include small deeds of courage and resistance, of help and mutual care; but in the larger picture, the image of viciousness and death grows to such enormous intensity that all else—any sign of elementary humanness—pales to insignificance. And surely this is understandable. The element of chance was so pervasive, the moment of salvation so unexpected, that the power of human encounters seemed slight and difficult to make sense of. Shock was another factor; what impressed survivors most indelibly was death, suffering, terror, all on a scale of magnitude and evil not to be faced without lasting trauma. Primarily, however, survivors stress the negative side of camp existence because their testimony is governed by a deep-felt need to "tell the world" of the terrible things they have seen. This determines not only the kind of material they select to record but also the emphasis they give it. As a witness, the survivor aims above all to convey the otherness of the camps, their specific inhumanity.

But the contradiction goes deeper than that. The essential paradox of extremity is that life persists in a world ruled by death. Life-in-death characterizes every aspect of the survivor's experience, for in order to live and stay human, the survivor must be *in* the world but not *of* it. That, of course, is an old distinction. For the Stoic or the Christian it was mainly a matter of spiritual detachment. For the survivor the problem is more difficult. He too must maintain detachment; he too must preserve an identity apart from the one imposed by his environment. But since for him death is the immediate determinant of behavior, he must find a realm of separateness in action as well as in mind. The survivor must act on two levels, be "with and against," as Eugen Kogon says in *The Theory and Practice of Hell*. And what this meant in practice is that to stay alive survivors often worked for, or even in, camp administration. As a Soviet survivor said, "you can only survive on a function." To one degree or another, many survivors were spokes in the wheel of mass murder, the ultimate instance being those members of the *Sonderkommandos* who ran the Nazi gas

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chambers, but who *also* burned down Treblinka and Sobibor, and blew up the crematorium at Auschwitz.

Under normal circumstances, assistance in crime is condemned, if only because (and this amounts to a definition of the civilized state) there is always a margin of choice, always another way to live. But in extremity there may in all strictness be no other way to live. In the concentration camps, to choose life meant *to come to terms with, but also to resist,* the forces of destruction. And although this imperative opens the door to every manner of hypocrisy and lie, and therefore becomes a constant occasion for corruption, it simply cannot be avoided. Overtly the survivor defers to death, covertly he or she defies it. This *duality of behavior,* of concrete action on separate levels, is one of the primary characteristics of existence in extremity, or in any institution, slavery for example, which through threat and force attempts to reduce its members to nothing but functions in the system. Survivors work with the system *in order* to work against it. The luxury of sacrifice—by which I mean the strategic use of death to resolve irreconcilable moral conflicts—may soothe our untried toughness; but for survivors, closed wholly in a world of death, it makes no serious sense.

On the surface, therefore, the rule of death prevails and everyone acts in ways that fulfill the logic of this rule. Underneath this primary level of behavior, however, there is a secondary level of activities, all of them committed to sustaining life through subversion of the imposed order. During the ordeal of the Warsaw Ghetto, for example, Chaim Kaplan made the following remark in his *Diary*: "In these days of our misfortune we live the life of Marranos. Everything is forbidden to us, and yet we do everything. Every Jewish occupation is under a ban, yet nevertheless we somehow support ourselves; true, we do it with grief, but we do survive." Trade was illegal, procuring medicines was illegal, schooling the children was illegal. So were things like meetings, movement outside the ghetto, and traveling on the streets after curfew. The punishment was death, and yet all these activities were necessary to the life and resistive cohesion of the ghetto population. Forbidden were the *means of life,* which had to be carried on covertly, at constant risk.

One of the most persistent forms of covert behavior, in both the camps and the ghettos, was smuggling. In the case of the Warsaw Ghetto this kind of "illegal" activity involved everyone; it proceeded daily on both individual and organized levels, and as death by starvation increased, smuggling grew to heroic proportions. There were periodic crackdowns, when dozens of smugglers were shot, and other, looser times when bizarre methods of every sort were used:

> Specially constructed mobile ramps were set against the walls on both sides to smuggle over live cows and oxen. ... From the window of a building ... which overlooked the ghetto ... a sheet metal pipe was lowered, and milk poured across the racial boundary.

Operations on this scale depended on collaboration with the oppressor—in other words, on "one simple and powerful mechanism, bribery, which reached to the police of all varieties and the gendarmes of all ranks." The complexity of such deals was amazing, as in this example from Ringelblum's *Notes*:

> A ladder is thrown over the Wall and smuggling goes on all night. But this night the smugglers quarrel among themselves, and one of them informs where it will do the most good. The police come at once and catch a whole crowd in the middle of operations. Machine guns begin shooting, one smuggler is shot dead on the spot, one or two others are wounded. Then they search every apartment in the building, take away a great deal of goods, and arrest forty smugglers. For 40,000 zlotys, they return the goods and set the smugglers free. That is the sum that the police claim to have lost because the smugglers used the Wall to bring goods in, rather than taking them through the watch at the Ghetto gate, where the police get a cut.

Organized smuggling brought profits, and no doubt that was a strong incentive. But there was a devil-may-care attitude among smugglers, as Ringelblum observed; a kind of stark

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bravado that kept them going and gave their deeds a desperate glamour: "One of the smugglers told a friend that he would keep on smuggling, because if he didn't he would starve to death. Rather die fast from a bullet than slow from hunger." In the case of the children, however, glamour faded to pathos, a pathos infinite and never to be answered, as in this example from Mary Berg's *Diary*:

> Whole gangs of little children are organized, boys and girls from five to ten years of age. The smallest and most emaciated of them wrap burlap bags around their bony little bodies. Then they slink across to the "Aryan" side. ... Often peasants give them potatoes for nothing. Their terrible appearance arouses pity. ... On this side of the barbed wire their older partners wait for them. Very often they stay there for hours waiting until the Nazi guard is busy checking the passport of some foreign citizen or Polish Gentile visiting the ghetto. This gives them an opportunity to smuggle their foodstuffs. Sometimes the German sentry does not notice them, sometimes he does, but pretends that he does not. ... But most of the German guards fire in cold blood at the running children, and the Jewish policemen must then pick up the bleeding victims, fallen like wounded birds, and throw them on passing rikshas.

Here we might also remember—especially when we talk about victims going to their deaths like sheep—that any kind of armed uprising within the ghettos or the camps depended on smuggling. And that arms were a great deal harder to obtain, and certainly harder to hide, than food. When Bruno Bettelheim (in his Foreword to Miklos Nyiszli's *Auschwitz*) criticizes everyone in Auschwitz who did not act as did the *Sonderkommando* that blew up the crematorium and shot it out with the SS, he overlooks the fact that the arms and explosives that made this particular revolt possible took *years* to accumulate. An organization had to be forged and made trustworthy amid constant depletion of members who were killed. Contacts with partisan groups outside the camp had to be made and, more difficult yet, maintained through time against informers. Finally, arms had to be found, paid for (which involved another network of smuggling), and successfully carried through an intricate system of surveillance. Only then was revolt possible. And all this had to be done while, ostensibly, the prisoners were cringing like dogs before their Nazi masters.

They cringed and hurried to perform their ugly jobs, but they did not justify themselves by saying, "I do one thing but I *think* another." The survivor is not a type of the "beautiful soul," as Hegel called those who embrace pristine principles but dare not tarnish them through action. Inward resistance is indispensable, of course; but for survivors something more is needed. Their lives and humanness directly depend on active *works*. And since on the primary level they are meshed in destruction, they must find another, secondary level of action—ways that will keep themselves and each other alive in spirit as much as in body. Survivors often remark that if a man were to obey all camp rules he would be dead in a month. As a survivor of Auschwitz says: "According to even the Camp Commandant ... the obedient *Häftlinge* could only survive for three months at the very most. Those who lived longer did so only by cheating the authorities." Or as a survivor of Buchenwald puts it, prisoners "gradually realized that obedience meant death. The only hope of survival lay in resistance."

Ghetto and camp regulations were designed to make life impossible. Survival therefore depended on an "underworld" of activities, all of them illegal, all of them risky, but all essential to life. There was a special word for this, current in all the camps: to carry out any kind of illegal action was "to organize." As one survivor says, "I was later to know that 'organize' was *the* most important word in the Auschwitz language. It meant: to steal, buy, exchange, get hold of." Another survivor, also from Auschwitz, gives a fuller definition:

> In the language of a political prisoner the word "organize" means to acquire a thing you need without wronging another prisoner. For instance: to take a shirt from a warehouse full of under-

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wear left to rot and be gnawed by rats because a German Kapo would rather see it destroyed than give it to prisoners is to organize. But to take someone else's shirt which she washed and put on the grass to dry is not to organize—that is stealing. When a prisoner gives other prisoners a few loaves of bread filched from the supply room—that is organization. But when the block supervisor takes loaves from the rations of other prisoners and hands them out to privileged prisoners, for some underhand additional services—that is theft. In the area of the camp there are many storerooms filled with all kinds of goods. From time to time their contents are sent to the interior of Germany. To manage to get at those shipments and distribute some articles of daily need over the camp uncaught, and thus make life easier for fellow prisoners, means to know how to organize.

The most important kind of organizing (apart from that of the political underground) was smuggling food, shoes and clothing out of warehouses into the rest of the camp. The Nazi extermination plant included gigantic systems of storage and transport, places where the belongings of millions of victims—money and foodstuffs, blankets, cooking utensils and all kinds of clothing—were gathered and packed for shipment back to the Reich. The largest of these was at Auschwitz. It was called "Canada," which in camp slang meant "an abundance of everything." There was so much sheer bulk to be processed that "the Germans became generous with manpower and put nearly twelve hundred men and two thousand women into the work." And although the least punishment a prisoner could expect for "stealing" was the standard and often fatal 25 lashes, each evening members of the Canada squads returned with vital loot:

> One had six tins of sardines, another, two pounds of figs. Shirts and fruit and soap, salami, sausages and ham appeared until the barracks began to look like a well-stocked grocery. ... The block senior strolled in to collect his percentage. ... The camp doctors, themselves prisoners, were there too, looking for drugs, for medicines, for anything which might help them in their hopeless task.

The crucial moment was the search, and all kinds of tricks were devised to get through:

> Every evening, before returning to camp, we were put through three spot-checks. These were carried out by dead-drunk Storm Troopers. ... Anyone on whom was found the smallest trifle was beaten terribly. ... Even so, everyone smuggled things back into camp. ... Every day I put on a new pair of shoes at work, came back wearing them and gave them to comrades in the camp. ... We smuggled gloves, blouses, underwear on our stomachs, under the coarse striped camp chemise. I hid pieces of bread, cake, bacon under my own clothing as I held it during the searches.

Each Canada worker had his or her own special methods, on which the lives of others depended: "I usually wore at least three of everything. ... I pinned towels along the inside back of the dresses. ... I carried rings and even gold watches inside my mouth."

Like an infernal funnel, seismic in its reach, places like Canada were the point in the Nazi system of extermination through which the wealth of the victims was sucked in—tons of gold, millions of dollars in jewelry—supposedly to be sent to Berlin, but much of it going into SS pockets. Some of it, however, went for purposes far different from those prescribed:

> We used the bank notes as toilet paper. We buried boxes full of gold and valuables in the ground. We handed much to the men, if and whenever possible, for it was generally believed

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that the men had contact with an underground movement and that any valuables might come in useful in obtaining ammunition for an uprising.

Smuggling is a strong example of the kind of covert behavior that prisoners called "organizing." It was not the only example. Prisoners working in factories performed daily acts of sabotage and theft. Those who worked in the notorious medical blocks stole medicines, jockeyed names, lied about symptoms, and in Buchenwald they used the typhus wards, which the SS would not go near, to hide men whose names had come up on a death list. Others kept up contact with partisan groups and helped arrange escapes. Still others saw to it that news of the progress of the war was spread throughout the camp—news on which morale and the will to hang on depended. In Soviet camps there was mass theft of camp supplies, especially coal and construction materials, both essential to survival in an arctic climate. Camp facilities were used for unauthorized activities: "Buildings designed for the manufacture of heavy equipment also housed independent workshops for producing goods out of pilfered materials, waste, and remnants." And since, in the Soviet camps, the worker's daily food allotment, as well as the privileges of those in administration, depended on fulfillment of "work norms," everyone, from the common prisoner to the Camp Commandant, falsified work reports. Prisoners fulfilled their timber-cutting norm by stealing from yesterday's output. If a work brigade produced 14 cars of coal that day, the brigade leader put down 15 in his report, in order to meet the norm and insure a decent food ration for his men. In GULAG, cheating was universal.

The distinction between levels of behavior—one "correct" and visible, the other "illegal" and covert—is essential to an understanding of existence in extremity. Men and women conformed because otherwise they died. But they also resisted, and for the same reason: otherwise they died. They resisted because only in this way could they sustain themselves and each other through despair and inhuman hardship. As a survivor of Auschwitz says:

> Oppression as violent as that under which we lived automatically provoked resistance. Our entire existence in the camp was marked by it. When the employees of "Canada" detoured items destined for Germany to the benefit of their fellow internees, it was resistance. When laborers at the spinning mills dared to slacken their working pace, it was resistance. When at Christmas we organized a little "festival" under the noses of our masters, it was resistance. When, clandestinely, we passed letters from one camp to another, it was resistance. When we endeavored, and sometimes with success, to reunite members of the same family—for example, by substituting one internee for another in a gang of stretcher bearers—it was resistance.

A principal aim of the camp system was to dehumanize its victims; to deprive them of all choice, to break their spirit and reduce them to willing slaves, each against the other. On the surface that was apparently true: cooperation with camp administration was more or less total, or appeared to be. And if, therefore, we continue to judge behavior in extremity from this perspective—if we see it only from above, so to speak—then we shall conclude that victimization was complete. But below, underneath, a different picture emerges. Here moral sanity reasserted itself, response to necessity was characterized by resistance, and the worst effects of extremity were thereby transcended. In a strikingly literal sense, these countless concrete acts of subterfuge constituted the *way of life* in the death camps. They were the immediate basis of survival and the means through which—just by doing what had to be done (disobey) in the only way it could be done (collectively)—survivors kept their social being, and therefore their essential humanness, intact.

Given the time, resistance is bound to arise under conditions of extreme coercion. Survival behavior necessarily transcends victimhood, and as we see him, therefore, the victim is a myth. He is the projection of our fears and wishes and mechanisms of defense. But to

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reduce all this to hypocrisy would be a mistake. We employ the strategies we do in order to maintain a precarious feeling of safety and grace; in order, quite literally, to "uphold civilization." A central function of civilization, after all, is to remove unpleasant facts from sight or explain them away; to dispel terror and provide ways that mediate, distance, and finally deny things like death and life's demonic undertow. The spectator syndrome issues from a level of consciousness committed to the primacy of the community, fearful lest any crack appear in the social matrix on which its own well-being depends. Durkheim equated society with God, which suggests that any given society must appear perfect in the minds of its members—if, that is, they are to enjoy freedom from the debilitating sense of their own openness to harm. And thus we seek to believe that victims owe their fate not to the imperfect working of the social order or to politics, but to themselves alone. Their suffering and rejection is what our sense of well-being costs. And in this precise sense their victimhood becomes sacrificial.

The imputation of guilt to victims is a way of lifting the onus of evil from the rest of us. And what this comes down to, finally, is the primitive mechanism of the scapegoat. Sins of societal failure are invested in *them,* who are in turn cast out of the community. Of all such victims, this at least can be said: the evil we do, or dream, or witness, is carried away by them, after we have judged them and found them defiled. The irrational aspect of this process suggests the depth at which it operates. And one of the worst results is that the actual doing of violence is overlooked, allowing the assailant a strange emancipation. He can assume, just as we do, that against all sane evidence he is not the agent of his own crime. They went, after all, like sheep. □

Note

All quotations are from reports by survivors, listed below; for exact page references, see Chapter V of my book The Survivor.

Mary Berg, *Warsaw Ghetto: A Diary.*
Halina Birenbaum, *Hope is the Last to Die.*
Alexander Donat, *The Holocaust Kingdom.*
Antoni Ekart, *Vanished Without Trace.*
Yehoshua Gilboa, *Confess! Confess!*
Jerzy Gliksman, *Tell the West.*
Bernard Goldstein, *The Stars Bear Witness.*
Kitty Hart, *I Am Alive.*
Chaim A. Kaplan, *The Warsaw Diary.*
Sim Kessel, *Hanged at Auschwitz.*
Eugen Kogon, *The Theory and Practice of Hell.*
Olga Lengyel, *Five Chimneys: The Story of Auschwitz.*
Micheline Maurel, *An Ordinary Camp.*
Judith Newman, *In the Hell of Auschwitz.*
Miklos Nyiszli, *Auschwitz.*
Emmanuel Ringelblum, *Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto.*
Seweryne Szmaglewska, *Smoke Over Birkenau.*
Rudolf Vrba, *I Cannot Forgive.*
Eugene Weinstock, *Beyond the Last Path.*
Elie Wiesel, *Night.* □

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Michael Walzer

Thoughts on Democratic Schools

On May 9th of last year, the Rockefeller Foundation and Dissent jointly sponsored a conference on Education. We print below a paper delivered on that occasion, and an abbreviated transcript of the discussion that followed. —EDS.

Education is not a good that we can simply distribute to needy or deserving children, like money or food, housing or health care. It must be received as well as given, and a growing amount of evidence suggests that the quality of the reception has little to do with the quantity of the giving. If we could concern ourselves solely with the allocation of educational resources, it would not be difficult to work out distributive principles: schooling ought to be provided for each child up to the limit of his capacities, or short of that, for as long as he wants it. And it should be equally provided, at least in the limited sense that, within the public system, roughly the same amount of money should be available for each child. No doubt, a great deal remains to be done to fulfill these principles; they would require significant changes in the financing of public education, for example, so as to eliminate the dependency of local school districts on local economies.

But the major problems that beset primary and secondary education in the U.S. today are not problems of distribution and cannot be solved by redistribution. I want to suggest that we think of them as problems of association. In a pluralist society, the preparation of children for political and cultural citizenship requires the creation of communities of learning, communities that have no *a priori* existence and must be constituted by political decision. The relevant decisions are not only those presently required by disputes over racial integration. There are general questions about integration and segregation that have to be answered. Which children should go to school with which others? On what principles should we associate children in schools and classrooms?

Just as these are not questions of race alone, so they are not questions only of social class. They would arise even in a classless society, unless we assume (as many socialists, particularly in the Marxist tradition, did assume) that classlessness would also involve the submergence or overcoming of religious, ethnic, and ideological differences. If socialist citizens had only that one, socialist identity and no other, the association of their children might raise no problems. But I expect that if they were good socialists, and typical ones, they would find things to disagree about. They would certainly disagree about educational philosophy, and so the question would inevitably arise: should children whose parents are philosophically divided attend different schools?

The search for an associative principle has reference only to children. Except in armies and juries, adults are not coercively brought together by the state. Their range of acquaintance and activity may be limited in all sorts of ways, but with reference to the state they associate freely, following whatever principles they choose. Freedom is the ideal here (and what-

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ever degree of "friendship" is necessary to democratic politics), but this is the freedom of particular men and women, with formed and stable identities they have not freely chosen. These identities are in part the product of their education—probably less of the formal curriculum than of the educational environment and the associations it requires—and in part the product of the same nongovernmental factors that presently limit their social range (and previously limited the social range of their parents).

Conceivably, we could maximize and equalize adult freedom by removing children at an early age from every sort of social influence and randomly associating them in identical schools. But the products of such an education would not be particular men and women in our present sense; nor would the society they formed be a pluralist society. Random association would represent a radical triumph of state and school over society and family, and though something like it has occasionally been advocated by leftist groups, it could probably only be enforced in a totalitarian regime.

Short of random association, what is the right associative principle? I can think of five possibilities, each of which I want to examine in some detail. They point toward different though overlapping conceptions of what the educational experience should be like, and the fact that there are five suggests our present confusion on that issue.

In weighing the five possibilities, I shall adopt the following guideline: *the principle on which children are coercively associated should anticipate the pattern that would prevail among adults in a world of freedom and equality*. In an instrumental sense, the anticipation may not do any good; it may not bring adult freedom and equality any closer—for that requires, whatever we do with children, the political activity of adults. But the school years are long, a substantial part of a human life, and they have a value in themselves, without regard to their long-term results. We want what is best for our children right now. Moreover, because of this parental concern, educational debates have significant short-term results: they are likely to generate adult political activity of a very intense kind. Christopher Jencks has suggested that the most important effects of school desegregation are on adults, not children. It's not that associating children from different racial groups brings their parents together; it doesn't. But it does force parents to think about associative principles, and these quickly open up into larger political issues.

First principle: neighborhood. There are such things as natural neighborhoods, the free creations of people who know one another and choose to live together. But most neighborhoods are political artifacts. Settled in chronological layers by different groups, their boundaries are the results of zoning laws, highway placement, economic development, subway and bus routes, and the location of public schools. A neighborhood school, then, doesn't necessarily serve a homogeneous community, though insofar as different groups of people come to view a particular school as theirs, it may serve to heighten feelings of homogeneity. This was one of the original purposes of the public school: it was to be a little melting pot, and neighborhood was to be the first of its products, on the way, as it were, to citizenship. It was assumed that school districts geographically drawn would in fact be socially mixed, that the children who came together in the classroom would come from very different class and ethnic backgrounds. This was never consistently true, across any particular city or town; I am not sure whether it is more or less true now than it used to be. With regard to racial mixing, however, the evidence is clear. Neighborhood schools serve to keep black and white children apart. Indeed, keeping them apart was one of the chief reasons for the political decisions, above all the gerrymandering of school districts that constituted the neighborhoods. For this reason, the associative principle of neighborhood is today under severe attack. Nevertheless, it remains for many people an attractive idea, quite aside

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from racial issues, and it is worth explaining why.

If one tries to imagine the basic units of a pluralist society, it's hard to avoid the geographic district. People are most likely to be active and effective where they live. It's in their neighborhoods that they are knowledgeable, involved, directly concerned—and the claim that children should be educated in that world where their parents are most at home is very strong. It's strong, above all, because parents make the claim so strongly, because the schools are, as I've already suggested, such an important focus of local politics. But we should pay attention to it for other reasons. Children probably do better in schools their parents support; parents probably do better, as parents, when their children are going to schools whose character they understand and accept. I don't want to deny the role of the school as an alternative environment, a liberation from homelife, a potential source of conflict in the socialization of children, but it is another of the advantages of the local school district that it is usually large and diverse enough to allow for that sort of tension. Since decisions about local public schools are political in character, they necessarily involve bargaining and compromise. Few parents will be entirely satisfied (unless they are entirely passive), and children are almost certain to find a world at school different from the one they know at home. Different, but not too different—so this same school can serve as a center for neighborhood activities: political meetings, athletic contests, concerts, dances, extracurricular classes in everything from car repair to yoga.

I've made the picture too "pretty." It's necessary to add that this first associative principle works better for some Americans than for others; it works best for those who live in cohesive and relatively prosperous neighborhoods. But there can be no doubt that most Americans would live in such neighborhoods if they could—and send their children to the local schools, involve themselves in school board elections, and so on. Before turning, then, to the problems raised by our actual residential patterns, I want to take up two alternative principles that arise among people for whom local schools are already effective, and which would arise even if all American neighborhoods were cohesive and prosperous (integrated, classless, or whatever).

Second principle: parental interest or ideology. We don't, in fact, bring all children together in public schools; we permit their parents to send them to private schools, supported (largely) with private money. Parents with sizable incomes or parents belonging to organizations, like the Catholic Church, with substantial resources, can associate their children in accordance with religious conviction, social standing, or educational philosophy. Among middle-class Americans there has recently been some proliferation of "free schools" (which are often very expensive) organized on the last of these criteria. The products of the affluent '60s, they may well collapse in the '70s, but they clearly reflect a growing sense that parental interest ought to prevail over democratic decision-making with its inevitable compromises. Arguments for neighborhood control would seem to apply *a fortiori* to private schools insofar as these are especially exposed to consumer pressures. Why shouldn't parents get *exactly* what they want for their children? At present, only some parents can do that, but the ability to do it could be widely extended if public support were forthcoming. This is the thrust of the "voucher plan," a proposal that tax money available for education be turned over to parents, in the form of educational vouchers, to be spent on the open market in whatever schools they choose. These would not be neighborhood schools, except insofar as parents with similar educational commitments happened to be living together. In any case, they would be oriented more precisely to parental wishes than neighborhood public schools are ever likely to be. There would also be more of them, presumably, and they would

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cater to a wider range of interests and ideologies.

The voucher plan is a pluralist proposal, with the basic unit shifted from the geographic district to the self-forming community of like-minded parents. Or, more accurately, it points toward a society where there would be no basic unit at all, but a variety of units for different sorts of activities. It might be argued that this is the pattern that would emerge among free and equal adults: they would be highly mobile, rootless, moving easily from one ideological community to another; they would make different decisions in different groups and so avoid the endless log-rolling of geographically based politics.

I am inclined to be dubious about this picture, but in any case it does not suggest the experience children would have in schools freely chosen by their parents. For most children, parental choice almost certainly means less diversity and less tension. Their schools would be more like their homes than they are now, and the children they were associated with would be more like themselves. Perhaps these arrangements predict their own future choices, but they hardly predict the full range (the desirable range) of their future acquaintance. Ideologically based schools might cut across ethnic and racial lines in a way that neighborhood schools often don't. But even that is uncertain, for ethnicity and race would surely be two of the principles around which free schools were organized. These are undoubtedly acceptable principles, so long as they aren't the only ones, in a pluralist society. Once again it has to be stressed, however, that for particular children they would be the only ones.

The most disturbing feature of the voucher plan is its reliance on the open market. Once vouchers are in circulation, we must expect the appearance of large numbers of entrepeneurs, with educational goods to sell. And since many parents are passive and confused with regard to their children's education, they (and their children) are ripe for an old-fashioned kind of capitalist victimization. In public schools, such parents are often protected by the political activists in their midst, who serve the interests of the community as a whole by keeping some pressure on teachers and administrators. In a free school system, interested parents would more likely vote with their feet, withdrawing their children from schools whose value they had come to doubt, leaving behind uninterested parents and helpless children. There would be little pressure on educational entrepreneurs, so long as they could replace departing customers—except insofar as governmental inspectors made their appearance, enforcing some general code.

Despite all this, there is much to be said for the argument that parents not be locked into their neighborhood public schools, or rather, that their right to exit not be conditional on their financial resources. After all, voting with their feet is often the only way they can vote that is immediately effective for their own children. Political action on educational issues tends to be especially altruistic; its beneficial results most often benefit other people's children. More immediate parental concerns might be accommodated by permitting what is called "open enrollment" within the public system. Given such an arrangement, most parents would probably prefer neighborhood schools, and prefer also to fight for better schools in their own neighborhoods, but there would be a way out for those particularly dissatisfied. Or, at least, there would be a way out if different neighborhoods had different sorts of schools. I will return briefly to this possibility later on, in talking about racial integration; I want to consider now another associative principle that parents often seek to implement either within or in spite of neighborhood schools that work.

Third principle: talent. The idea that careers should be open to talent is central to liberal society, and it has often been argued that school careers should be similarly open. Then those children who can move along quickly will be enabled to do so, while slower students will find their work adjusted to the

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pace of their learning. Both groups will be happier, so the argument goes, and within each group children will find their authentic friends and future allies. In later life, they will continue to associate (and would do so even in a world of freedom and equality) with people of roughly similar intelligence. Parents who think their children especially bright tend to favor this sort of segregation, partly so that the children make the "right" kind of friends, partly so that they are not bored in school, partly in the belief that intelligence reinforced is even more intelligent. Just for this reason, however, there is often a counter-demand—that bright children be distributed throughout the school or the school system so as to stimulate and reinforce the others. This looks like using the bright students as a resource for the less bright, a use we would not permit among free and equal adults. But whether it is "using" or not depends upon what one takes as the natural starting point for coercive association. If the starting point is everyday residence and play, then it is the segregation of the bright students that can plausibly be criticized: it now seems to be a willful impoverishment of the educational experience of the others.

It's not really true that the adult world is voluntarily segregated by intelligence. All sorts of work relationships, up and down the status hierarchy, require mixing, and what is more important, democratic politics requires it. One could not conceivably organize a democratic society without bringing people of every degree and kind of talent and lack of talent together—not only in cities and towns but also in parties and movements (not to speak of armies and bureaucracies).

Schools should anticipate that kind of integration, and only when they do so, it seems to me, are more limited uses of segregation permissible. There are educational reasons for separating out children who are having special difficulties in math, for example, and also children who are especially good at math. But there are neither educational nor social reasons for making such distinctions across the board, creating a two-class system within the schools or creating radically different sorts of schools. When this is done, and especially when it is done early in the educational process, it is not the voluntary associations of adults that are being anticipated, but the class system in roughly its present form. For then children are brought together chiefly on the basis of their preschool training and their home environments, in ways that drastically limit their future development. Moreover, in contemporary America, they are brought together so as to establish a hierarchy not only of social classes but also of racial groups. Inequality is doubled, and the doubling, as we have reason to know, is especially pernicious for democratic politics.

We can try to minimize the coercive effects of the class structure and of racism in two ways: first, by avoiding every kind of premature labeling of students and keeping channels of opportunity open as long as possible; second, by building a more fraternal pattern of association in our schools (but not only there). The claim that neither of these goals can be achieved within neighborhood schools, even if they are untracked, generates the fourth associative principle.

Fourth principle: equal treatment. The argument here is that neighborhood schools are radically unequal, not because or not primarily because of the amounts of money spent or the quality of the teaching or the content of the curriculum, but because of the social character and expectations of the children associated within them. In ghetto and slum schools, children are prepared for ghetto and slum life. The world they see, the contacts they make, the debased value of the certification they receive: these are the crucial features of their education. In effect, they are labeled by their social location and taught to label themselves. Their schooling is from its first moments an attack on their self-esteem, and their performance in school reflects the success of the attack. The only way to alter this situation, it is said, is to shift the social location of the students, that is, to separate their schools from their neighbor-

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hoods. This can be done both by moving ghetto and slum children out of their local schools and by moving other children in. Either way, it is the associational pattern that is being changed.

It's not easy to say exactly what new pattern the principle of equal treatment requires. We are likely to be pressed toward a system where the social composition of each school would be exactly the same. Different sorts of children would be mixed in the same ratio in every school within a given area, the ratio varying from area to area with the overall character of the population. But how does one identify the appropriate areas? And how does one sort out the children—by race alone, or by religion too, or by ethnic group, or social class? Logic would seem to require the largest areas within which transportation is possible and the most detailed sorting out. But the federal judges who are currently deciding such questions seem likely to stop short of both, focusing their attention on cities and (perhaps) their immediate suburbs and on racial integration alone. "In Boston," Judge Garrity declared, "the public school population is approximately two-thirds white and one-third black; ideally every school in the system would have the same proportions." No doubt there are good reasons for stopping at that point, given the special role of race in American society, but it is worth emphasizing that equal treatment, taken literally, would require a much more complex proportionality.

Because of the current stress on race, arguments against proportional association often take racist forms. I don't think they need do that; it's only necessary to suggest that proportionality would not characterize the relations of free and equal adults. Among certain black activists, for example, the argument goes this way: even in a society free of every taint of racism, most (or at least many) black Americans would choose to live together, shaping their own neighborhoods and controlling local institutions. The only way to anticipate that social pattern is to establish neighborhood control now. If increasing numbers of black adults (parents as well as professional teachers and administrators) take active part in the schooling of black children, if black communities become centers of educational activity, the ghetto will cease to be a place of discouragement and defeat. What equality requires, in this view, is that the association of black children with other black children carry with it the same mutual reinforcement as the association of white children with other white children. To opt for proportionality now is to acknowledge the impossibility of such reinforcement, to admit the failure of black community—and to do so before any serious effort has been made to succeed.

This is a powerful argument. It draws force from the principle of neighborhood, which, as I have been trying to indicate, must be the preferred principle in a democratic and pluralist society. But it faces in America today a major difficulty. The residential segregation of black Americans is very different from that of Irish Catholics, WASPs, Jews, and so on. It is, to put it simply, a great deal less voluntary and a great deal more thoroughgoing. It does not anticipate pluralism so much as separatism; it is not the pattern that we would expect to find in a racially open society. Surely we ought to avoid associating children so as to consolidate that pattern. But how far can we deviate from it while still respecting the communities that blacks would form in an open society? Equally important, how far can we deviate from it while still respecting the communities that other people have already formed? I don't know exactly how to draw the line, but I am inclined to think that proportional association draws it badly.

If equal treatment means identical schools, then the principle is incompatible with the existence and development of a pluralist society. For as long as adults associate freely in groups, shaping diverse communities and cultures, the education of children will be, and should be, group-dependent. But adults don't associate freely enough: above all, in the U.S. today, contacts between the races are severely constrained. Hence the schools must try to

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bring children together in ways that challenge the existing barriers and maximize the possibilities for cooperation and mutual involvement among members of different groups. For this purpose, it's not necessary that all schools be identical in social composition; it's only necessary that different sorts of students encounter one another within them.

This probably requires what is currently called (by those who oppose it) "forced busing." The phrase is unfair, since all school assignments are compulsory in character, but it contains a grain of truth, and it suggests why busing, however necessary, is not an ideal procedure. Though children will undoubtedly make the best of it, if left alone, it represents a more overt kind of coercion, a more direct disruption of everyday living patterns than is desirable. Under the best of circumstances, there is sure to be tension and conflict when groups of children who live entirely apart are suddenly thrown together. More centralized patterns of political control are likely to be necessary once the principle of localism has been set aside. On the other hand, it's clear that that principle has been set aside before—by school committees and city councils that imposed racial segregation even when geography called for, or at least allowed for, very different associational arrangements. Given the actual histories of many school districts, further assaults on the norms of neighborhood seem unavoidable, though I would seek to minimize them wherever possible. Other arrangements should also be explored: parental choice within the public system (open enrollment) may operate against racial segregation and should certainly be encouraged if it does so; the creation of "magnet schools" catering to particular student interests may have a similar effect. And more desirable patterns of student contact could probably be achieved by giving up the requirement that children (particularly older children) spend 30–35 hours a week in the same school building. It might be preferable to bus children for parts of days, associating them in different ways for different activities, while maintaining a neighborhood base. But it's not my purpose here to offer practical suggestions, only to recognize the force, and also the limits, of equal treatment as an associational principle.

Fifth principle: nationalism. Given today's residential patterns, the ideology of the melting pot probably requires the same kind of racial (and class) mixing as does the principle of equal treatment. The requirement is not, however, equally strong. The idea of a nationalist education drew whatever strength it once had from the perceived difficulties of immigrant absorption. I don't believe that contemporary forms of ethnic assertiveness pose the same or even remotely similar difficulties. Failures of democratic socialization today have more to do with the weakness or inadequacy of local and particularistic institutions than with the absence of a common language or a national consciousness. It's hard to imagine any group of children brought together under any possible circumstances in America today who would not be recognizably American, to themselves as well as to other people. They don't need any further "melting," but they do need, and schools should provide, an environment within which they can take on some independent shape.

That shape will of course be mediated by their homes and neighborhoods as well as by their schools. But I see no reason for state or federal governments to take a direct role in establishing the sovereignty of the school (beyond the role they already take in setting minimal standards). No doubt, they could make American nationality a more uniform product if they did intervene, particularly if they did so by separating children from their homes and neighborhoods. That might also be a way of reducing racial and ethnic prejudice—if only because children who came increasingly to resemble one another would have to find new ways of disliking one another. But it is not an attractive prospect, for what is valuable and distinctive about America is precisely its pluralist character: the absence of nationality in

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the usual sense of that term and its replacement by citizenship. Since the association of free and equal citizens in a pluralist society is determined in large part by their group identities, there is no reason to refuse to allow similar determinants to work among children. They won't be the only determinants at work, for the fact that the schools are preparing children to participate in a single economic system and a national politics assures a certain uniformity in educational outcomes. The omnipresence of the mass media and of the cultural products they purvey heightens the assurance. Pluralist tendencies play against these forces, I think, in a salutary way; in any case, the play is unavoidable unless the government were to commit itself to a *Kulturkampf* of extraordinary proportions.

A rather simple and, I am afraid, unoriginal proposition follows from the survey of associational principles I have just completed. The most important battle for democratic education was won when public schools were established and given over to local control. Educational politics has, since then, been the most decentralized form of American politics: I mean to endorse that decentralization. The phrase "local control," of course, begs many questions. In fact, the localities are radically different in character and size, and I have said nothing about the desirable shape of school districts or the proper authority of school committees. These are matters (sometimes) worth fighting over—along with finances, curriculum, and so on; but the structure of the inevitable battles is set and, I think, rightly set by the present patchwork of public systems. The existence of that structure is already a victory for democratic schools, and we should not be quick to relinquish that victory even when, because of failures elsewhere in society, we have to compromise its character.

Today we are involved in a major compromise that is likely to require larger school districts, centralized decision-making, increased use of busing, and so on. These are expedients made necessary by prevailing residential patterns (and by past school districting decisions), but they are not desirable in themselves; they should be temporary expedients; in a just society no one would have any reason to suggest them. When men and women live as equals in communities they have chosen and over which they exercise some significant degree of control, they will, by and large, want to educate their children where they live—and that preference should be respected as a matter of course.

They will disagree about what should go on in the local schools, and these disagreements will be an important part of local politics (and local politics will be important because of them). Across a city or state, very different decisions will be made in different school districts. Some of these districts will be relatively homogeneous in character; some will be radically heterogeneous. Sometimes the boundary tensions endemic to a pluralist society will have to be faced in a particular community or a particular school, but we need not insist that this be the case everywhere and all the time. Most often, within particular districts parents with diverse commitments will establish a *modus vivendi*. Within particular schools children will have to cope with the common, but not, or not often, with the extreme differences that pluralism makes possible.

This is, I think, the natural form of democratic politics and of democratic education. It invites participation within a familiar world; its institutions are built to a human scale. It opens the way to every form of diversity while still permitting people who choose to do so to live and work together—and to bring their children together. It promises local excitement, well short of civil war. □

To Our Contributors

- When sending manuscripts, please make sure that you do not send your only copy.
- And please also be sure to enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope. —THE EDITORS

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The Discussion

IRVING HOWE: We have grown accustomed to two commonplace notions about schools, and both are wrong. One is a kind of baby-talk Marxism, which says that the schools just reflect the larger society, communicating its materialistic or bourgeois values. The other is that the schools are, or should be, agencies of social transformation, a notion with roots very deep in the American experience; it goes back to Emerson and John Dewey. I think it's also wrong, if only because impossible. But what seems to me both true and important is the idea that in a democratic society there is a tension between the school and society, and that indeed there *must* be in any society that allows a possibility of freedom. The school must always act in the name of some larger social value or norm, and that idea, though it may be hard to define, pervades Michael Walzer's paper.

The tensions the paper exhibits reflect the difficulties of adjusting proclaimed larger social values to the more particularistic interests of local communities, interests we have learned to try not to scorn. I deliberately put it in so cautious a way. We have learned to try not to scorn those particularistic interests, because one of the ways in which we define the larger social values is to learn to be sensitive to local particularistic interests. So there is bound to be a tension between the school and society; between the proclaimed ends of the school and the attitudes the child brings to it.

The school seeks to shape and transform; it seeks in some ways to impose values, the values of society, to be sure, but also values *against* those that are dominant at the moment. If a school doesn't seek to shape and to impose, then it totally abdicates, and no school except perhaps in the most extreme circumstances, totally abdicates.

STANLEY PLASTRIK: I want to comment on Michael's views about the value of the neighborhood. We all are well aware that in our country, housing and neighborhood patterns are more or less dictated by socioeconomic status. In New York City you have a high-rise, privately built housing development where professionals and middle-class people live, sending their children to the local private schools, and in the vicinity will be a municipal housing development, and there the children go to a completely different school. And so the question I would like to ask him is, "What is the *reality* of the neighborhood?"

MICHAEL WALZER: I went to neighborhood schools, so let me try to say a word about my own experience. I went, first, to a public school in the Bronx, until I was eight years old, and it was a neighborhood school, in the sense that the children I was associated with in the school were the children I played and fought with on the street. The proportions of children in the school—in this case it would be of Jewish and non-Jewish students—were roughly fifty-fifty. My sense is that, even in cities, and especially when you get out of places like Manhattan, there are still large numbers of urban school districts that have this character.

My family then moved to Johnstown, Pennsylvania, where I continued in public schools, very clearly neighborhood schools, and then in a consolidated high school, which was class-consolidated.

Although most of the middle-class kids went to college and most working-class kids went to the steel mills, there was mixing at the fringes, meeting on the football team and on the newspaper—which was, I think, very useful. Because the communities were directly adjacent, there was also some playing and fighting together, reflected at the school. School board elections were enormously important, because the school was close to everybody. I think a

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great many Americans still go to schools of that sort.

Now I don't know enough about the sociology of American school districts, but my sense is that my emphasis on neighborhood schools is not a matter of mere nostalgia. All over the country, school board elections are the most important local elections, and that reflects a real commitment to both particular areas and particular institutions.

MICHAEL NOVAK: Some clarity can be gained by moving away, just for a moment, from the question of race. If you will just think of the class problem Michael hinted at and if you think of working-class schools—I guess South Boston is a fair example—there is still this tension between the part of the population that wants an elite school where they conceive of their youngsters going into some professional line, and others who more or less want them to get through school because it is a credentialing operation. I recently met a young man who is working for his Master's degree at C. W. Post College in Criminology. His father is a lieutenant on the elite detective group here in the city, but his father will never go above the rank of lieutenant because he doesn't have an A.B., let alone a Master's. And he thinks his father is first-rate, but *he* wants that Master's degree so that when he goes into the police force, he'll go higher than his father did. His attitude toward school interested me. He was just really getting through.

DAVID BENSMAN: I feel the issue has been sharply drawn, in that Irving's remarks seemed to me dangerously close to what the liberal conception of education is. I think he tends to ignore areas of social conflict, especially if you look at the matter historically, i.e., at the larger social purpose that the public schools were to serve when they were set up in 1842 in New York. They were set up to promote the values of the Protestant elite in New York City. That's pretty clear, if you look at it as it was 130 years ago, when there was a battle about whether the schools should continue to be controlled by the Protestant Establishment of New York City. The Irish Catholics fought hard, and it led to very explicit political conflict. Eventually the schools dropped their Protestant names but continued to fulfill the same function. As a result, the Irish Catholics tried to set up parochial schools. They were largely too poor to do it and weren't able to send too many of their children to those schools. But that's what their concept was and, it seems to me, throughout American history most of the immigrant groups *resisted* the public schools as well as trying to benefit from them. For instance, the Italians resisted the public schools by sending their children to work. They voted with their feet.

But now I think there is a convergence in goals and desires between the parents of working-class children in America and the people who control the society and the schools. By and large, everybody is agreed that the schools ought to be achievement-oriented, mobility-oriented, and producing adults who are individualistic. And so there is a convergence now, I think, and the schools are training people for the liberal capitalist society that we live in. So, if we were to talk about what kind of schools we want, we would have to talk about what sort of values the school system and the society now are trying to inculcate in children, by and large successfully.

MURRAY HAUSKNECHT: If we agree to stress universalism as something desirable, that, it seems to me, runs in opposition to Michael's emphasis on the neighborhood, because the neighborhood, almost by definition, is very parochial. One of the things that happens with decentralization, even in New York City, is that one moves away from universalistic emphases. There might also be a tendency to move away from the tension that Irving says exists in schools. That may very well be because there is local control or neighborhood control. I think that's, again, one of the tensions built into a democratic society, a continual tension between the universalism one would presumably want and the local control one also would want. At least, I'd add, local

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control to a degree, because I have heard the argument made by educators that the worst thing about American education has been that there's been too much local control rather than too little.

WALZER: Yes, and can I comment on that? The paradigmatic example, now, of this issue is the fight in West Virginia over textbooks, and it's raising very interesting questions for people committed to democratic values. You can, after all, choose from many, many textbooks. It's unlikely that parents, even of the most parochial sort, will write their own. And when those choices come to be made, under local control, we have to expect that very often textbooks will be chosen that don't reflect what we have been calling universal values, or that don't reflect them to the fullest degree. (It's very hard to write textbooks on civics or in history without reflecting *some* universal values.) My own inclination, insofar as one has to plunk on these issues, is that, were I living in this West Virginia school district, I would fight hard in defense of whatever the best textbooks are. But, living outside it, I am content that the people in West Virginia be allowed themselves to decide.

DAVID SPITZ: Why should you be content? In effect, you have two majorities here. You have a local majority and a national majority. In Tennessee, a local majority decided that the Darwinian theory of evolution is contrary to God's law and should not be taught. You are now saying that, were you a resident of Tennessee, you would be against such an attitude—but, as an outsider, you are content to let them decide by themselves.

In your paper you say, "We want the best for our children." As an outsider, you are surely aware that this is not the best for the children, because it keeps them in a state of ignorance—but, as an insider, you would be content to let them stay in a state of ignorance because the local majority would prevail.

WALZER: Wait a minute . . .

HOWE: David, you wouldn't want to send troops to West Virginia, to change the textbooks?

SPITZ: They sent troops to Arkansas.

WALZER: My own commitment, I expect, is also yours, David. It is that democracy works within limits that are set by rights, so I would draw a certain line. A school board can make a decision that is within its democratic authority, but I think I would also want to defend academic freedom—that is, the teacher teaching from that textbook can say about it, in his or her classroom, what he or she wants to say.

ROSE LAUB COSER: I like the idea of the neighborhood. But I think we ought also to realize that while the neighborhood, like social mobility, goes together with democracy, it can also go against democracy. The neighborhood is exclusive. To use the rhetoric about class society and the schools being an expression of class society: social classes are maintained in part through the neighborhood—that is, through residential patterns . . .

PATRICIA CAYO SEXTON: I think that, however much we might want to integrate our schools through busing, it's very clear that it's an extraordinarily difficult thing to do; that, if we cherish the neighborhood school, we may not want to have completely integrated school systems. Beyond that, it's also a political impossibility. Let's think a little bit more about innovative ways in which—other than full-time busing of students out of their neighborhood—we can deghettoize all of our schools. Most of our schools and most of our children really are ghettoized, whether they live in the suburbs or the inner city. They are segregated from other people, and I think that one of the basic problems in the school is that there isn't enough association with people outside of their own neighborhood. If we think a little more about how we can get our children out of their schools—and into more than just brief encounters with the outside world; how we can get them into other neighborhoods, how we can get them into other schools, not for brief periods and not for full time, either; how we can increase associations across class and race lines for all of our children—there is not even

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enough association with adults, let alone other children from other school systems.

DEBORAH MEIER: They are not even in much association with children a year older or younger, for they are also ghettoized by a very strict notion of age.

One of the things that's happened in the schools is that you had tracking, and as a result children played mostly on a single-class line. They went to a mixed neighborhood school, but tracking made it easier to maintain the illusion, in some ways, that they were mixing with the kids in the school, even though they were mixing only within their own sphere.

But I must say, there are moments when I feel like a veteran Marxist, and one of them was when I began to study the question of how we measure the impact of the schools, and the enormous amount of discussion about what the effectiveness of schools is. I had to think about the purpose of the way we did our measuring. Instruments are used that really have nothing to do, in my opinion, with what the school teaches. I am not talking about college entrance exams, which are clearly meant to select—in other words, to screen out. I am talking about measurement instruments used when kids are younger, to establish whether the school is doing a good job or not; whether some program is effective; all the things that James Coleman uses in discussing whether or not our schools are doing a good job. The more I examined these measuring instruments, the more clear it became that they were not intended to measure such matters at all.

One aside. Of course, human beings learn something in any environment they are in. And so, in a certain sense, any environment is educative; you learn something from the way it's organized, learn something on the street, playing with one another. But I am also saying that to learn, as we speak of it here, means an experience that enlarges someone's intellectual capacity to think about and traverse the environment. But the instruments we use for measuring the effectiveness of a school don't actually tell us much about whether the school did that. These instruments were, in effect, designed, organized, and planned so that, with rare exceptions, they would be impervious to the impact of the school. And that's true, whether you are talking about math or reading tests. I did not realize that until I began to work with kids and to talk about what was on the tests, and explored how the tests were designed.

Largely they serve another purpose. They were designed to maintain the scheme of social mobility as it is today, and to make some people always look better and some always look worse. And they were designed to make sure most people stay in the same place. I don't say that it's a conspiracy, but it's not an accident either. It's a vicious cycle—we design an instrument to measure by those standards, and then we spend our energy in school, pretending we are going to try to outwit a measurement instrument that, by its very nature, can't be outwitted. Then we say, "See, it proves the kids can't learn, because we poured extra money in there, and lo and behold, their IQs didn't go up"—as though the school's purpose were to change the unchangeable. You have to look at the instruments themselves, and sit with kids, to realize they aren't measuring anything you can teach in school.

An example: I am working with eight-year-olds this year, and the EEO has a respected math test. In fact, it is nothing more or less than a standardized paper-and-pencil/verbal IQ test, and it's absolutely phony to think that it has anything to say at all about whether I or the schools are teaching math. Nothing the school can do can change most children's scores on those tests, and I think that's in the nature of a standardized instrument. It's unbelievable that people in the education field, including guys like Coleman and Jencks, don't go back to look at the instruments being used to decide whether schools have an impact or not.

NOVAK: One of the things we have alluded to, a number of times, and haven't mentioned is the impact of family traditions in the schools. I think David's point about the Italian

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families of some years ago, how they withdrew students from school, is paralleled in other groups. With Slavic families, quite often, the first item of business was paying off the mortgage on the home, well before you sent anybody in the family to college. Jewish families took a very different route. People are making very different uses of the educational system.

SPITZ: I want to come back to a fundamental issue between Michael Walzer and myself. Let me start with the comment he made about certain social or legal subdivisions. Now, the school is not quite a secondary institution like a labor union or a corporation; the school is in some sense part of the political system.

It is conceivable that you can draw a line in, say, American society between a political order and a technical economic order or a cultural order, and talk about principles appropriate to each order. The school falls into a category that crosses the political and the cultural; it has a multiplicity of functions.

One of the things any society must concern itself with is the definition of what that society is. What do we mean by "a community"? And when you talk about a majority, you are talking about a majority within a community. You aren't talking about a majority of the world; you aren't talking about a majority at this table; you are talking about a particular *kind* of majority. And, education in the American society involves America. We are an American society. We want Americans to be educated. And therefore we have a concern with what is done everywhere in the country, because we are a national community and not just a grab bag of local communities.

So we now have to understand what we mean by "community," and I am not impressed by accidents of geography. Where Michael talks about rights, I am talking about human rights, not geographical rights. A community is not defined by the fact that a few people happen to live in this or that neighborhood. We are very mobile; Michael himself has traveled across many geographical areas. I don't know why "neighborhood" is so sacred. What does it mean, to have an "American community"? We talk of certain standards, talk of education and local rights. The State of New York does not respect local rights. The State of New York says, "Yes, you can educate your children, but you have to be sure they learn 'X.'" It may be, regents tests are miserable—I haven't looked at regents tests. But, there is an effort made by the state to prevent gross inequities in educational results.

I was once a resident of Ohio. I taught at the state university, and I can tell you that I had students who came from high schools where they had been valedictorians, and they could not read or write an intelligible paragraph. Some of them came from little high schools where the little boy or girl erased the board and did errands for the teacher—and learned nothing.

Local control may or may not have its virtues, but the one thing we cannot tolerate is the disparagement of a certain notion of reasonable competence. Minimum standards have to be set.

LEWIS COSER: I think the distinction we have been bandying about between "particularism" and "universalism" turns out, upon inspection, to be not quite helpful. The question is, What do we mean by "universalistic standards"? Who defines what is "universalistic"? David Bensman, in the beginning, made a good point. The so-called universalistic standards were, in fact, the standards of the WASP Establishment. They served quite specific class purposes. Well, that's no longer entirely the case. But, I ask myself, Who writes what textbooks, now? My sense of it is that what you find, in many of them—obviously, not all—is by no means universalistic standards, but peculiar parochial standards—namely, the parochial standards that come out of teachers' colleges.

That's why David Spitz worries me a little bit. He has made an impassioned argument for universalism—and I would agree with him, provided he could tell me who defines what is

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universal. If it turns out that, in fact, there are parochial interests in the teachers' colleges that establish what they call universal values, and therefore try to obliterate ethnic, class, and other interests, then I still perhaps prefer that the West Virginia miners have some control over the books they want to use in school.

BENSMAN: I think the problem in our society, more than anything else, is that parents aren't involved enough in the educational system. Sennett and Cobb gave some reasons for that in their book, *The Hidden Injuries of Class*. Working people have some values differing from the values of the schools but are intimidated because they feel inferior to them. One working-class value is that students should help each other, rather than compete against each other. And, if you get to Columbia University, where students wreck each other's lab experiments so that they can get into medical school, you will see how far the educational system is pushing people in the other direction.

Now, basically, parents don't feel they can make an input into the schools, because they feel the schools are superior to them. As a result, they are letting the schools inculcate their children the way the dominant society says students should be.

BOGDAN DENITCH: It is true, what kids learn in school is formed by middle-class values and teachers' shaping of those values, and one could say it doesn't have much to do with intelligence; but it does have terribly much to do with success and mobility in the society. It's a kind of a learning of a rite of passage.

I am always a comparativist in this thing. And, in one of the European cases, a multiethnic country, Yugoslavia, they have exactly this problem. They have a backward, mountainous Moslem area with a certain set of values, including hostility to educating the women, and local school boards do not then send the girls to school; they say they don't need it; they will be married at the age of twelve. And the government is faced with the question, Is it going to allow this valid expression of local ethnic identity to continue expressing itself, which means these people are ghettoized in the name of freedom. . . .

Under these circumstances, the question of rights becomes a rather interesting one. Who on earth has said that the parents have the exclusive right to determine what is a proper education for their children?

On the question of participation, I am not at all sure that, in a society formed by democratic educational values—that is, Deweyism, in its good form—we have exactly created a more democratic society than those not formed by those values. I don't think we are more democratic than Scandinavians and some of the other Europeans. Our schools, in a way, lead me to think that maybe there is no causal link between the two; that, if you want to change the politics of a society, you do it in the center of politics in society, and don't futchy around with the kids, to do that.

HOWE: Far from being too American-centered, our discussion has not, I think, really taken into sufficient account the distinctiveness of the American experience, or of what we call the American myth. A myth is neither mere lie nor mere fact; it is a story that binds together a culture and releases the values of that culture.

The American myth is the myth of democracy, to which Emerson gives a quasi-religious character. People like ourselves, socialists, have severely criticized not so much the myth itself as the failure of the society to conform to the myth. But if that criticism spills over into an attack upon the myth, then we do a grave disservice; while, insofar as we criticize the failure of the society to live up to the myth, we do a great service.

Now, in reality, the whole relationship between parochialism and universalism in this country has been in terms of the democratic myth. Ethnic group after ethnic group has come along and said, "We have rights, too. We are Americans, too." The fact of saying that is one of the things that helps to give them access to the goods of society. If you want to use a certain vocabulary, it has been the form in which the class struggle in America has, in part, occurred—through the intervention of

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ethnic groups laying claim to the universalistic goods, real or alleged, of the society. And, by and large, this is one of the ways in which some things, at least, have gotten better.

I think the reason we have had the kind of discussion we have had here today is that in the last period the myth of American society has lost, for perfectly legitimate and understandable reasons, some of its binding power. It's at this point that unhappy kinds of localism and parochialism arise within the society, which means there are many forces in the society running counter to the proclaimed values of the myth.

WALZER: I am inclined to think that, were we able to create a more egalitarian society in the United States, we would probably have a more interesting and lively kind of democracy, and precisely because of our localist and decentralist traditions. The schools are just one, perhaps the most important, example.

A summary word on the issues that David Spitz raised. The tension between school and society we have focused on at various points today can be made more precise, in two ways. It is a tension between parents and the political community, both the local community that includes nonparents, and all the larger communities in the federal system. And it is also a tension between parents and teachers. And those are two very different sorts of tensions that exist in the school.

As for the first, I don't want to argue that children belong to their parents, who can do anything they like with them. Issues have arisen with regard to the Amish communities, court cases in which they pulled their children out of school after the eighth grade. The state brought suit, to force these children to go to school, and the defense was that this was an authentic expression of religious conscience, etc. My impulse in those kinds of cases is to say that those children don't belong to their parents, and the state has to hold opportunity open to them; the opportunity will be defined in some arbitrary way—four more years of school, maybe.

I don't want to see children belong to their parents, but I also don't want to say, however, that children belong to the larger political community, which can take them away from their parents. The Workers' party of New York State, between 1820 and 1830, brought forward a proposal for the random distribution of children to state boarding schools as a way of creating an egalitarian society. And, I am sure, it would have that effect. But we tend not to want to go that way, because we do recognize that parents, while they don't own . . .

ROSE LAUB COSER: We have done it, with Indian and Navajo children, on a large scale.

WALZER: That's different. You aren't randomly associating children—and randomly associating them was a way of breaking the family tie, because it carried the class and ethnic tie.

So, one has to create a kind of institutional balance between the rights of parents and rights of a larger community. In my schools, in Pennsylvania, there was a reading list put forward by the state. We had to read Ben Franklin's autobiography and *The Tempest*. There was a set of books for the different years of high school—and, I don't necessarily disapprove of some efforts in the higher levels to create minimal standards and requirements, to fix a common culture, so that, when students leave the schools and encounter people around the country, they encounter people with whom they share some culture. On the other hand, one has to say that the modern mass media and the effects of a national political-economic system have created a situation where one doesn't have to worry a great deal about the national identity of the student. Right now, I am inclined to think that one should strengthen the local community. Strengthen the schools and you would probably also improve social behavior, ordinary, everyday social behavior.

One wants to make sure tensions are creatively used. At different points in history, one shifts the balance one way or another. My impulse, now, is to shift it toward the parents, but not in such a way as to eliminate the tension. □

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David Spitz

Justice for Sale

The Justice of Property vs. the Property of Justice

In the short time since its publication, Robert Nozick's book, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*,[1] has received a quite extraordinary reception. Bernard Williams in the London *Times Literary Supplement* (January 17, 1975) described the author and his book as "original, remarkable, and strikingly intelligent," then subjected the work to devastating criticism. Peter Singer in the *New York Review of Books* (March 6, 1975), applauded its "rigorous argument and needle-sharp analysis," then gave a host of reasons belying this judgment. Sheldon Wolin in the *New York Times Book Review* (May 11, 1975) said that "the book is unquestionably a dazzling technical achievement," then treated it with biting contempt. In short, these and other serious critics dislike the book but yield it grudging respect.

Perhaps more extraordinary is the reported fact that President Ford's speechwriters are devouring the book for possible use. In one sense this is not surprising, for Nozick defends property rights and offers what appears to be a profound rationale for extreme individualism. But in another sense this is a mistake, for Nozick's ideas are not conservative but closer to anarchism than a contemporary capitalist (who is clearly also a statist) can abide.

That a technical philosophical work should become a primer for certain politicians is ultimately less consequential than its philosophical import. For a long time utilitarianism (along with perfectionism, whether in its Kantian or Platonic forms) reigned as our dominant philosophical doctrine. But the principle of utility, even as modified by John Stuart Mill, has come increasingly under attack. In the service of the greatest good for the greatest number, it seems to sacrifice individual rights, e.g., freedom, to economic and social welfare. Further, the greatest good is an imprecise standard, leaving room for prudential and therefore diverse judgments; it affronts those who crave certainty in moral and political affairs, especially those who seem to have found this precision and certainty in game theory, decision theory, and other modes of formal analysis. Moreover, the principle of utility does not seem to protect minorities from the tyranny of a majority seeking (like the Nazis) its greatest pleasure. Hence many contemporary philosophers have either abandoned utilitarianism or sought to revise it. John Rawls's book, *A Theory of Justice*,[2] is perhaps the most ambitious and significant recent effort at this revision, setting forth minimum rules of justice to circumscribe an otherwise utilitarian doctrine. Nozick's book is a full-scale assault on both Rawls and utilitarianism, on both the welfare state and the principle of equality. As such, it challenges contemporary liberalism.

Since, however, I believe the book to be politically naive, philosophically deficient, and historically irrelevant, I find myself in a quandary. I can treat it briefly and perhaps satirically, in which case it might be more instructive to review Nozick's reviewers rather than his book. Or I can seek seriously to demon-

[1]New York: Basic Books, 1974.

[2]Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

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strate why I think it is a bad book—which neither demolishes its antagonists nor proposes an adequate alternative—in which case I must deal with it in painstaking detail. In this latter case, however, I cannot—without writing at book length—consider *all* of Nozick's arguments, e.g., his extensive critique of Rawls. I will confine myself instead to the central principles of Nozick's enterprise.

THE THESIS OF THE BOOK, at least initially, may be stated briefly.

Everything, including freedom and human rights, is for sale. It's only a matter of price.

What each individual has legitimately acquired, he may legitimately transfer. What he is and what he has is his alone to dispose of, provided only that he not interfere with the rights of others, who also may dispose of what they have or are. Each individual is his own sovereign. To oblige him to help others, e.g., through taxation, is nothing less than extortion; it is also "cruel paternalism" to those helped, i.e., maintained in what they have not. The state—if or to the extent that there must be a state—should be no more than a minimal state, limited to the protection of sovereign individuals from force, theft, and fraud, to the enforcement of contracts, and so on. Anything more—"But how *dare* any state or group of individuals do more. Or less."

Lest the reader think this an inordinately extreme statement of Nozick's views, I add Nozick's blunt assertion that "a free system will allow [an individual] to sell himself into slavery"; indeed, "any individual may contract into any particular constraints over himself." And, what he offers as a simplified version of what he calls the entitlement theory of justice: "*From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen.*"

SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS:

First, Nozick's propositions, startling as they may appear, are by no means new. They derive from the 18th-century "invisible hand" theory of Adam Smith; from the 19th-century teachings of Josiah Warren, Stephen Pearl Andrews, Lysander Spooner, and Benjamin R. Tucker—though without the diverse commitments of these thinkers to spiritualism, phrenology, and other fads;[3] and from the present-day writings of Murray Rothbard and other so-called libertarians.

Second, Nozick's book is an exercise in formal, not empirical or causal theory. Those who think that history or sociology or political and economic events have something to do with moral and political philosophy will look in vain for concrete examples taken from those fields. Nozick is concerned only with principles that he believes apply to political and social life, but those principles—both descriptive and normative—flow only as logical deductions and inferences from given axioms. Whether his book demonstrates the strength or aridity of formal theory turns in part on whether or not one believes that a fictional explanation of how a thing—such as rights—may possibly have been produced furthers our understanding more than does a correct explanation of how it was actually produced (or more than does a reasoned account of how it ought to have been produced); and in larger part on the extent to which one agrees with Nozick that economic concepts and models, buttressed by mathematics and game theory, constitute the proper vehicle for the understanding of morals and politics. (A market, like a family, is not a state.)

Third, Nozick must show not only that his principles are correct but also that they are relevant to, that is, can actually be applied in, social and political life.

Moral teachings generally call upon individuals to perform acts contrary to, or to abstain from acts in furtherance of, their traditional ways, customary beliefs, conceived self-interests. This is generally sufficient to denude a teaching of its supporters, if not in espoused

[3]The bizarre doctrines of these early American thinkers—a curious mélange of Owen, Fourier, Proudhon, and Max Stirner, along with such indigenous curiosities as Warren's time store—defy easy classification. Some commentators have thought they add up to "left-wing individualism," others, to "right-wing anarchism." Dean McEldowney, from whose doctoral dissertation on these writers I have profited greatly, employs the term "bourgeois radicalism." Nozick seems to prefer "individualist anarchism." But whatever label, they remain *divertissements*.

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principle then certainly in practice. It does not, of course, invalidate that teaching as a standard by which human behavior should be governed and judged, provided that teaching is psychologically feasible, that is, that individuals can actually live according to the stipulations of the creed. Nothing in Nozick's book supports the expectation that this might happen.

Politically, Nozick's creed requires universal or at least general, not partial, consent if it is to be made operative. But in the face of widely opposing philosophies and traditions, and in the absence of coercion (which his libertarian doctrine eschews), that creed cannot hope to gain more than partial consent. To win what little it can through compromise is both insufficient and wrong, for this is to compromise inviolable rights. How, then, does Nozick propose to bring his theory to earth?

Finally, Nozick employs the neutral language of logical or philosophical analysis in the service of nonneutral ideas. This has the inestimable advantage of lulling the reader unfamiliar with the assumptions behind this language to accompany him through a seemingly unbiased argument before he arrives at those ideas. A less innocent terminology would alert an otherwise unwary reader to the fact that Nozick advances nothing less than a radically reactionary doctrine: radical, in that it fundamentally departs from accepted ideas and institutions, whether liberal or conservative; reactionary, in that it calls for a return to (the *concept* of) a world of atomistic individuals, living not in community (with all that this entails) but first in a state of nature and then in enclaves of self-selected protective associations, motivated only by self-interest, and led by an invisible hand to a larger (but narrowly limited) association that "may" be termed a state.

Now for some detail.

II

"Individuals," says Nozick, "have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). ... [T]he state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their *own* good or protection."

What is an individual, and how do we know that an individual has rights? What are these rights, and to what extent, if at all, may they be limited? What does it mean to be a citizen, or a member of "the people," as distinct from an individual? Does membership in a community entail no obligations for that community's preservation and welfare? Does an individual who is a member of a community, especially of a "good" or "just" community, retain all the rights he may be said to have had in a state of nature? And what *is* the state of nature?

If it did not actually exist (as it assuredly did not), if it is but a fiction, a hypothetical construct designed to enable us to arrive at a notion of rights through imagination (and reason), why rely on a state-of-nature theory—in particular, on Nozick's version rather than on the historical realities pertaining to the actual formation and evolution of communities and states? Such questions need to be answered if we are to make sense of Nozick's argument.

Let us begin with the notion of isolated "individuals" in a state of nature. Suppose Adam[4] without Eve, that is, suppose a single organism capable of independent existence, a single person as distinguished from a group. In what sense can such a person be *human*, or exist? Surely only as a physical specimen, not as a moral being, not even one who can reproduce his own kind (and will therefore very soon be extinct). If he is a rational animal, who is to know this when there is no other person with whom he can communicate? If he has rights (and perhaps obligations), against whom or with respect to what person does he have them when there is no other person to whom he can relate? It is impossible to speak of his individuality, for individuality entails the possession of qualities or characteristics that differentiate him from other human beings, and there are no others.

He becomes human only in relations with

[4]Not Robinson Crusoe, for Crusoe was already a *social* animal before he was stranded on an island.

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others, even if only with one other (Eve) and their progeny. He becomes human because he is then a *social* animal, a member of a community. As the community is enlarged, his humanity and individuality enlarge too. Only then can he begin to assert the notion of (and we can entertain the idea of his having) rights, for rights are claims made against *others*; they require modifications in the behavior of those others toward him. They are claims that those others may not do certain things to him, nor he (presumably) to them.

Insofar as an individual advances those claims, he denies that he, or any other individual, is his own sovereign. He affirms that there are limits on what any person, including himself, may do with respect to another. *Contra* Nozick, who argues that rights "are already possessed by each individual in a state of nature," there is no state of nature, i.e., a world of discrete individuals living independently of each other. Consequently there are no rights in such a state of nature, for there are no others against whom to assert those rights, nor any need for others or for the assertion of rights.

To the extent that an individual can claim rights, it is only because he is an individual within society and only because other individuals respect (or ought to respect) those claims, which makes them not individual but social rights—rights perhaps necessary to the development of individuality. If we use the term "individual rights," it is simply as shorthand for this conception. All rights are social rights.

It may be said that a state of nature does not mean the absence of society but only the absence of *civil* society, that is, of government, a state. But this is to mistake the nature of government and does nothing to salvage Nozick's notion of individual rights.

Government exists everywhere—in the family, the group, the larger association. Always there are rules that govern the relations of individuals to each other, even in the smallest unit, the family—rules, for example, concerning sex (such as the ban on incest), property (such as clothing or tools), and the socialization (education) of the young. And always there is an authoritative power to enforce those rules, whether a parent or priest or king or elected official. In this sense every society is a civil society, for every society is governed. And what rights one has as an individual one has only by virtue of the fact that they are rights recognized, i.e., *given* to individuals, by the society of which they are members. One may of course claim as rights things one does not yet possess but believes—as a matter of moral law or in accord with one's conception of one's nature as a human being—one should possess; but however conceived—whether as actual rights or moral claims—these remain rights within a social context; they are among the rules by which men and women are (or ought to be) governed.

Let us, however, waive the fictitious nature of the state of nature and of the supposed social compact by which individuals are held to be obliged to respect each other's rights or to obey some sort of sovereign (whether this be the doctrine of Hobbes or Locke or Rousseau). What sort of obligation is it that binds me to a promise made by some unknown ancestors? By what "right" do I lose *my* "right" to enter into promises of my own? Why indeed should I be bound to keep any promise, whether by others or by myself? Surely it cannot be because someone, somewhere, at some now-forgotten time decided this was the way individuals should live together in civil or political society; that property (as John Locke for example would have it) should be acquired in such a way and be transferred in such a manner, and that property so acquired and transferred is an individual right that cannot be transgressed. (Would one really feel bound by the agreement of some 17th- or 18th-century ancestors that two of their 20th-century progeny, one decidedly unsavory to the other, should now be married?) It can only be because I and others recognize that certain arrangements and practices, including promise-keeping (though not of course without regard to extenuating circumstances[5]), are necessary

[5]Such as the refusal to keep a promise extracted through coercive means, or to pay a debt at a stipulated time when the one to whom the debt is legitimately owed is at that moment drunk.

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to the maintenance of a common life, of society; that they promote the interests of the society, and of the individuals who compose it; that we should therefore be bound to respect certain arrangements and practices, including rights, lest we suffer mischievous consequences. We do not then need a state-of-nature theory at all. Nor are we bound by rights and promises supposed to exist in that fictional state.

Nozick's entitlement theory, which relies heavily on a modified version of Locke's state-of-nature teaching, seeks to escape some of these obvious difficulties by substituting for the social compact doctrine the notion of self-generating protective associations. But this substitution deviates in no way from the fundamental principle of the social compact: that rights men possess in the state of nature are transferred to a collective agency only through an initial agreement (or purchase).

Thus the entitlement theory remains doubly flawed at the outset: it builds on a fictitious and unexamined individualist conception of the origins of rights; and it looks only to the origins of rights and not also to their purposes and consequences for their justification.

III

Individuals, I have argued, cannot be understood apart from community. To remove that social context and talk only of individuals and their unassailable rights is to operate in an unreal world.

No rights are, or can be held, inviolable. Consequently, rights—which entail duties and obligations on the part of others, e.g., to respect those rights and perhaps to do what may be necessary to render them actual—are held at the sufferance of the community, because the community believes those rights are essential and are necessarily subject to limitation according to circumstance and the community's conception of the common good and the good man.

It is meaningless to waive these considerations in order to be able to talk of rights in a state of nature. For what can it mean to speak (as Nozick does) of a right to property in the state of nature? Property is not a thing (say a timepiece or a plot of land) but *ownership*—already a social concept—of that thing. And ownership is not merely possession or use of that thing, for then anyone can take it and by using it make it his own, which reduces ownership to a matter of preponderant force. Ownership is a *legal*, or (if we must talk of a state of nature) socially sanctioned, right. As such, it requires moral (or social) justification, as Proudhon well understood when he argued that private property is theft.

By what "right," then, can an individual acquire property?

Suppose it were technologically possible to bottle up all the air. Would we recognize a single person's "right" to do so, either by initial acquisition (appropriation) or by purchase, and to sell it to others who otherwise could not live? Suppose one man claimed ownership of all the drinkable water, or all the land, so that no one else could drink or find a place on which to stand, save at the owner's sufferance. Would this be acceptable? Suppose instead of but a single person such ownership were divided among a few individuals. Would this be any more acceptable? Assuredly this (at least with respect to some water and a great deal of the land) has been done; but by what *right*—even in a state of nature?

It will not do to say, as Nozick does at one point, that this is precluded in any practical sense because the scarcer a substance becomes that others want, "the higher the price of the rest will go, and the more difficult it will become for him to acquire it all." It is patently absurd to rest such a determination on economic considerations alone. More important, by introducing such terms as money and price, the issue is moved out of the state of nature and into civil society, into community. What Nozick requires is a theory that will justify a right to property within the state of nature.

Nor will it do for Nozick to rely on the Lockean proviso that there be "enough, and as good left in common for others," which he interprets to mean that the situation of others is not worsened, as it would be, for example, if someone was the first to come upon the only

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water in a desert and appropriated it all. Why shouldn't the situation be worsened for others if there are only "individual rights," and how can the situation of others be anything but worsened if a portion of the earth is taken from them?

In an all-too-neglected chapter in the first edition of his *Social Statics*, entitled "The Right to the Use of the Earth," Herbert Spencer—whom Nozick cites approvingly in another context but conveniently ignores here—argued that equity does not permit private property in land:

> For if *one* portion of the earth's surface may justly become the possession of an individual, and may be held by him for his sole use and benefit, as a thing to which he has an exclusive right, then other portions of the earth's surface may be so held; and eventually the *whole* of the earth's surface may be so held; and our planet may thus lapse altogether into private hands. Observe now the dilemma to which this leads. Supposing the entire habitable globe to be so enclosed, it follows that if the landowners have a valid right to its surface, all who are not landowners, have no right at all to its surface. Hence, such can exist on the earth by sufferance only. They are all trespassers. Save by the permission of the lords of the soil, they can have no room for the soles of their feet. Nay, should the others think fit to deny them a resting-place, these landless men might equitably be expelled from the earth altogether. If, then, the assumption that land can be held as property, involves that the whole globe may become the private domain of a part of its inhabitants; and if, by consequence, the rest of its inhabitants can then exercise their faculties—can then exist even—only by consent of the landowners; it is manifest, that an exclusive possession of the soil necessitates an infringement of the law of equal freedom. For, men who cannot "live and move and have their being" without the leave of others, cannot be equally free with those others.[6]

Nor is this all. If (Spencer continues) we move from the possible to the actual, we find still less reason to uphold the rectitude of property in land. *No* existing titles to property are legitimate. Why? Because the sources from which such titles are derived are "violence, fraud, the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning." Since no valid claims can thus be constituted, the sale or bequest of such holdings is equally invalid. It is equally impossible, Spencer further maintains, "to discover any mode in which land *can* become private property," for what belongs to the human race cannot be claimed or apportioned by any one generation; else "men born after a certain date are doomed to slavery." The land—all the land—belongs only to society.

But what of Locke's contention that

> Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a *Property* in his own *Person*. This no Body has any Right to but himselfe. The *Labour* of his Body, and the *Work* of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his *Labour* with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his *Property*. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, hath by this *labour* something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this *Labour* being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.[7]

This argument, so impressive to Nozick, leaves Spencer utterly cold. In the first place, Spencer argues, if the earth is common to all men, the consent of all men must obviously be required before any article can rightfully be removed from the state that nature has provided. To say that a man has mixed his labor with the land is to ignore the question: By what right did he gather, or mix his labor with, that which belongs to mankind at large? In the second place, to claim that any article of property is valid only "where there is enough, and as good left in common for others," is to raise a host of queries. How do we know that

[6]Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics* (1850; New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1873), chap. IX, p. 132.

[7]John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, in *Two Treatises of Government*, Peter Laslett, ed. (1690; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), chap. V, sec. 27, pp. 305–306.

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"enough" is left in common for others? Who is to determine whether what is left is "as good" as what was taken? If there is not enough left in common for others, how should the right of appropriation be exercised? Why, in such cases, does the mixing of one's labor with the acquired property cease to exclude "the common right of other men"? Suppose "enough" is attainable, but not all is equally "good," by what rule must each man choose? In short, Spencer argues, it is impossible, under state-of-nature conditions, to establish the rightness of such appropriation.

"Justice in holdings," Nozick says, "is historical; it depends upon what actually has happened." I should like to see his (or any other) account of *that* history. It is certainly not given here. What we are offered instead is a wildly implausible rendering of acquisitions in an alleged state of nature.

Can we then look to a moral (if not a historical) basis for his conception of individual rights? Alas, no, for "this book," Nozick admits, "does not present a precise theory of the moral basis of individual rights." On what foundation, then, does his theory of property rights, and consequently his entitlement theory of justice, rest? It is indeed a sad theory of justice that cannot itself be shown, either on historical or moral grounds, to be just.

IV

It would serve no useful purpose to analyze in similar detail Nozick's state-of-nature theory with respect to other rights, e.g., liberty. Among other things, a right to property is a right *over* liberty as much as (and perhaps more than) a right in the service of liberty. In any case, as Spencer has shown, in the state of nature it is incompatible with the equal liberty of others. If liberty and property are to be defended as rights—and it is scarcely surprising that Nozick excludes *equality* as one of his individual rights—that defense must look to an alternative mode of justification, e.g., to a theory of natural right (Aristotle) or natural law (Aquinas) or utility (J. S. Mill), in any event to a theory rooted in man as a social animal.[8] It must also build, not on the empty notion of liberty as a totality, but on the more realistic understanding of liberty as a complex of particular liberties and concomitant restraints, in which some liberties are necessarily curtailed in the service of more esteemed liberties. This in turn requires a theory of the proper hierarchy of liberties and of the relation of those liberties to other values, always within the social context of varying circumstances. This sort of theoretical inquiry is notably lacking in Nozick's book.

What needs now to be remarked, instead, is that Nozick's state-of-nature theory, which is a device to provide plausible (indeed necessary) grounds for his theory of individual rights, misreads (and therefore misuses) the crucial purpose that such a theory was designed to serve: namely, to discover the true nature of human nature. One does not discover this by assertion, certainly not by asserting the validity of another's (e.g., Locke's) assertion.[9] Nor can he discover this in history, for in this conception the nature of man must be discerned in what man is (or is thought to be) prior to history, prior to convention or accident or human design. One can only discover this through reason, that is, by imagining what man would be like were he in something that might be called a state of nature and by reasoning about the qualities or characteristics of man in that prehistorical, precivil state. It is one of the more obvious deficiencies of Nozick's book that, though he avoids a historical investigation into man's nature (even while he claims, but nowhere demonstrates, that his account is historically correct), he does not in fact reason about man's nature at all. He merely asserts that man's nature is what he proclaims it to be.[10]

[8] Nozick (p. 177) notes certain "familiar social considerations favoring private property" but doubts (even as he argues for the proposition) that they support the Lockean enough-and-as-good-left-over proviso. He denies that they enter into a utilitarian justification of property, but offers no reasons for asserting that this is so.

[9] For Locke, as Nozick recognizes (p. 9), "does not provide anything remotely resembling a satisfactory explanation of the status and basis of the law of nature in his *Second Treatise*."

[10] It is obviously no accident that, despite the recent revival of interest in social contract theory, Rawls does not root

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This is decidedly not what Hobbes, who employed a state-of-nature theory (in Part One of *Leviathan*) did, and for good reason. He wanted to know what man was like in order to answer the question: Why should such a man—independent and equal and unbound by political (but not by *natural*) laws—want to enter into civil society? Why should he surrender some of his liberty, much of his equality, and all of his independence, and willingly submit to a civil authority?

The answer, Hobbes said, is fear. Since no man is so much stronger than another, or a combination of others, as to be secure in his life, he seeks protection. To save his life, to escape an untimely death, he willingly gives up all his alleged rights—except, obviously, his right to self-preservation.

Unlike Hobbes, Nozick attempts no detailed and incisive analysis of human nature in the state of nature. He recognizes, to be sure, that fear is a major motive for men to join together into protective associations; but what he makes primary is not fear of death but love of property, and hence the Lockean protection of one's "rights," above all, the right to one's property; for what Nozick incredibly believes is that man is an economic, not a social or political animal. Hence, what unites men, what leads them to form a community (or to join a protective association), is not (in Nozick's view) their common interest, their equality, in avoiding death and seeking peace, but avarice, the rational pursuit of self-interest, the grim determination to retain what holdings they have.

I set aside Nozick's neglect of the still earlier contention by classical philosophers (e.g., Socrates) that every sane man seeks not profit but justice, what is right by nature—by the nature of man, not by the state of nature. I set aside, too, his failure to address himself to the ensuing conflict between Socrates and Hobbes as to what is truly natural, or truly right by nature, and how this is properly to be known. I cannot set aside, however, Nozick's easy assumption that it is enough to adopt and restate (albeit in somewhat modified form) Locke's view of man in the state of nature. Why not the image of man given us by Hobbes (or Rousseau), all the more so since without fear there would be no need for Nozick's protective associations? Why not, then, *all* of Hobbes? Why, instead, Locke? Surely a philosopher needs to set forth reasons that would confirm the validity of Locke's portrait. Without such reasons that notion of human nature is no more than a statement of arbitrary preference. Indeed, it gives rise to the suspicion that Nozick embraces it only (or largely) because it is a premise required by the conclusions he wishes to reach.

That Nozick does not give reasons, and that the suspicion I have articulated is warranted, is attested to by Nozick's curious statement explaining (justifying?) his choice of Locke's vision. Since descriptions of individuals in the state of nature are in any case problematic, it will not do (he argues) to select the most pessimistic, or *worst*, rendering of that state; nor the most optimistic, or *best*; but rather the most *moderate*, one in which "people generally satisfy moral constraints and generally act *as they ought*" (my italics). This now introduces an external (moral) standard by which to judge whether individuals behave moderately, *as they should*. In view of Nozick's later rejection of what he calls "end-result principles," that is, principles by which actions are judged in terms of given ends or consequences, it is difficult to see how Nozick can make any judgment concerning the rightness or wrongness of individual or group behavior in the state of nature, or how he can term any such state best or worst or moderate. The state of nature is what it is; individuals in that state are what they are; the state-of-nature theorist can only discover and describe these things. To select from among them only those practices

this theory in an alleged state of nature. His "original position" and "the veil of ignorance" associated with it, are significantly different. This is also why, to anticipate what follows, my concern is not so much to show that Hobbes rather than Locke (or Rousseau) reads the state of nature correctly, but rather to argue that the entire appeal to state-of-nature theory is misguided; and that, consequently, Nozick's theory of rights, which derives from his reading of that state of nature, is without theoretical (or factual) justification.

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(or that reading of those practices) that yield the principles he wishes to deduce from them, and then to employ those principles as moral criteria by which to judge those practices is an elementary circular fallacy.

V

If Nozick has neither proved nor offered a plausible case for his theory of individual (primarily property) rights and individual sovereignty, the huge and intricate edifice he then seeks to construct on this foundation can be no more than a house of cards. To show that this is so, let us look at the three major themes of the ensuing doctrine: the notion of protective agencies and their development (without violation of anyone's rights) into a dominant association that is *de facto* a state; the entitlement theory of justice that limits that state's activities to no more than the minimal or night-watchman role ascribed to it by late 18th- and early 19th-century economic theory; and the utopianism (or inspiring ideal) claimed for this sort of social organization.

Nozick begins by asking, Why the state? For him this is *the* fundamental question of political philosophy. One might suppose then that he would consider some of the more obvious answers that have been put forward in the history of political philosophy—e.g., the notion (in Plato's *Republic*) that the state came into being in response to natural needs; or the idea (in a long tradition from Aristotle to MacIver) that this is not really a serious question at all, since government naturally and necessarily exists wherever there is a social entity—the family, the tribe, the city, etc.; or the Marxist contention (forcefully argued by Franz Oppenheimer) that "The State, completely in its genesis ... is a social institution, forced by a victorious group of men on a defeated group, with the sole purpose of ... economic exploitation" [and securing itself against revolt and war].[11] But Nozick does not mention, let alone discuss, these or other traditional views. He presents only Locke versus the anarchists, surely a most curious estimate of what is important in the tradition of political philosophy.

Against the anarchists, who argue that no state can be moral because every state violates individual rights, Nozick wants to show that the minimal state can be and in fact is moral precisely because it comes into being, and persists, without any such violation of rights. He seeks to show this by building on Locke's "inconveniences of the state of nature" and by introducing the notion of protective associations.

Locke's inconveniences derive from the fact that in the state of nature some persons violate the rights of others. In response to this, Locke holds that everyone, acting alone or in concert with others, has a right to defend himself and punish the transgressors; hence "*Civil Government* is the proper remedy."[12]

Nozick concurs in all but the remedy. He argues, instead, that civil government need not come into being as a conscious and deliberate response to those inconveniences, but that it can (and does) emerge as an unconscious and unplanned consequence of a series of intermediate arrangements within the state of nature. These intermediate arrangements are the voluntary devices and agreements persons might reach while acting within their rights. In a state of nature an individual may himself enforce his rights, and others may join with him in his defense. Groups of individuals may thus form "mutual-protection associations." To resolve difficulties that attend such simple associations—e.g., that "cantankerous or paranoid members" might seek to use the association to violate the rights of others, or members of the same association may be in dispute with each other—these protective associations "will use some [any? or only a "just"?] procedure to determine how to act." In any case, "some people will be *hired* to perform protective functions, and some entrepreneurs will go into the business of selling protective services. Different sorts of protective policies would be offered, at different

[11] Franz Oppenheimer, *The State*, J. M. Gitterman, trans. (1908; 2d American ed., New York: Vanguard Press, 1926), p. 15.

[12] Locke, *op. cit.*, chap. II, secs. 6–7, 13, pp. 288–90, 293–94.

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prices, for those who may desire more extensive or elaborate protection.''[13]

Such protective associations will doubtless come into conflict with each other, where they operate within the same geographical area and seek to enforce the claims of their respective clients. The stronger agency will obviously prevail; it will also attract the clients of the losing or subordinate agency. In this way the strongest agency becomes the dominant association. As such, it provides a common system that judges between the competing claims of all the persons in its geographical area ''and *enforces* their rights.'' Nozick (after Adam Smith) calls this an invisible-hand explanation; for without agreement or design, every individual seeking only his own gain is ''led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.''

Nozick believes that this dominant protective association is not only a state but that it is a morally legitimate state. He believes this because the dominant association may properly ''judge any procedure of justice to be applied to its clients'' and properly defend its clients against ''a procedure that it finds to be unreliable or unfair.'' Since it may thus punish the punisher of its clients and not allow anyone else to defend against its own procedures, the dominant agency—even while not claiming a monopoly—clearly comes to occupy ''a unique position by virtue of its power. It, and it alone, enforces prohibitions on others' procedures of justice, *as it sees fit*. ... It alone is in a position to act solely *by its own lights*'' (my italics). The dominant agency thus enjoys a *de facto* monopoly of the right to enforce rights.

The legitimacy of this monopoly derives from two alleged facts: the powers of the association ''are merely the sum of the individual rights that its members or clients transfer to the association ... the agency protects those nonclients in its territory whom it prohibits from using self-help enforcement procedures on its clients,'' which it is ''morally required'' to do by the principle of compensation. Thus the dominant association, which now enjoys a monopoly of force and extends its reach to all in its territorial domain, is a state that violates no one's rights.

AMONG THE MANY THINGS that might be said concerning this extraordinary argument, I limit myself to but a few points.

1. It is not at all clear why only one—rather than two or more likely three—dominant protective association will emerge from the process Nozick describes. I say more likely three because, as Orwell understood in *1984*, if there were only two, a conflict between them would reduce the loser to a subordinate role or eliminate it completely; while if there were three, the third would enter to do battle with the enfeebled victor, thereby leaving the vanquished time and opportunity in which to recover, so that it may take on the new victor in turn. In this way irrational men can continue the enjoyable process of mutual slaughter to the end of time. Neither stability nor peace but perpetual strife, as Hobbes might have taught Nozick, is the characteristic feature of the state of nature. By what reason—historical or logical—*dare* Nozick presume the inevitable outcome will be a single dominant agency?

2. If, however, a single association were to become the dominant agency, it would rule by imposed fiat, on the obvious principle—since Nozick holds this rule is legitimate—that might makes right. Now Nozick says that he does not wish to assume or claim that might makes right. But since he looks not to purposes or consequences but only to origins, he must accept this absurd argument. And he does. For, even as he deprecates the claim that might makes right he argues that it is might alone that enables the dominant protective association to enforce its prohibitions against an opposing but weaker agency. ''[M]ight does make enforced prohibitions, even if no one thinks the mighty have a *special* entitlement to

[13] Again, I am at a loss to understand how within a state of nature, which is a state without a common Authority, there can be such things as prices—which presuppose a common system of currency and a common standard of exchange, and such arrangements as hiring and selling—which presuppose an established market and an Authority to enforce contracts. I find Nozick's argument (p. 18), taken from Ludwig von Mises, absurd.

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have realized in the world their own view of which prohibitions are correctly enforced." Precisely: the mighty do not have a special entitlement; they have only the ordinary entitlement attached to each individual, and by grant of individuals to a protective association, to realize that individual's (or association's) view. What is required for anyone to realize his view is clearly power; hence the reign of the most powerful. And this is "right," Nozick believes, because as against a small agency, the dominant agency, "having a greater number of individual entitlements, ... has a greater entitlement."

Not only does Nozick thus commit himself to the doctrine that might makes right. What is worse (for his theory), he also commits himself to the principle of equality. For only if entitlements are equal can a greater number of entitlements make for a greater entitlement. Without equality, a greater number merely makes for a greater (or larger) number; if the numbers are not equal, if one counts for more than one, a greater number may in fact add up to a lesser number. Since Nozick rejects the idea of equality,[14] on what grounds may the dominant agency claim it has a right to be dominant?

3. Let us look more closely, and realistically, at the nature of this dominant protective association. Will it in fact protect the rights of its clients? Does its power come to no more than the sum of the rights ceded to it by its clients? May we reasonably apply to the entrepreneurs and hired mercenaries of the protective agency what Nozick assumes of mankind: "that generally people will do what they are morally required to do"? And if the answers to such questions are in some measure unfavorable, what instruments or arrangements has Nozick built into these associations that will ensure their right (i.e., limited) functioning, their legitimate behavior? Who or what, in short, will control the controllers of power should they (when they) exceed or abuse the powers entrusted to them?

An entity is always more than the sum of its parts. Ten determined men acting jointly constitute a far more formidable force, certainly physically (since might is an issue here), than do ten determined men acting each for himself. And a protective association, hiring mercenaries to enforce the rights of its clients and headed by an entrepreneurial *condottiere*, constitutes a far greater power than do the members (or the sum of those members) of the association. It may or may not be true that the legitimate rights of the association are no more than the sum of the individual rights that have been assigned to it. It is certainly not true, as Nozick asserts, that "the legitimate powers of a protective association are merely the *sum* of the individual rights that its members or clients transfer to the association." Nozick all too easily substitutes powers for rights in this equation, and this is patently illegitimate. The rights may be the same, but the powers are overwhelmingly different.

Even the rights, however, may not be the same. If A has the right to do X, and B has the right to do Y, then an association in which A and B are members has the right to do both X and Y, which we may call Z. Neither A nor B individually has the right to do Z, but the association now has that right, because it includes both A and B. Since the association now has the right to do Z, it may clearly exercise this right on behalf of both A and B, thereby giving each of them a right that neither had before (giving Y to A, and X to B). But how can any person or collection of persons give an individual a right to which he was not himself entitled? Clearly, only because the association gives it to him. Then the association becomes a source or distributor of rights, or at least a mechanism through which an individual may acquire, if not a right, access to or protection of a right possessed by another.

Thus, both the powers and the rights of the association are indeed more than the sum of

[14]Some readers may take Nozick's arguments against equality, and against state efforts to promote equality (chap. 8), as a major challenge to liberal and socialist theory. I do not share this view. But to explain why this is so would require an intensive analysis of the different meanings of, and arguments for and against, equality, which I cannot undertake here. I have dealt with some of the relevant issues in my article, "A Grammar of Equality," *Dissent*, Winter 1974, pp. 63–78.

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individual powers and rights.[15] And this has portentous implications.

For we now know, from historical experience and organizational theory, quite a bit about the behavior of associations. We now know that all associations, at least with the range of power with which we are concerned here, have more than the single purpose for which they were ostensibly created. They exist not only to carry out the functions assigned to them, but also to promote the interests of those who control and serve them—the leaders and the bureaucracy. Those interests are primarily the survival and expansion of the association. Indeed, this last is actually required by Nozick's theory, which expects and even demands that the initial small protective association seek to become the dominant association.

The purpose of the association will not only inevitably be corrupted by the nature of bureaucracy. It will be subverted, even more, by the leaders of the association. For what will those leaders do when a situation arises in which, called upon to defend the rights of their clients, they risk self-annihilation or—more mildly—put their power and positions in jeopardy? Doubtless some will readily sacrifice all for a right cause, but history is replete with contrary instances.

Similarly, the leaders may fail to protect their clients' rights even in less irksome situations, where the inconveniences attached to such protection are more than they wish to bear. It is, after all, no easy matter to defend the legitimate claim of a less influential client against the competing claim of a more prestigious or powerful client. Since individuals buy their membership in the association, i.e., they pay fees or purchase (as it were) life-insurance or property-insurance policies, is it really to be expected that the claims of poorer clients will be respected as much as will the claims of wealthier clients, especially when they are competing? Or, since the dominant agency is charged with the protection of nonclients as well, is it to be believed that they will receive equal consideration and treatment with the fee-paying members of the association, and be given compensation, as is "morally required"? Merely to ask these questions is to indicate the inadequacy of Nozick's invisible-hand explanation; for to the extent that the invisible hand operates at all, it may well lead individuals to promote an evil end that was no part of their intention.

How, then, do the members of the association control the corrupters of power? What restraints or controls, if any, are imposed on them to assure the correct performance of their duties?

The reader will look in vain in Nozick's book for the answers to these questions. In a work of some 350 pages purported to be a contribution to political and moral philosophy, no more than two or three pages even touch these obvious questions of political power. And those pages focus not on the dominant protective association but on the modern state (what he calls "the nonneutral state"). Here is his one crucial passage:

> The illegitimate use of a state by economic interests for their own ends is based upon a preexisting illegitimate power of the state to enrich some persons at the expense of others. Eliminate *that* illegitimate power of giving differential economic benefits and you eliminate or drastically restrict the motive for wanting political influence. True, some persons still will thirst for political power, finding intrinsic satisfaction in dominating others. The minimal state best reduces the chances of such takeover or manipulation of the state by persons desiring power or economic benefits, especially if combined with a reasonably alert citizenry, since it is the minimally desirable target for such takeover or manipulation. Nothing much is to be gained by doing so, and the cost of the citizens if it occurs is minimized.[16]

[15]This is among the reasons Aristotle gives in defense of the idea that the people should be sovereign. One person may lack sufficient wisdom to rule, but a multiplicity of such persons constitutes an entity that becomes something different—one to which each brings his share of goodness and moral prudence. "Some appreciate one part, some another, and all together appreciate all." This is why it makes a difference to understand man as a social animal rather than an isolated individual. See Aristotle, *Politics*, Ernest Barker, trans. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946), Book III, chap. XI, p. 123.

[16]Nozick, p. 272.

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To argue that the thirst for domination is essentially inconsequential in the minimal state, because the prize is minimal, is to ignore not only the immense power and economic benefits attached even to that minimal state (if there were such a state) in the modern world—if we think, say, only of national defense and the contracts and profits this brings—but also to scant the most rudimentary propositions set forth in textbooks and monographs on the psychology and sociology of power. Wherever, and in whatever form, power exists, men will strive to obtain it. However small the range of that power, men will exercise it and seek to enlarge it. The lust for power, for ever-increasing power, is insatiable. And power once acquired gives rise to innumerable temptations, so strong and pervasive as to have led a host of political philosophers—e.g., Montesquieu, Madison, Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill—to warn against its corrosive effects, and to seek for principles and arrangements that might curb and control the abuses and misuses of power. Nozick's failure to come to grips with these crucial problems is but another indication of the political irrelevance of his theory of justice.

4. Insofar as Nozick seeks to meet these sorts of political problems, he does so by an extended disquisition on procedural rights and what he calls "reliable" procedures. But these, whatever their intrinsic merit, are irrelevant to the issue; for it is not Nozick who decides and institutionalizes such procedures for the protective association; it is the association that judges which procedures are reliable or unreliable ("calling them as it sees them"), that applies the principle and has "the muscle to do so," that alone "is in a position to act solely by its own lights." Why, then, should the association adopt Nozick's conception of a reliable procedure rather than one that better serves its needs, as it sees this? It is not only the judge in its own case. By Nozick's own argument, it is *legitimately* the judge in its own case. Hence private interests determine what Locke called "The Publick Good." Indeed, the Good is whatever the dominant private interest proclaims it to be. Justice, then, as Thrasymachus said, is nothing else than the interest (at least the conceived interest, the stated and enforced will) of the strongest. And Nozick's state, his morally legitimate state, appears to be no more than a variant of Marx's state: an instrument through which a ruling class secures its domination.

Nozick could, perhaps, salvage much of his argument by insisting either (i) that the dominant protective association must adopt his "reliable" procedures, or (ii) that any system of justice—however conceived and however harsh—is better than none; that is, that a state in which the principles of, and procedural rights associated with, justice are known and therefore predictable, is preferable to tryanny, where justice is arbitrary and unpredictable. But the logic of his argument prevents him from advancing either of these arguments, and he doesn't. For one thing, he would then have to deny the principle of entitlement, which holds that an individual may do with himself and his possessions as he will, provided only that he not violate the rights of others—and we now understand that it is he, through his protective association, who decides whether or not he has violated another person's rights, and what should be done about it. More important, were Nozick to advance either or both of these arguments, he would have to hold that it is proper to make judgments in terms of end-result principles; and these he explicitly rejects. I turn now to his reasons for doing so.

VI

The entitlement theory of justice is historical: "whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came about"; consequently, "*any* set of holdings that emerges from a legitimate process ... is just" (my italics). In contrast, end-result principles "hold that the justice of a distribution is determined by how things are distributed (who has what) as judged by some *structural* principle(s) of just distribution."

Here—perhaps for the only time in the book—Nozick offers a strikingly realistic (at least hypothetically realistic) case to buttress

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the argument for his entitlement theory. He says:

> ... suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly in demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction. (Also suppose contracts run for only a year, with players being free agents.) He signs the following sort of contract with a team: In each home game, twenty-five cents from the price of each ticket of admission goes to him. ... The season starts, and people cheerfully attend his team's games; they buy their tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty-five cents of their admission price into a special box with Chamberlain's name on it. They are excited about seeing him play; it is worth the total admission price to them. Let us suppose that in one season one million persons attend his home games, and Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the average income and larger even than anyone else has. Is he entitled to this income? Is this new distribution ... unjust? If so, why?[17]

If each person in this situation was entitled to control the resources he held, the fact that he freely chose to give 25 cents of his money to Chamberlain—rather than (say) spending it on candy bars—is just. That inequalities eventuate from such a gift to, or exchange with, Wilt Chamberlain is (Nozick argues) no legitimate ground for complaint; for where men are entitled to X (say the money they have earned), they may justly transfer that X, or a share of that X, to another. To deny that right of transfer (say under socialism) is "to forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults." Hence, any end result or patterned principle of redistributive justice entails interference with another person's liberty and thus violates his rights.

Consider taxation. This not merely deprives people of the right to choose what to do with what they have. Even more: "Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. ... [T]aking the earnings of *n* hours labor is like taking *n* hours from the person; it is like forcing the person to work *n* hours for another's purpose." This too is a clear violation of that person's rights; for no one (Nozick holds) may interfere with another person's right to choose from among the constrained set of options available to him. Each person has a right to decide what he would make of himself and what to do, and to reap the benefits accordingly. And what is true of taxation on earnings is true of taxation on interest, entrepreneurial profits, and so on. "Individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent. Individuals are inviolable."

Hence, as both examples demonstrate, no state beyond the minimal state can be justified. No end-result principles are warranted.[18]

INTUITIVELY, one feels there is much to be said for Nozick's view. One wishes to do what he will with what he has. To interfere with him, to tell him that he *must* give some of his earnings to others or to this or that cause, that he may not do with his earnings what he wishes to do (e.g., buy what others believe to be noxious things like liquor and drugs), seems to violate his autonomy.

But in the real and unequal world, many do not have sufficient earnings, or any earnings, to buy the things they need or would like—say a ticket to a basketball game, with or without the added tax for Wilt Chamberlain. A woman may marry a hard-working but low-income-earning man who dies and leaves her with several children. Are she and they "entitled" only to suffer misery? What if a man sells himself into slavery? Do his children go with him into bondage? It is surely a strange notion of justice that exempts the rich and the better-off from responsibility to the less-fortunate. Surely outcomes cannot really be irrelevant to a well-founded theory of justice.

[17] Nozick, p. 161.

[18] Further to support his argument, Nozick considers—and finds deficient—some opposing end-result theories, primarily John Rawls's theory of justice and, less extensively, Bernard Williams's case for equality. Considerations of space preclude a critical evaluation of that debate here, all the more since Nozick omits other important alternative views—e.g., the classical ideas of Plato and Aristotle—and gives insufficient attention to still others—e.g., views on utilitarianism, both by Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Nor is it necessary to do so in order to assess his own argument.

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1. Suppose one were to hold, as I do, that on Nozick's terms (though not necessarily on other terms) *no* property rights are legitimate. No one has properly appropriated land that he may call his own. Consequently no one may legitimately transfer such land, or a portion of that land, to another. And no one may legitimately use the proceeds from that property, or from products directly or indirectly resulting from that property, to buy anything.

Suppose one were also to hold, with a Biblical teaching, that to lend money at interest—any interest—to a fellow human being in need is usury and therefore immoral. Or argue, as a humanist, that to earn money from investment that involves exploitation of or harm to others, is also unjust.

To justify *some* lending of money at interest (e.g., that in capitalist systems the lending of money is a form of investment, or part of a credit system necessary to business enterprise), Nozick would have to distinguish types of persons, and types of situations, where such lending is legitimate from those persons and situations where it is not. He would also have to consider what is an appropriate (just) rate of interest. He does not do this, in part because the entitlement theory does not call for it but actually excludes it as a legitimate concern. Whatever a person legitimately has, he may do with it as he will. Outcomes are indeed irrelevant. So too with the problem of earnings from investment.

For Benjamin Tucker, and now for Nozick, to mind your own business is the primary moral law; to interfere with another's business is the primary crime. But if, as I suggest, *no one* (on Nozick's terms) has a legitimate claim to a business in property, then no one has a business of his own to mind, or a right initially to acquire or later to transfer that business through sale or bequest, or a right to "hold" the business and what he has "earned" from it. Then it decidedly becomes someone else's business to interfere. It becomes society's business to reclaim its property and use it for the social good.

2. Here Nozick's principle of rectification comes into play. If the principles of acquisition and of transfer have been violated—as I contend—then end-result or patterned principles of distributive justice properly enter. As Nozick puts it: "then a *rough* rule of thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off in the society." I take this properly to apply to *all* existing societies where private property in land is still an operating principle.

3. In this way, on Nozick's own terms, the notion of community is reintroduced. Rectification requires a society of persons held together by a sense of common identity and hence of some common interests. Racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination—which Nozick ignores—is not a matter of private but of public interest; its elimination is crucial if all individuals are to be equally members of the community. Hence it requires a common Authority to deal with it. War, whatever its origins, is not something to be left to a dominant association's notion of which prohibitions it may properly enforce, but becomes central to the community's survival. Since all are affected, all must share—in the determination, conduct, and resolution of the war. If some are uneducated, or inadequately educated (as in the poorer states), this deprives them of what is necessary for their development as individuals; and where a community is concerned with this value for all its members, this too becomes a matter of the public interest. If life itself is precious, so that communities provide police and fire protection, sewage disposal systems and garbage collectors, lifeguards at beaches and hospitals, and the like—without regard to wealth or station—then this too becomes a matter of community concern and action. And so with the things that are necessary to life—food, clothing, shelter, medical care, etc.

To be sure, there is need for liberty—for areas of privacy within which, or situations in which, individuals must be left alone in order to cultivate their unique qualities and implement their diverse desires. A careful analysis of the legitimate domains of the individual and

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the community is surely essential. But this analysis, not to speak of its applications in practical affairs, cannot be left solely to those who have "holdings," to the dominant private interest. The rich—who would then surely combine into a protective association and "buy" the most powerful "enforcers"—can hardly be entrusted with the welfare or rights of the poor; indeed, why should they in Nozick's theory? Who, then, will take care of the widows, the orphans, the infirm, the less powerful, the poor?

Nozick would have them look to themselves, or—since many are unworthy objects of sale, whether of their labor or their bodies (and souls)—to the charity of the affluent. Since he is not concerned with outcomes, the obvious consequences (as we have experienced them) cannot trouble him. But even if we think only of individuals, as Nozick does, and not of community, is it really a matter of indifference to the rich that they live surrounded by poverty and misery and urban and rural blight? Is this the kind of world that is pleasant or productive for them and their children? Is it even safe for them? To invoke Aristotle yet again, it was the awareness of this danger, this threat to the stability of the state, that led him to warn against a too-great division between the rich and the poor, lest rebellion ensue. Does Nozick really think a protective association can do everything with bayonets, even sit on them? Is not will, the will of all—rather than force, enforcing the will of a few—the true basis of a state?

From this standpoint, taxation is not extortion but a necessary device to insure the welfare of the community, including its dominant members—even, if need be, against their will. For it is not a choice between we and they; it is a matter of us all. This is why an economic conservative like Justice Holmes could cheerfully say: "With taxes I buy civilization." And from this standpoint the ludicrousness of the Wilt Chamberlain example becomes patent. The question is not whether an individual—the ticket-buyer—may do what he will with what he has, or even whether a state committed to equality may use coercive measures to prevent any inequalities from reappearing. The question is, first, to assure that all have the means to provide themselves with the necessities of life, and then to allow the freedom to make choices among the leisure activities, the luxuries of life—though the question must surely remain open whether a just society should not limit the otherwise bizarre consequences to which such freedom might lead, e.g., Chamberlain or a movie star receiving an income even greater than that of the president of the United States! Here, as everywhere, crucial distinctions must be drawn.

4. This brings me, finally, to the issue of freedom and human rights, of justice for sale. Nozick makes much of rights, and properly so; but in his extreme individualist version those rights are operative in the real world only for those who can afford them, who are in an economic position where they need not sacrifice them. For the rest, those rights are up for grabs, for sale. And by any standard of justice other than Nozick's, this is sheer madness.

Rights, especially the rights to life and liberty, are too precious to be sold. Even Locke proclaimed against the right to sell oneself into slavery.[19] John Stuart Mill—surely no enemy to libertarian thought—is particularly appropriate here, for what Mill said against slavery applies to all contracts in perpetuity. An individual, Mill contended, is not the best judge of his own interest when he

> attempts to decide irrevocably now, what will be best for his interest at some future and distant time. The presumption in favour of individual judgment is only legitimate, where the judgment is grounded on actual, and especially on present, personal experience; not where it is formed antecedently to experience, and not suffered to be reversed even after experience has condemned it. When persons have bound themselves by a contract, not simply to do some one thing, but to continue doing something for ever or for a prolonged period, without any power of revoking the engagement, the presumption which their perseverance in that course of conduct would otherwise raise in favour of its being advantageous to them, does not exist; and any such

[19]Locke, *op. cit.*, chap. IV, secs. 22–24, pp. 301–303.

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> presumption which can be grounded on their having voluntarily entered into the contract, perhaps at an early age, and without any real knowledge of what they undertook, is commonly next to null.[20]

This is why, for Mill and for Western societies generally, the law will not enforce such contracts.

It is true that in order to live, within a system of property rights, individuals must often sell their labor. Does this mean, should it mean, that even then the community has no stake in the conditions of that sale, that the community should not set minimum wages and maximum hours, and regulate what otherwise might be (as they have been) noxious and unsafe working conditions? Do property rights really have, should they have, priority over life itself, and the conditions that make life viable?

Nozick's theory of entitlement, looking only to the rights that emanate from holdings, and caring little or nothing about what happens to the rights of others as a consequence,[21] produces end results that are not outside of but within his own theory. A theory that deals only with means but not ends is not a theory. The two are inextricably intertwined in a moral judgment, for only a total situation is susceptible of a moral judgment. And a moral theory that leads to immoral results is not a theory of justice at all. (This is but another instance of Nozick's failure to come adequately to terms with utilitarian and other end-result theories.)

Justice is not, and cannot be, for sale. Freedom and human rights are not, and cannot be, for sale. They are both means and ends: they are means to, or requisites of, what it means to be human; they are also among the reasons why it is important to be human. This is why the test of a decent theory of justice, as of a society, is what it does to individuals, what it makes of individuals, and what it enables individuals to make of themselves.

That Nozick's theory of entitlement is, at best, good for some individuals—those with holdings—but not for all, is a sufficient mark of its moral deficiency.

VII

Only a few words need to be said concerning Nozick's idea that his vision of a good society, the minimal state, constitutes utopianism—a utopia that, belying its name (which literally means nowhere), is actually, in his view, realizable in this world.

By utopia Nozick means not the best of all conceivable worlds, but the best of all possible worlds. It is that in which "each person receives his marginal contribution."

Since you and I will obviously differ as to which is the best world, there can be no one best society for everyone. "Utopia will consist of utopias, of many different and divergent communities in which people lead different kinds of lives under different institutions. ... The utopian society is the society of utopianism." Utopianism, then, as a framework for many utopias, will be acceptable to almost every utopian at some future time and is compatible with the realization of almost all particular utopian visions. "Though the framework is libertarian and laissez-faire, *individual communities within it need not be*, and perhaps no community within it will choose to be so. ... The utopian process is substituted for the utopian end state of other static theories of utopias."

At first blush, Nozick's utopianism exudes a certain charm, for what can be more appealing than a utopia of many utopias, a utopianism that is not monolithic and stifling of diversity and individuality but allows for every kind of diversity and individuality? But as with most everything else in Nozick's book, appearance has little to do with reality.

Consider the notion that the most desirable of all possible worlds is that in which "each person receives his marginal contribution." Not his happiness, not love or good health or the development of personality, but "his marginal contribution." Can so paltry an end really constitute an ideal worth striving for?

[20] John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy* (1848; 7th ed., 1871), in *Collected Works*, J. M. Robson, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), vol. III, Book V, chap. XI, sec. 10, pp. 953–54.

[21] Nozick's proviso—that any exercise of rights must not violate the rights of others—would of course enter here; but we have already seen what that means.

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If Nozick's argument is to be taken seriously, then not the minimal state, but a world that accommodates almost every form of state, including what Nozick would himself call an oppressive (because more-than-minimal) state, is utopian. If this is what Nozick has in mind when he speaks of the actualization of his ideal, it is a most peculiar utopian vision indeed; for it not only permits, it justifies evil systems and practices—and I use the word "evil" here to include anyone's definition of that term, including Nozick's. In the name of libertarianism, Nozick would permit anyone to do anything, as long as this is done voluntarily—as a matter of moral right! It is a strange notion of utopianism that permits a mixture of good and evil worlds, and in no stated proportions.

But in fact Nozick's true ideal, a combination of minimal states, cannot be realized; or if it can, it can only be realized by a process and a power that in itself would destroy that ideal. To achieve the kind of world Nozick wants, we would have to reverse history, and keep it reversed. This would entail precisely the massive state interference, with all its bureaucratic malevolences, he rails against; for how else could we rectify the injustices of existing states?

Thus Nozick's utopianism is not a utopia, any more than his idea of entitlement is a theory of justice. Together they constitute a vision of hell. □

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Georg Mann

Abuses of Soviet Psychiatry

Early in 1975, CBS network television reported that some 7,000 lobotomies had been performed on Soviet citizens to cure patients of the wrong political beliefs. The report aroused an ache in old wounds that have stubbornly refused to heal. Lobotomies—either chemical or surgical—have been generally discarded by psychiatrists because of damaging effects on the personalities of the patients; they were outlawed in the Soviet Union itself in 1950. Their revival shows again the complacent irrationality of the Soviet government's conviction that any subject who objects to its policies must be out of his mind.

Although the Czars occasionally sent dissenters to insane asylums, it remained for the Soviets to rationalize the process, beginning in the early 1960s. As reports of such treatment filtered out of the Soviet Union, Dr. Norman B. Hirt of Vancouver began a campaign urging Canadian psychiatric and medical associations to protest this perversion of psychiatry. His campaign, incidentally, still awaits a definitive echo from institutionalized psychiatry on the U.S. side of the border.

Then, early in 1971, Vladimir Bukovsky (a political dissenter first confined in 1963 to the Serbski Institute of Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow, whose director was a KGB colonel named Daniel Luntz) smuggled out records of the psychiatric examinations of six prisoners in the psychiatric Institute. When these records were examined by psychiatrists in the West, they inspired 44 British doctors to sign a statement disagreeing with the diagnoses of their Soviet colleagues. Findings of mental illness among the six, they reported, were "made purely in consequence of actions in which they were exercising fundamental freedoms—as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution." Their analysis was distributed to 7,000 delegates attending the World Congress of Psychiatry at Mexico City in early December 1971. When the issue was brought up from the floor, the Soviet delegation walked out. Dr. Andrei V. Snezhnevsky, chief psychiatrist of the Soviet Ministry of Health, called the statement "a maneuver of the Cold War, carried out at the hands of experts."

Snezhnevsky cited in his defense a visit to the Serbski Institute by an American delegation in 1967. The Americans ignored the problem of political inmates, noted the somewhat unusual precautions of iron gates guarded by soldiers, and described the Serbski as "the most prestigious examining institution in the U.S.S.R." Unlike Owen Lattimore's and Henry Wallace's visit to the infamous Soviet prison camp at Kolyma during World War II, which resulted in their giving Kolyma a clean bill of health, this report was perhaps not so much a deliberate deception on the part of the American visitors but the result of innocent ignorance.

The World Congress failed to act on the charges. And not until November 1974 did the American Psychiatric Association get around to form a committee to draft a statement protesting the incarceration of political prisoners in mental institutions. Soviet psychiatrists calmly ignored the issue until late in 1973, when they published a statement in the *Literary Gazette*. Twenty members of the Presidium of the All-Union Society of Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists said,

> In any country ... there is a number of psychiatric patients whose illness—the consequence of mental disturbance, deleterious ideas, or other psychopathological disturbances—can cause antisocial actions which are contrary to the law, for example, the violation of public order, spreading of slander, the display of aggressive intentions, etc.

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That same year Dr. Alfred M. Freedman, president of the APA, cabled Snezhnevsky suggesting a conference between Western and Soviet psychiatrists to discuss involuntary confinement for political dissent. After the meeting, late in 1973, varying reports emerged. Freedman returned to the United States saying that his initial concern had not been quieted, and more meetings were needed. He reported that "dissent, criticism or opposition are considered to be bizarre behaviors and important manifestations of disease ... deviance appears tolerable until it is involved with political dissent." Although the Soviets seemed uninterested in continuing the meetings, Dr. Georgi Morosov wrote the *British Medical Journal* suggesting that the participants in the meeting had generally agreed with Soviet diagnoses of the prisoners and urged more international consideration of forensic psychiatry. But Morosov was promptly contradicted by a British psychiatrist who had attended the meeting at the Serbski.

WHAT MOROSOV AND HIS COLLEAGUES mean by forensic psychiatry can be judged by the diagnoses sent to the West by Bukovsky, and reported on by Dr. Hirt and Mr. Paul Chodoff of George Washington University. You could join, according to the tenets of forensic psychiatry, the other inmates of the Serbski if you were characterized by "obsessive reformist delusions," "schizo-religious deviation," "ideas of exaggerated self-worth, overvaluing [yourself] as a personality and a reformist," "tendencies to moralize," "manic reformism." Natalya Gorbanevskaya was diagnosed as "unshakably convinced of the rightness of her actions," and of "lacking a critical appraisal of her own conditions and the situation she is now in." Major General Pyotr Grigorenko, a hero of World War II, a vigorous protestor in favor of civil liberties, was found to be "characterized by reformist ideas, overestimation of his own personality of Messianic proportions, affective intensity, and conviction of the rightness of his actions." There was also—and who could blame Grigorenko after being routinely popped in and out of prison?—evidence of morbid suspicion. Almost the only diagnosis lacking was that favorite of the Nazis of "physiognomic insubordination," applied by the Nazis to anybody who looked unhappy with the regime.

Certainly the most cogent comment on these diagnoses was made by one of the victims, Viktor Feinberg, who wrote that the government was "using the figleaf of psychiatry as a reliable cover-up for the imprisonment of people with minds of their own." In the meantime, Bukovsky is still in prison.

The treatments given the prisoners were less ridiculous and more painful than the diagnoses. Drugs—sedatives and tranquilizers—were routinely used, including stelazine and aminazin, better known as thorazine. Both can produce physically painful side effects. Also used were injectible substances that can cause joint pain and hallucinogenic agents. Physically brutal treatment was also common, although it did not reach the heights of the late 1930s, when, as Joseph Berger reports, 9 out of 10 political prisoners were routinely tortured. But Grigorenko was beaten on a leg injured as the result of Nazi wounds.

If the reports on lobotomies are substantiated, they merely indicate that Soviet psychiatrists have profited by reading Zamyatin's *We*, written by a Soviet exile in the 1920s. In his non-Utopia—which influenced both Aldous Huxley and Orwell—he showed political dissidents being rendered surgically incapable of independent thought.

It is a neat touch that the main outside voice supporting the Soviet psychiatrists comes from Professor J.J. Lopez Ibor, head of the department of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology at Franco's University of Madrid. At the Mexico City meeting he happily managed to avoid seeing any documents denouncing Soviet misuse of psychiatry. And he obliterated the entire problem by saying, "In any event, the political nonconformist who is not mentally ill does not pertain to the field of psychiatry." Apparently he neglected to inform Luntz, Morosov, and Snezhnevsky of this opinion. Or perhaps he was thinking of those mentally ill who thought they were Trotsky.

Not all Soviet psychiatrists have been eager to cooperate in railroading dissidents into mental hospitals. One psychiatrist, Dr. Gluzman, was sentenced to seven years in jail for his refusal to take part in committing dissidents. Local psychiatrists have seen no reason for mental treatment of political offenders. For example, a Tashkent psychiatric commission found Grigorenko sane, but he was returned to the Serbski and certified as not showing "a critical attitude toward his own condition and the situation that developed." Gorbanevskaya was found to require no need for psychiatric treatment by a commission presided over by the Moscow City psychiatrist, and then was promptly transferred to the Serbski. Apparently, Luntz and the KGB had the last word.

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There are other aspects of Soviet psychiatry that may cause skepticism in the West. Soviet psychiatrists, as Dr. Martin G. Allen noted in 1973, are notably diffident about conceding that environmental factors might be responsible for mental illness among their nonpolitical patients. If they did so, this might be considered a criticism of Soviet society and the environment it has created. Moreover, Soviet psychologists have shown a greater tendency to rely upon modifiability tests rather than intelligence and capacity tests in assessing the general population. They have also found that talent consists of a "remarkable inclination for work." The Soviet psychologist Leites emphasized that because the proletariat has a greater inclination for work, it has a larger quotient of talent than the former parasitic classes. Furthermore, work is a favored form of psychotherapy prescribed for mental patients in the Soviet Union. Whether or not it helps the patients, it certainly adds to the revenues of the state.

But perhaps the worst inhumanity in Soviet psychiatry is the lack of judicial review of patient commitments. The ineffable Snezhnevsky regarded this review as unnecessary, saying it is "absolutely impossible for healthy persons to be committed to mental hospitals in the Soviet Union." Presumably he said this before the uproar aroused by the case of Zhores Medvedev, the distinguished scientist who spent the better part of a month in a mental institution before protests from scientists within and without the Soviet Union forced his release. So far as I have been able to discover, his release is unique in the annals of Soviet forensic psychiatry.

AT FIRST GLANCE, the Soviet psychiatric offenses seem almost trivial compared to the total numbers of victims of political purges—a few thousands against millions. And like the latter, they have aroused an astonishingly tepid reaction in the West. But when the actions of the Soviet psychiatrists are considered in conjunction with the eagerly supported psychophysiological research in Russia, along with a political and stubbornly supported doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, a definite pattern emerges. That pattern is aimed at creating a docile population to serve the ends of an authoritarian party in an authoritarian state. As Gregory Razran, the American psychologist wrote about Soviet psychology almost two decades ago, "The need to catch on, catch up, and surpass in vital areas of psychophysiology and *the control of man* may not be very different from the related requisites in physics and the control of missiles" (italics mine).

One of the charges that led to Medvedev's confinement was that he had written a book attacking the doctrines of Lysenko, who had already been toppled from his domination over Russian genetics. Lysenko is one of the three key names involved in this attack on the independence of the human mind. The other two are Lamarck, who developed the theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and Pavlov, whose experiments led to the conditioned reflex. Pavlov's theory was simple. Condition the population to the desired response, and then develop a technique to make sure that the conditioning was inherited. The search for a scientific proof of Pavlov's theory was launched in the 1920s. As the American geneticist L. C. Dunn wrote, "it is not surprising that in Russia, where the aim is a quick change to the Socialist Utopia, the inheritance of acquired characteristics has become a prime scientific problem, claiming a priority interest of politicians."

The first attempt ended in failure when the Austrian Paul Kammerer produced experimental results aimed at proving the inheritance of acquired characteristics in the male midwife toad. Western scientists cried fraud, and Kammerer was charged with "improving" his results. Nevertheless he was invited to continue his work in the Soviet Union—but shortly thereafter committed suicide. The Soviets found his work important enough to eulogize his memory in a film scripted by the late Lunacharsky, then the Commissar of Education. The film, *Salamandra*, depicted a fictional Kammerer as a scientific victim of a clerical-royalist plot. Lunacharsky's wife played the leading lady in the film, and Lunacharsky did a bit part as himself.

With Kammerer a grudgingly lost cause, the Soviets turned to Lysenko, who offered a new hope in agriculture. The Soviets reasoned that if Lysenko could vernalize wheat—turn winter wheat into spring wheat by changing the environment of the seeds—then they could happily bypass classical genetics. Lysenko's roller-coaster career as the doyen of Russian biology lasted from 1938—when he succeeded in sending Vavilov and other world-respected geneticists to their death in Soviet prison camps—until 1965, when he was demoted from his post as director of the Institute of Genetics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. His overall effect on Soviet agriculture was disastrous, but more dangerous were the political side effects of his theories,

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Celia Morris

Moral Laziness in *Nashville*

The most unnerving fact about Robert Altman's *Nashville* is its success. Pauline Kael wrote in the *New Yorker*: "I sat there smiling at the screen in complete happiness," and most critics have cheerfully bought Altman's claim that the place and the people are metaphors of modern America—or as Vincent Canby said in the *New York Times*, middle America. Though most of the people Altman shows us are frankly caricatures, he expects us to believe that collectively they represent a realistic assessment of human possibility here and now. And that presumption—his admiring critics to the contrary—seems to me both offensive and lazy-minded. In his sense of human experience he operates on a level of cliché no more interesting than that of the old *Saturday Evening Post* or the *Readers' Digest*: his banalities are simply more churlish and joyless.

What, for example, does he see in the people he assembles in Nashville? Mainly that they're flabby. They rut and call it sex, and even, on occasion, love. Their only ambition, and the only thing that draws them publicly together, is the desire to get or keep money and fame. Their public speech is blandly cozy and genial, while privately they bitch or evade or manipulate. Vibrant and sullen by turns, none are drawn deeply together by shared hurt or shared respect or shared integrity. Altman shows us neither a convincing friendship nor a good marriage, and some of the characters are catatonic. Fine movies can be made about those we so readily call "common" people: think of Kazan's extraordinary *On the Waterfront*. But where, in Altman, is Dreiser's tenderness? Or Nathanael West's overwhelming pity? Or, for that matter, Flannery O'Connor's sense of evil?

Not only is the movie pretentious and sadistic, it's boring—in part because Altman chooses the realistic mode only visually and on the level of dialogue. What we see of Nashville is garish or drab—concrete, plastic, steel, and neon in public and comfortably Sears-Roebuck in private. Contemporary America, with some dazzling exceptions, *is* visually ugly, and on that score I think Altman—along with the multitude of others who have made the same observation—is right. But a relentless sequence of graceless scenes becomes simply tiresome. A movie that depends almost exclusively on ordinary conversation tells us no more than we already know: that such conversation tends to go slack and becomes tedious. We also know that the noise pollution index in this culture is too high, but an extraordinarily noisy movie abuses our ears instead of commenting, in any insightful way, on that abuse.

Altman refuses realism of other, more demanding kinds. Though set in the South, *Nashville* is a movie that barely mentions race, much less acknowledges it as the brute fact it is. The only racial comment is a black man's taunt to a black singer: "Tommy Brown is the whitest nigger in town ... he ought to drink some milk: it fits his personality." A white woman would not be the lead singer in a black choir. And in Altman's movie that choir gyrates in a recording studio and on a public platform, while in the privacy of their own church they are sedate. An easy sexual relationship like the one implied between the black waiter, Wade, and the white woman, Sueleen, is less likely in Nashville than in places outside the South.

Far more crucial, Altman refuses to answer basic questions about his characters: Why do they behave as they do? What has made them the people they are? (Again the critics have indulged Altman's self-indulgence: they say the audience is to be co-creator with the producer and the actors in the meaning of it all.) Life of course is complicated and meanings are

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elusive, coherence and certainty hard to find. But most adults, most adolescents, and, I suspect, many children, know that.

ANY ARTIST WORKS with human emotions and experiences and inescapably shapes them. Altman selected the material, and meanings emerge—whether or not they are those he deliberately chose. One theme struck me forcefully: many of the characterizations and almost every major scene humiliate women. (I don't mean to imply that any of the men are attractive—quite the contrary—and staggeringly enough a woman, Joan Tewkesbury, wrote the script.) First in order of offensiveness is Martha, who has renamed herself L.A. Joan (Shelley Duvall). She has come to Nashville ostensibly to see her dying aunt but neither walks through the door of her hospital room nor comes to her funeral. Of course people evade death, but not quite in the way she does. Her uncle says she's from California, as though to explain her wacky clothes and wigs and her compulsive pursuit of any man who comes remotely near. But a woman that catatonic and cruel would be Manson-group-crazy, seriously dangerous, a figure to be explored with fear and trembling. Altman uses her for comic relief and a few notes of easy pathos.

The second most offensive is Opal (Geraldine Chaplin) of the BBC. A local man acting as chauffeur for some out-of-town musicians offers to show her the real Nashville; to this she says "I make a point never to gossip with servants." The BBC and those who work for it undoubtedly have sins, but gross stupidity and vulgarity are not, I think, among them. Altman apparently wants us to take Opal for an English lady. Now, an English lady might well have the conviction that she shouldn't gossip with servants—though many apparently do. However, an English lady determined to humiliate a social inferior would do so in a far more devastating, because more discrete, way. Further, an English lady sufficiently intelligent to be hired by the BBC would not wander through acres of yellow school buses or smashed-up cars apostrophizing pompously on the cultural meaning of it all. One may chuckle at Sir Kenneth Clark or Alistair Cook for their grand generalizations, but they are not fools, and they do not abuse their native tongue.

The most obvious scene that humiliates a woman is Sueleen Gay's strip at a political smoker. (Gwen Welles in a brilliant performance.) In one sense that scene is absolutely convincing: the men's leering expressions are those you can see at a whore-house strip show in Juarez. In another context we might feel we're sitting for a bitter lesson in the dues people pay for success, but in *Nashville* we're forced to wonder. A good many waitresses may be dumb, but why did Altman make her impenetrably so? Many singers are bad, but why did he make her voice and gestures ridiculous? Why didn't he let a professional strip, as in real life one would almost certainly have done? Why did he make a strip the price a stupid waitress has to pay for the chance to sing at the "Parthenon" with Barbara Jean? One suspects finally that he relished her abasement.

Altman's fondness for humiliating women and his refusal to explain his characters come together in what he does with Barbara Jean (Ronee Blakley), the most successful female country music star in Nashville and at the same time extraordinarily fragile. Quite apart from having her killed in a scene no critic I've read has had the temerity to justify, Altman intermittently focuses on her neurotic breakdowns and in one chilling scene has her repeat her husband's litany that what he does is always in her interest. ("Don't tell me how to run your life. I've been doin' pretty good at it.") What can we make of her? In part, she is a woman molded by the Southern mystique that says sugary surface is all. Any white woman brought up in the South, whether she has adopted or rebelled against that mystique, is crippled by it. To be good, charming, and lovely means, to an astonishing degree, to say "Honey, ya'll come over to see me when you get the chance," or "Mr. Green, you give my best to your wife now, and tell her to take her Vitamin E." Such women are not raised to believe that the intellectual life, the aesthetic life, or genuine moral awareness matter: it is not by crazed assassins that women are killed in the South. The ravages of that mystique can give an artist a powerful subject, as Tennessee Williams triumphantly showed in *Streetcar*. But Altman seems interested not in understanding this woman but in showing her beaten.

Why are we told she was badly burned as a child? Does her success have something to do with that childhood disaster? Why are we shown her married to a boor and a slob—a man who may in some obscure way care for her, but who manipulates and humiliates her as a way of making his living? Is she fragile because success is hard to sustain? Or is there something about the peculiar idiocies of the country music circuit that damages her? A director paying due respect to human experience ought to

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Jerome H. Skolnick

Are More Jails the Answer?

THINKING ABOUT CRIME, by James Q. Wilson. New York: Basic Books. 231 pp. $10.

For the past decade, Americans have become increasingly fearful of what James Q. Wilson calls predatory crime—"robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft." Robberies and burglaries encompass more than a loss of property or the experience of pain. They often violate the integrity of the self and of genuinely personal, as distinct from abstract, private property.

As an antidote to the crime problem, changes in the social and economic structures of society have been proposed by a variety of students of crime in American society, from staffs of national commissions through scores of independent scholars. Such proposals have, on the whole, been received with little enthusiasm from the politically powerful. Nor has the public generally been persuaded to try, much less accept, a social structural approach to crime, even though generations of scholars have urged massive social changes in American society as the only humane and democratic response. So when a book like Wilson's comes along, promising to address itself more directly and effectively to reducing crime in the streets, it will draw favorable attention, particularly when conservative Republicans hold national power.

Basically Wilson argues that the courts are too lenient, sending too few convicted criminals to prison, and for too little time. Thus the deterrent effect of prisons is lost, as well as their capacity to incarcerate those who would otherwise be committing crimes. This simple and appealing argument is couched in gracefully written disclaimers, but it comprises the faint thread connecting the essays. Sometimes the argument is obscured because Wilson writes too beautifully, exchanging euphony for clarity. "I argue for a sober view of man and his institutions," he writes, "that would permit reasonable things to be accomplished, foolish things abandoned, and utopian things forgotten." Well, who wouldn't? Unfortunately, when carefully considered, Wilson's supposedly sober, reasoned, and unsentimental analysis turns out often to be narrowly conceived, ahistorical, empirically scant, logically inconsistent, and, horror of dreaded horrors, utopian.

What is Wilson's sober view? First, it limits consideration of crime to what he calls "the more common, serious crimes" such as burglary and robbery, larceny and auto theft. This limitation is enormously consequential. It draws attention away from thinking about a range of conduct arguably as dangerous to human welfare as common burglary and robbery. For example, we are not to consider the bribery and corruption of public officials as a crime phenomenon worthy of study. Nor are we to consider the abuse of power by public officials—breaking and entering, illegal surveillance, illegal punishment and threats as crimes to be understood.

Furthermore, a whole range of boardroom crime is to remain unconsidered, although the consequences of decisions by those possessing economic and political power may be far more harmful, en masse, than the predations of the street criminal: for example, violations of international law, resulting in massive bombing destroying humans and entire environments; or decisions to destroy or repress entire races or ethnic groups or classes in the name of political or social ideology; or even decisions to impair, intentionally or negligently, products or services so as to harm or plunder the general public. Wilson never raises the question of how the criminal sanction might be employed to limit such preda-

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tions, because the perpetrators apparently do not fall into the class of "predatory criminal," a category that in his use excludes those possessing wealth, social position, influence, or power of government.

Wilson's stance must exclude such considerations because his perspective relies on an ahistorical vision of American society. Of course, Wilson recognizes that robbery and burglary are crimes of the poor and racial minorities, but his premise of the overriding importance of immediate solutions requires that he take no cognizance of factors in American social and economic history that account for the development of rising crime rates. He enjoins us to limit severely our interest in the causes of crime, and to concentrate solely on its prevention through governmental power, primarily through punishment. He is of course egalitarian: neither the rich nor poor should be allowed to steal, and when apprehended, should be treated with equal severity.

WILSON RECOMMENDS a seemingly simple and therefore attractive solution to the street crime problem—increase the certainty and severity of punishment. Such a position demands that Wilson resurrect the idea of the rational criminal, which he does with his characteristic combination of literary flair and scant evidence. An example of Wilson rhetoric: "We have become so preoccupied with dealing with the causes of crime (whether the causes are thought to be social conditions or police inadequacies) that we have almost succeeded in persuading ourselves that criminals are radically different from ordinary people—that they are utterly indifferent to the costs and rewards of their activities, and that they are responding only to deep passions, fleeting impulses, or uncontrollable social forces."

Surely Wilson must be aware that the entire tradition of sociological criminology from Sutherland on has been to regard criminals as ordinary people learning systems of behavior and interpretations of motives and events. Ordinary people are of course never "utterly indifferent" to the costs and rewards of their activities, but for a variety of reasons they may not be closely attuned to these costs and rewards. Not the least of the reasons is the complexity of measuring cost and reward. For example, a highly rational cigarette-smoking professor may not be "utterly indifferent" to an almost certain shortening of life further impaired by pulmonary malfunction, but he may still smoke cigarettes. The threat is remote, even though evidence of it appears in daily coughing and hoarseness of the throat. Indeed, we all learn to assimilate threats of risk—we drive automobiles at high speed, fly airplanes, ski, and so forth. We ordinary people, like prudent criminals, learn to accommodate to risk. We do so because our gains and gratifications are proximate and pressing while future sanctions exist only as a probability.

Wilson recognizes this fact, but he saves the recognition until his final chapter where it is used in an entirely different context, to question increasing employment opportunities as a strategy for reducing crime. He writes:

> Since the average "take" from a burglary or mugging is quite small, it would seem easy to make the income from a job exceed the income from crime. But this neglects the advantages of a criminal income: One works at crime at one's convenience, enjoys the esteem of colleagues who think a "straight" job is stupid and skill at stealing commendable, looks forward to the "big score" that may make further work unnecessary for weeks, and relishes the risk and adventure associated with work.

So the issue is not whether potential burglars and robbers are rational but what constitutes rationality in the face of alternative courses of action. If one relishes risk and adventure, then increasing penalties only makes criminal activity more adventuresome. If one earns far more from stealing cars than from washing them, the rise in sanctions proposed by Wilson will have little effect. One result, not considered by Wilson, will be to increase substantially the tax burdens borne by noncriminal citizens for supporting a prison system that Wilson acknowledges does not rehabilitate.

WILSON PROVIDES slight evidence for the effectiveness of punishment as deterrent and treats contrary evidence with faulty logic. For example, he cites as evidence only an unpublished study by two Texas researchers and other studies based upon what he acknowledges to be questionable crime statistics. Yet on a nearby page he reports that a comprehensive study conducted in California "found that almost two-thirds of those offenders placed on probation had, one year later, no known subsequent arrest, while less than one-half of those sent to prison had been equally successful." With respect to this finding Wilson points out that it would be incorrect to assume greater success from putting on probation more of those offenders now sent to prison. The findings on the superiority of probation might be attributed to judicial selection of better risks. Quite so. But Wilson's general position is that crime would be reduced if more probationers were *sent* to prison. Thus the California study clearly undermines Wilson's argument for expanding im-

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prisonment even if it does not unequivocally support an argument for reducing prison commitments and sentences.

Apparently, Wilson doesn't really believe his own argument about the effectiveness of punishment or is unusually untroubled by inconsistency. In his concluding thoughts, he startles by writing a paragraph totally undermining an argument developed at length earlier. "Even the deterrent capacity of the criminal justice system," he writes with either astonishing candor or naivete, "depends in no small part on its ability to evoke sentiments of shame in the accused. If all it evoked were a sense of being unlucky, crime rates would be even higher." But never before in his book do we learn of the importance of a sense of belonging to a community, or of human feelings of compassion and identity. Of course, we could not, because such an admission would imply a totally different approach to thinking about crime than the supposedly sober and unsentimental one Wilson proposes.

GIVEN his stance, Wilson's greatest failure is a total lack of consideration of the economic and social costs of punishment. For example, he suggests as a solution to the heroin problem "heroin quarantine centers" with comfortable accommodation and intensive care where addicts would be forcibly confined, unless, when let out, they could show through frequent urine tests that they were off drugs.

Wilson attributes American society's failure to develop such centers to three factors: one, lack of concern over the problem; two, an obviously ill-conceived concern that addict detention would violate civil rights; and three, a supposed misapprehension that law enforcement should go after large dealers rather than innocent users. This interpretation aside, Wilson nowhere considers the economic costs of such remotely located centers, nor generally the economic costs of prisons. This is curious, since the classic conservative complaint argues against "throwing" money at social problems. Evidently, the cost of prisons are to be excluded from the virtues of thrift.

Yet prisons are terribly costly. Estimates of cost are usually low because they rarely consider inflation or the loss of the taxable value of prison real estate. San Quentin, for example, is located on one of the most attractive sites in the Bay Area. Alcatraz prison was closed by federal authorities in the 1960s only partly out of humane considerations. At Alcatraz it cost about $50,000 per year to house each prisoner in its maximum security facilities. Thus, on economic-cost grounds alone, a punitive approach envisaging a substantial increase in prison and other detention facilities is quite utopian for American society, since the standards for such facilities, however minimal, would, if introduced on the scale Wilson's argument suggests, prove economically vexatious.

Of course, a far more economical solution would be to kill addicts and those who commit street crimes. Wilson, who is certainly not a fascist, never comes close to suggesting the crematorium. He clearly locates himself within the ambit of constitutional government, however conservative its interpretation. Yet he never analyzes the economic costs of such constitutional limitations on severity.

Perhaps more important, he never evaluates the *social* costs of increasing punishment. Wilson argues convincingly, as if it needed to be argued, that prisons do not rehabilitate, they punish. But if they do not rehabilitate how can they infuse the sense of community appreciation and the emergence of feelings of remorse acknowledged by Wilson to be essential for the criminal justice system to work? Moreover, prisons are not inert institutions. They develop social systems and statuses, norms and values. A sober view of the evidence on imprisoned men suggests that prisons reinforce criminal tendencies—in a cliché, they are "schools for crime." Unless as a nation we are prepared to kill criminals or send them for lengthy periods to slave labor camps, prisons must fail as institutional devices for social control.

Thus, humanitarian considerations aside, Wilson's position fails on its own supposedly unsentimental grounds. The economic and social costs of prisons far outweigh their achievements. Wilson's position ultimately drops into the dustbin of his own disdain, that is, utopian thinking. Supposed unsentimentality is finally caught on the horns of the contradiction between the advocacy of constitutional government and the economic and social costs of imprisonment.

Ultimately, there are no simple punitive remedies to the crime problem in a society valuing freedom, democracy, and due process of law. And that is one reason why, in thinking about crime, we must finally understand that it is utopian not to consider its causes. Either we attend to altering the social and economic bases of crime or we grope our way toward a false realism—a garrison state, increasingly controlled by those possessing the force of arms and the keys to the prison. □

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Nicolaus Mills

Unique Union, Special Problem

CHAVEZ AND THE FARM WORKERS, by Ronald B. Taylor. Boston: Beacon Press. 342pp. $10.

How would you describe Cesar Chavez?

"He is a guy who knows what he ultimately wants, and he knows he can't get there in the traditional ways," a veteran AFL–CIO organizer replies.

"I discovered in dealing with him that he's a God-fearing Christian. Besides, I couldn't get anybody to pick my peaches," a grower admits.

"I felt he was kind of godlike, that he didn't make mistakes, that he had some uncanny ability to see through everything," his administrative assistant says.

The question is one that Ronald Taylor never tires of asking in *Chavez and the Farm Workers*, and the result is the most complete history so far of the UFW. The conclusions Taylor reaches (or fails to reach) are, however, best understood not in terms of his analysis of Cesar Chavez but in terms of the overriding issue raised by the UFW in 1975: Can it survive as a democratically run trade union and a quasireligious movement? In this review I shall examine Taylor's book in light of four specific questions that stem from that issue.

- Can the UFW successfully unionize thousands of workers with organizing tactics that are nonviolent in nature and often pietistic in aim? If, as is so often the case, this question is flattened out to mean, Can the UFW dispense with the day-to-day problems of organizing and win contracts and workers solely on the basis of its moral position?—the answer of course, is, no. But the UFW has never taken this route. Their organizing has been remarkably thorough and, as Taylor shows, their most publicized and dramatic demonstrations for nonviolence (such as the 25-day fast Cedar Chavez undertook in 1968) have been synonymous with intensive organizing campaigns. As UFW lawyer Jerry Cohen observed of the 1968 fast, "People came from all over the valley ... what a fantastic cement that fast was ... it was an amazing organizing tool."

The real question is: Has the UFW's nonviolence and strongly religious bent helped or hindered its organizing? Taylor never seriously deals with this question in terms of the ethnic or racial problems posed by a union in which the Catholic Church and Our Lady of Guadalupe are important elements, and his omission is more revealing of the relatively homogeneous characters of the UFW's membership than any carelessness on his part. But, appropriately, Taylor does turn his attention to the farm workers' reactions to Chavez's Gandhian nonviolence, and here his findings may be summarized with a remark Erik Erikson once made about Gandhi: he struck "the religious imagination of an angry people."

Time and again, Taylor points out the organizational cohesiveness of the UFW's nonviolence. Whether he is discussing the union's 300-mile Lenten *peregrinación* from Delano to Sacramento in 1966 or the militant nonviolence maintained by the 3,500 Farm Workers who were jailed in strikes and battles with the Teamsters during the summer of 1973, Taylor shows the UFW's strategy having a direct payoff, and in addition gaining it enough public support to limit the union-busting efforts of state and local officials.

- Can the UFW deal effectively with political problems and other unions in view of the special demands its position regarding nonviolence makes on it? The political answer, as Taylor's book demonstrates in detail, is a resounding yes. Particularly on a national level the UFW's "specialness" has brought it to the attention of individual politicans (the Kennedys), who might otherwise have ignored it, and given it real political clout (the 1972 Democratic Convention formally endorsed the lettuce boycott). At the state level too, the UFW's nonviolence has been a political asset rather than a liability. It helped their drive to defeat Proposition 22, a bill that would have made farm strikes virtually impossible in California, and it helped the UFW's lobbying to get the California legislature to pass what amounts to a state version of an NLRA for agriculture.

More problematic is the UFW's relations with other labor unions. With such clear-cut allies as the United Auto Workers, the UFW's moral posture has been an asset in gaining financial support and public endorsement. With more relucant allies, such as the AFL–CIO, the UFW's nonviolence has been closer to a neutral factor, arousing the suspicions of a traditional figure like George Meany but at the

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same time making it difficult for the AFL–CIO to ignore the Farm Workers (in the summer of 1973, the AFL–CIO did, for example, give the UFW $1.6 million for its strike fund). The hard question is: What has the UFW's nonviolence cost in the dispute with the Teamsters? There is no definitive answer, but the problem is easier to deal with if we raise a second question: Would the UFW have better relations with the Teamsters if it were not nonviolent? Certainly it wouldn't have Teamster support. As far back as the DiGiorgio strike of 1966, the Western Conference of Teamsters took on the spoiler role where the UFW was concerned and tried to sign contracts the union had already won.

A more realistic question is: Would the Teamsters be less willing to employ "goon" tactics against the UFW if they were unsure of the UFW's commitment to nonviolence? Taylor raises this possibility when he tells the story of how the UFW turned down the offer of Seafarers' President Paul Hall to send his "sailors" into the fields against the Teamsters. But the possibility is a slim one. Given their history, it is difficult to imagine the Teamsters being deterred for long by Farm Worker counterviolence, and it is even more difficult to imagine the UFW meeting an escalation in Teamster violence unless it wanted the Seafarers around as permanent Samurai.

- Can the UFW remain internally democratic in view of the kind of Gandhian commitment to nonviolence that Cesar Chavez has made? Taylor never directly takes on this issue. Instead, he shows that Chavez has gone to great lengths to democratize the union through ranch committees, elections, and a national convention—and that he has personally avoided the trappings of office (such as a large salary) that a union leader in his position might be expected to acquire. But as revealing as these signs are, they are beside the point when it comes to democracy in the UFW and Chavez's commitment to nonviolence.

For the issue is not a matter of debate or of formal democratic procedures. Indeed, the whole point of Chavez's fasts is to make nonviolence beyond question as far as the UFW is concerned. With his weak health, he has literally put his life on the line when he thought the UFW might abandon its commitment to nonviolence. To quote again UFW lawyer Jerry Cohen on Chavez's 1968 fast:

> He didn't say, "I'm not going to eat until you guys shut your mouths about violence," he just said the union was committed to nonviolence, then started fasting. The people responded like "God, what is this guy doing?" The people were scared and frustrated, they didn't know what the hell to do with him.

Chavez has acknowledged that his 1968 fast was a "last resort," and since then, he has undertaken long fasts only as a last resort. The problem is that the impact of Chavez's fasts and intensely personal appeal to the loyalty of his supporters is very difficult to separate from his overall leadership of the UFW. It is no coincidence that Taylor is hard pressed to name a single, major policy that the UFW has adopted over Chavez's objections. Within the UFW, opposing Chavez is a matter of conscience, not merely votes, and given the sacrificial style of leadership he has exercised, opposition is almost fated to peter out. For it invariably calls into question not just the issue at hand but Chavez's Gandhi-like moral stature within the UFW.

- Can the UFW expand, given the inspirational nature of its leadership? This question is particularly ticklish in view of the difficulties that have beset the UFW; even at its peak in 1972, the union had no more than 147 contracts covering 60,000 jobs. At stake here are the lives of 3 million farm workers in America. How long will they have to continue as rural *lumpen*? Will they ever be unionized under one union?

Taylor approaches this problem from an essentially bureaucratic perspective. He quotes former UFW Vice-President Larry Itliong's complaint that "we, in the top echelon of the organization, make too many of the rules," and then he goes on to detail the problems Chavez in particular has had in trying to limit his control over union administration.

The ability of the UFW's leadership to accommodate expansion is, however, not a problem that parallels the growth of a business but rather the growth of a church. It is not a cult of efficiency that makes it difficult for them to deal with expansion but the justifiable sense they have of their own dedication and ideals. Like the founders of a church who fear their piety will die with them as the church turns into a denomination, so the leadership of the UFW constantly worries that the "specialness" of the UFW will be lost as the union acquires new members. This is a concern that greater bureaucratic efficiency fails to address, and an issue that is exacerbated by the strains of running nationwide boycotts. Indeed, on one occasion the boycott staff of an entire city was dismissed rather than admit that the leadership of an organizer sent out from UFW headquarters might be at fault. For the present, all that is clear is that the UFW is without a valid

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solution to its expansion problem, and the only way the problem can be avoided is for the UFW to remain a small, tightly knit organization, content with limited success.

A final note. Taylor concludes his book by observing that without federal legislation guaranteeing farm workers the right to strike and boycott, to have secret-ballot union elections, and to be protected from job competition with illegal aliens, the UFW will "remain a band of guerrilla fighters reacting to the great conspiracies hurled against them." Given the current political climate, this is an especially grim prediction, and it goes far toward explaining why anyone as admiring and knowledgeable of the UFW as Taylor should have such blind spots when it comes to analyzing their internal difficulties. □

Peter Connolly

Rightist Anti-Utopia

MEDIACRACY: AMERICAN PARTIES AND POLITICS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS AGE, by Kevin P. Phillips. Garden City: Doubleday. 228 pp. $8.95.

On August 10, 1975, the teenagers of South Boston gathered on a local beach to signal their defiance to the assembled cops and black demonstrators. One of their recurrent cries—"Bring on the niggers!"—was sadly predictable. But another consisted of repeated shouts of "Taxes, taxes, taxes!" The two slogans, considered together, tell us that something other than mere racism was at work on that beach. That something is the subject of Kevin Phillips's book.

Phillips believes that the people of South Boston, though they may not know it yet, are "populist conservatives." Phillips is a prophet-evangelist of what he believes to be a vast, if still inchoate, movement of working- and middle-class white Americans opposed to "elitist liberalism" and those who benefit from it. The people of South Boston, with their scornful hatred of "hypocritical liberals," of the high taxes imposed by those liberals, and of the blacks who they presume are supported by those taxes, seem to Phillips likely recruits to the banner of populist conservatism. So too, he thinks, are millions of Americans who revere George Wallace and feel a sense of impotent rage at crime, "permissiveness," "dirty" school textbooks, quotas, busing orders, skyrocketing gasoline prices and property taxes, and Walter Cronkite's supercilious eyebrows.

Mediacracy revolves around two related arguments. One is a variation of the well-worn theory that America is fast becoming a "postindustrial" society; the second is that because of the coming postindustrial society, the political allegiances of most Americans are undergoing a sea change.

Phillips draws on the writings of Daniel Bell, David Riesman, and Ralf Dahrendorf in arguing that the "production, consumption, and dissemination of knowledge" is now the dominant "locus of American wealth, culture, and power." Phillips, unlike his predecessors, attributes great and sinister powers to the television networks, foundations, and large liberal newspapers. This new "knowledge-sector" elite, he argues, is not sanely conservative like past elites but perpetually hungry for socially destructive novelty. He believes that the social programs of the '60s have been uniformly disastrous and largely the result of faddish pressures from the new elite. Yet one senses that whether or not his version of the theory of postindustrial society accurately describes the development of American society is not terribly important to Phillips. It merely serves as a handy sociological underpinning for his reading of current politics.

As Phillips sees it, "America may be on the verge of an epochal shift in the nature of her political and governmental institutions." This shift will be the result of a historic reversal of party roles. The Democrats, traditionally regarded as the party of the common man, will increasingly take over the role of the party of "privilege," hitherto occupied by another eastern-based, moralistic, elitist movements such as federalism and radical republicanism. They will be triumphantly opposed by a new movement that may or may not stay within the bounds of the present Republican party, but will in any event be composed of the same types of people who gave Richard Nixon his huge majority in 1972. Phillips convincingly argues that Nixon aimed his 1972 campaign at "America's traditional antielitist constituency." The Southwestern and Southern states Nixon carried most overwhelmingly were those with

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"low incomes, many poor, relatively low literacy, ... low health and welfare, high infant mortality rates, high rates of violent crime." Nixon also took many traditional Democratic areas outside the South, especially those with a weak "tradition of political moralizing, more poor people, higher minority ratios, more crime." This contrasts with the areas of greatest McGovern strength, New England, the upper Midwest, and the Pacific Northwest, where there are "relatively few poor people, few black or Chicano minorities, and relatively little violent crime." These characteristics represent the base lines of the new alignment.

PHILLIPS is convinced that this shift must emerge inevitably from the changing economic nature of privilege. I am not. I do not believe that Roger Mudd or even McGeorge Bundy have anywhere near the power over their fellow citizens that the President of AT&T has. But Phillips indeed has grasped that, in the forming of political attitudes, the media figure more significantly as targets for popular hostility than do the multinational corporations. The "leering, sneering commentators," to quote our former Vice-President, and the socially aggressive foundations are visible; for some reason corporations and their presidents have ceased to be. For millions of populistically inclined voters, CBS has come to represent what Wall Street did for their ancestors.

Once this is understood, much that has been obscure about American politics becomes clear. It is instructive, for example, to compare the almost complete lack of response evoked in the former populist heartland by Fred Harris's decent, historically authentic populism, with the frenzied enthusiasm that greets the sinister pseudo-populism of George Wallace. The monopolies have surely not gone away since 1896. They have, however, been replaced in the lexicon of popular demonology by newer and more exciting villains. Phillips's theory might also help explain those new Democratic Governors across the country who used to be liberals and now preach self reliance to the poor with all the fervor of Ronald Reagan. These men have not suddenly become devotees of Milton Friedman. They are merely political animals who can sense a change in the wind.

The ever more liberal Congress remains the great riddle to Phillips's theory and is currently the chief repository of liberal hope. But should it be? The 94th Congress has been chiefly distinguished by a stunning inability to override any of Ford's vetoes of important liberal legislation. What hurts even more is that, according to Christopher Lydon of the *New York Times*, this failure has resulted as much from the liberals' recognition of an apparent conservative mood at home as from predictable Dixiecrat defections.

Even if we assume that Congress remains a liberal bastion, Phillips offers two plausible and unconsoling reasons for this. First, the power of incumbency has grown since the last seismic upheaval in American politics, the New Deal. Thus, there is a lag between changed presidential and congressional alignments. Second, thanks to the bungling of Richard Nixon and his associates, the Republican party no longer seems to be a fit vehicle for the transfer of middle-American allegiance. (Phillips thinks this will soon result in the creation of a new populist conservative party.)

I would add a third. For some blessed reason, people do not associate the much disliked Federal Income Tax with their local congressman or woman. He or she is generally regarded as a provider of federal largesse, whereas at the state level taxes are seen as emanating directly from the governor and state legislators. For example, in 1974, Ohio Governor John Gilligan, an able liberal who had pushed through the legislature a state income tax in order to put the state's educational system on a sound financial footing, went down to defeat, while Democratic senatorial candidate John Glenn was achieving a million-vote victory margin.

It can be reasonably argued that Phillips exaggerates the degree to which Americans are politicized and polarized on ethnic or regional lines. He may overstate the degree to which ordinary Americans are purposefully angry and he may understate the degree to which they are simply confused. His new movement may never find a political vehicle. The Republicans probably cannot shed their image as the party of genial privilege, at least as long as Gerald Ford remains in the White House. And, since 1856, new parties, even those with potentially vast constituencies, have not been able to do any lasting damage to the Democratic/Republican party structure. Phillips underestimates the tenacity and resourcefulness of many liberal Democratic office-holders, who continue to show an astounding ability to survive in electoral habitats that seem politically unsuited to them. He pays no attention to the liberalizing influence of the better labor unions or to the "trickle-down" economics of the current Administration, which helped to push millions of "Democrats for Nixon" back into their old party's column in November 1974. In short, he overlooks the fac-

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tors in American political life that don't support his thesis.

Nonetheless, I think Phillips is essentially right about where this country is headed politically. Everywhere there are cutbacks in essential government services and desperately needed social programs. There is "no money," it seems, to employ firemen, feed hungry children, or build housing within the financial reach of any but upper-class people. The City of New York faces a potentially catastrophic default on its obligations and the Congress, which lavished $100 billion on the Vietnam War, cannot spare one nickel. One would think that we were living in Bangladesh rather than the richest country in the world. There is no money because *higher* federal taxes, especially on those who do not now pay their fair share, which are the *sine qua non* of real social reform, are politically unthinkable. A country that believes that Seoul is more important than New York and "big government" a greater threat to personal dignity than rat-infested tenements is not far from where Kevin Phillips says it is.

What is to be done? It goes without saying that the Democratic Left should make every appeal to the *ressentiment* constituency that it responsibly can. It should emphasize such programs as like national health insurance, job safety legislation, real pension reform, and a housing program to reach the working and middle class. Perhaps the late Alexander Bickel's idea of massive compensatory education programs as a substitute for busing could be revived.

But what we must not accept is a definition of liberalism as Democrats-in-office. Jerry Brown's welfare cuts are no more acceptable than Ronald Reagan's. While the tide is running against us, we can at least call things by their right name. In the immediate future, there is one obvious contribution that can be made to the health of this political system. The current leader of the "populist conservative" movement is indisputably George Wallace. It has been argued that Wallace does us a service by "raising real issues." This is dangerous nonsense and should be exposed at every opportunity.

Populist conservatism indeed fails the test. Its leaders and ideologues dream of no cooperative commonwealths or even TVAs; it has no constructive solutions. Its *raison d'être* lies in the exploitation for political profit of the ethnic, regional, class, and religious antagonisms that it sees as the essence of American politics. Kevin Phillips once told Garry Wills that the whole secret of American politics lay in knowing who hated whom and then acting upon it. This has been the guilding principle of Wallace's political career. Pilgrimages to Montgomery, Alabama, can only help to legitimate the viciousness that is this movement's indispensable core and to hasten the day when it begins a process of polarization which may end by apalling even Kevin Phillips. □

NOTEBOOK (*continued from page 92*)

which became part of the programmed package in creating "the new Soviet man."

It should be remembered that Marx and Engels had accepted Lamarck as part of the legitimate science of their time. Mendel's genetics were not generally known until after 1900, and not until the mid-1920s was the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characteristics dished. Lenin's espousal of Lamarck's theories was purely pragmatic, offering an enchanting vista of insuring the long-range dominance of the Party.

Still, there were nagging questions. If a superior environment fostered superior people, how could the proletariat, with its generations of physical abasement, possibly have succeeded in overthrowing the aristocracy, bourgeoisie, and intelligentsia? And what about the less advanced primitive (now developing) peoples? Conway Zirkle, in his *Evolution, Marxian Biology and the Social Scene*, reports that Herman J. Muller, who had taught genetics in the Soviet Union in the interval between two wars, resigned from the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1948, because, among other reasons, the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characteristics had racist consequences. And at the Eighth International Congress of Genetics in the same year, Muller asked a Soviet science administrator if the doctrine didn't demand that primitive and colonial peoples were hereditarily less advanced than those of the industrial nations. The administrator replied that colonial peoples were inferior in every respect, and that was official doctrine.

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Lysenko's doctrine that members of the same species did not compete with each other, although designed to soothe the populace into accepting their assigned roles in society, must nevertheless come as a posthumous shock to Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Kamenev.

Pavlov, with his scientifically proven ability to create conditioned reflexes, offered an immediate means of conditioning the Soviet citizen to respond to the wishes of the party and even a hope that the conditioning could be inherited. In its simplest form, his experiments demonstrated that if you gave a dog food, he would salivate at the sight of food. If you offered the dog food and rang a bell at the same time, he would still salivate. And finally, after repeating the process, he would salivate if only the bell were rung. As Joost A. M. Meerlo has written "Through a continued repetition of indoctrination, bell ringing and feeding, the Soviet man is expected to become a conditioned reflex machine, reacting according to a prearranged pattern as did the laboratory dogs." Meerloo also comments that the Soviets tried to apply Pavlov's theories to the political front, but in a purely mechanistic way. Further development of his ideas led to the so-called second-signal system, in which words replaced other signals. (There were also reports during the 1920s that human beings had been conditioned to respond appropriately to the sound of a bugle.) Hence the grinding repetition of slogans, the use of such "derogatory" words as imperialism, democracy, colonialism, aggression—given arbitrary and often startling definitions—to influence the populace. As Meerloo points out, "Pavlovian conditioning to special words forces people into an automatic thinking that is tied to those words," especially, he suggests, "if one withholds any other form of the interpretation of reality."

THIS LEADS TO a second influence on behavior in the Soviet union. Pavlov had found that the conditioned reflex could be best developed if the subject were kept in isolation during the experiment. A background noise of unapproved signals might wreck the results. Thus the Soviets have been disingenuously coy in aborting genuine intellectual interchange with the West, and automatically raise the cry of "cold war" at the slightest hint of criticism.

Pavlov reached unquestioned dominance in the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, and his influence still remains potent. And it left behind one nagging question: can conditioned reflexes be inherited? Pavlov reported some success in transmitting these reflexes in experimental animals to their offspring. This would seem an obvious goal not only in Soviet science but in Soviet politics. But the issue, as reported in letters to *Science* in late 1958, remains moot. W. Horsely Gantt was quoted as saying there was no written repudiation of this theory in Pavlov's writing. On the other hand, the papers reporting success were eliminated from his later works, but incorporated into popularizations of Pavlov's work by Y. P. Frolov, as late as 1952. As for Pavlov himself, Razran, who interviewed Pavlov in 1934 when the latter was 85, reported that Pavlov answered a question on this issue by shrugging his shoulders and responded "with the sound of a typical Russian 'Ekh' which to me meant 'don't ask.'"

Doubtless, the search still goes on, for the internal political stakes are great. Lobotomy and psychiatric incarceration are a means of culling the dissidents and isolating the subjects. This is a more sophisticated approach than that of the Stalinist purges, which killed at random, probably eliminating more of Stalin's adherents than his enemies. And it offers a broad scope to the second stage of the conditioned political reflex. The psychiatrists form a first line of defense against the subjects who have failed to respond as they should. And if all other attempts fail, if human nature does not accommodate itself to the desires of the government-controlled experimenter, if the children fail to salivate at the same political slogans that stirred their parents, then perhaps the rats of Winston Smith may be less than a programmed decade away. □

Who Says They're Not Fighting Capitalism?

The German paper *Handelsblatt,* an equivalent of the *Wall Street Journal,* reports in its September 15, 1975 issue:

> Something new has been added to the "Numbered Accounts" discussion. We hear from Zurich that the Russian Voshed Bank has been distributing a prospectus of the Russion Bank for Foreign Trade (Vneshtorg Bank) that specifically offers customers the opportunity to open numbered accounts.
>
> The prospectus guarantees not only secrecy for all transactions taking place with regard to such accounts but also that the customer's name will under no conditions be divulged to any government. Thus, people who until now could afford a numbered account in Switzerland, Florida, or Singapore will have the same opportunity, with no strings attached and with the same kind of discretion, through a Zurich Russian bank in Moscow. A richly illustrated four-color brochure is available. □

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LETTERS

Socialists in Canada?

Editors:

Harry Fleischman's article on the New Democratic party (NDP) government in British Columbia—"A Report from British Columbia"—in the Summer 1975 issue of *Dissent* reveals a fundamental misconception about the NDP.

Fleischman says that: "... Canada now has three provinces with avowedly socialist New Democratic party governments, in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and British Columbia." This statement is patently false. Alan Blakeney, Ed Schreyer, and Dave Barrett, premiers in the three provinces, have consistently stressed that they and their governments are social democratic in character, not socialist. The difference is not incidental.

Socialists base their analysis on the Marxian insight that the evils of capitalism are inherent in basic economic institutions—the labor market, private ownership of productive assets, and capitalist ideology. This leads them logically to the conclusion that a precondition for the creation of a socialist society is the disappearance of these institutions. Social democrats, in contrast, attribute the same evils to the failure of governments to introduce appropriate policies—equitable tax arrangements, sound social-welfare programs, stiff measures to curb the practices of predatory monopolies, and the like. Thus they would make over capitalism by using what Ed Schreyer fondly refers to as the "instrumentality of the state" to alter the superstructure.

Canada has never had a socialist government but its experience with four social democratic ones has been sufficient to demonstrate the differences between their approaches. The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation party—forerunner of the NDP—formed the government in Saskatchewan, an agrarian province, from 1944 to 1965. This government was extremely progressive and innovative by North American standards. It converted consumption of health services—initially hospital and subsequently medical—from a private to a collective basis, created a crown corporation with a monopoly on automobile insurance, expanded power and telephone services, and established a number of modest public-sector enterprises to produce products Saskatchewan was importing—leather, shoes, boxes, bricks, and the like. Significantly, however, all of the measures it introduced were compatible with, and many of them enhanced, basic capitalist institutions. Thus, by the time the CCF government was defeated in 1965, competent observers of the political situation in Canada characterized it as being either "liberal" or "welfare statist," never socialist.

Any source of confusion between social democrats and socialists has disappeared as a result of the experiences in the three provinces that currently have NDP governments. In all three provinces, the NDP replaced governments that, while they had different party labels, were ultra conservative. Consequently, there was a backlog of needs that the new governments responded to with a flurry of legislation, most of it copied from other jurisdictions, jurisdictions with Conservative and Liberal governments. Since this initial burst of output, the level of activity has diminished appreciably. To be sure, there have been some innovations in the social-welfare field—for example, "pharmacare" and "denticare" programs—but, in general, inertia has set in and this has been attended by a steady retreat from all policies that might create controversy or social tensions.

Not surprisingly, this process of degeneration has progressed furthest in Manitoba where the NDP has been in office for six years. Virtually nothing of consequence has happened since the party was reelected for a second term in 1973. And there is little prospect of improvement in the foreseeable future; indeed, Ed Schreyer has publicly stated that there is nothing more of consequence to be done. ...

It is when social democratic governments are replaced that the limitations of their reforms become apparent. Since none of the reforms introduced by these governments challenge basic institutions, they may be reversed or permitted to deteriorate by succeeding governments; indeed, the British experience demonstrates that when a social democratic government finds itself in a tight corner it will abandon its own programs to get out of it. That is indeed apparent in the list of examples that Fleischman uses to illustrate the achievements of the NDP government in British Columbia: the curtailment of grants, tax write-offs and other concessions to big business, the increases in benefits to pensioners and welfare recipients, the $2.50 minimum wage (which incidentally is 10c less than the minimum wage in Quebec), the pharmacare program, support of nonprofit day-care centers, the land-use legislation, the government insurance corporation, the $25 million investment fund, and the new regulations on energy production and distribution. While all of these reforms are reversible, it does not necessarily follow that a different government would move immediately to dismantle them. Quite the contrary, because all of these reforms are anchored in economic orthodoxy, that is, justifiable on the basis of equity or efficiency considerations and market failure, they are supportive of capitalist institutions. Therefore, many of them will be retained. The ones that will be discarded or sabotaged are those which, while they benefit segments of the working class, and the poor and the aged, are of dubious value to the owners of capital. In a nutshell then, the benefits of social democratic reforms are either illusory or transitory.

Fleischman poses the question: "Has the NDP government made British Columbia socialist?" He gives the correct answer, of course—"Not by a long shot"—but the

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burden of my comments is that, if he had understood the character of the NDP, he would not have bothered to raise it at all.

ERROL BLACK
Brandon, Manitoba

HARRY FLEISCHMAN *Replies*:

Errol Black's letter strikes a sympathetic chord in me, since he's repeating the strictures I made in the early 1930s about reformist socialists both in the United States and in other countries. I, too, then considered myself a Marxist and questioned the right of non-Marxists to even call themselves socialists.

Today, I still consider many of the insights of Marx in his analysis of capitalist ills important. But his forecasts of the future were often incorrect and he was by no means infallible. More important, following my generation's experiences with Communism and Nazism, we have realized the importance of considering not only what the government owns, but who owns the government. We found Communist regimes, claiming to be "people's democracies" and "socialist," actually transforming their systems into state capitalism—in which the new elite, the party leadership, grabbed all the emoluments and appurtenances of power, while the workers had little to say about the conditions of their lives.

Socialism must be concerned with more than economics, it must have a heart as well as a mind. It must help people take control of their own destinies and make their own decisions. That is why democratic socialists stress democratic controls, even if it should be at the expense of efficiency. The Socialist Party, U.S.A., therefore, at least in the 1940s, included among the forms of social ownership it recommended not only direct government ownership but also public corporations like the Tennessee Valley Authority, at least one step removed from direct political control. (We wanted such authorities to have boards of directors representing the workers in the enterprise, managers, *and* the consuming public—to avoid situations where workers and managers in a particular enterprise could team up to gouge the rest of society.) We also considered desirable for a socialist society the concept of producers' and consumers' cooperatives as well as nonprofit private corporations, such as universities, together with some nonmonopolistic free enterprise.

Black concedes that the New Democratic party governments have been progressive but mourns that "inertia" has taken over and that the "benefits of social democratic reforms are either illusory or transitory." I challenge his assumption, which he nowhere documents. It sounds suspiciously like the slogan of the DeLeonist Socialist Labor party that "reform is chloroform," and its call for the "unconditional surrender of the capitalist system."

While all the NDP governments have had parliamentary majorities, they had no electoral majorities. They operate within the constraints of minority support among the electorate. Their policies have to be tailored to achieving that majority by educating the masses, who are currently populists—not yet socialists—to the realization that the immediate benefits they receive can only be maintained and expanded under a broader socialist framework.

When Errol Black maintains that all three NDP premiers have consistently stressed that they and their governments are social democratic in character, not socialist, I think he is playing semantic games. I do not know Alan Blakeney or Ed Schreyer and cannot speak for them, but I have talked with Dave Barrett many times and he has used the terms "socialist" and "social democratic" interchangeably.

If one is not an elitist or adventurist, and if one believes in democracy as essential to a socialist society, then one must agree that we cannot manipulate people into socialism, that it must be the result of conscious acceptance of a socialist program by a majority of the people. That, it seems to me, is the NDP's goal. □

Socialist Dilemmas

Editors:

The article by Peter Jenkins [*Dissent*, Fall 1975] on the dilemma of social democracy has two virtues. It is well written and catalogs the key arguments in British Labour party factionalism plus the strange politics of the Liberal party. Mr. Jenkins trotted out his phrasing "the English sickness" in a recent *Guardian* interview with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Schmidt would have none of it as symptomatic of social democracy generally and I would enjoy seeing his reaction to the rest of the *Dissent* piece.

Mr. Jenkins performs the unusual feat of giving a critique of BLP policies any *Tribune* reader (Labour left) would applaud while offering remedies supported by the *Socialist Commentary* crowd (Labour right). It may seem peculiar to blend standard left analysis with more moderate policies but this should not surprise us. The *Guardian* provides effective support for the Liberal party—that strange assortment of has beens and never wills—and their line borrows from both Labour and the Conservatives. . . .

The issue is broader than an incomes policy. In the 1974 general election campaign the *Guardian* joined the rest of the British press in calling for a "grand coalition" government comprised of all three parties to confront Britain's economic difficulties. As Wilson repeatedly stated Labour's opposition to the proposal, the actual goal of the coalition talk was to block the formation of another Labour minority government. Since Wilson gained but a three-seat majority (since down to one), this is not a small threat. . . .

While inadequacies of social democracy can certainly be described by opponents of our movement they should be

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so labeled. Let me hasten to add that Mr. Jenkins is not the most distant of adversaries. He works for a great newspaper and no one remembering his coverage of the 1972 U.S. presidential campaign could confuse him with the rest of Fleet Street. But his article is not quite that of a friend. If he would look to the proposals by Jack Jones on investment policies rather than to George Lichtheim for a definition of socialism—and the dilemmas of social democracy—we would all be better off.

TOM KRAMER
Springfield Illinois □

Who Are the Palestinians?

Editors:

In "Who are the Palestinians?" [Dissent, Fall 1975] Henry Pachter traces the Middle East crisis to 3,000 years of victimization of the Palestinians by other peoples, mainly the Jews. He informs us that Palestine is "the land of the Philistines, a Semitic people that once was subjugated by Joshua and by David . . . ."

Here is revisionism with a peculiar vengeance. It should cause us to reconsider old beliefs. Perhaps 3,000 years of Jewish history were blighted by that uppety kid who put a smooth stone into his sling and smote the champion of the Philistines, Goliath. In fact, Eliab, David's oldest brother, was angered by David's offer to fight the Philistine, saying, "I know the presumptuousness and the naughtiness of thy heart." (The King James version calls it *pride*, not presumptuousness, in case the reader is checking sources.)

As to Joshua, whose conquests came before David, he was the most unfair fighter ever; he enlisted the Lord to dry up the waters of the Jordan, so "Israel could come over this Jordan on dry land." And Jericho was "subjugated" by Joshua in a most unsportsmanlike manner. He called upon the priests to blow their horns and when the Israelites heard the sound of the horns they "shouted with a great shout, and the wall fell down flat."

So, from Joshua to David, on through the Balfour Declaration, with its perfidious promise of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, up to and including a defense of Bevin's actions against Jewish immigration, Pachter makes strong moral judgments always pointing to the guilt of the Jews. After compiling that one-sided record, he ends up with this stern admonition to his readers:

> Aware that I have made some controversial statements, I want to make clear that the issue is neither moral nor judicial, but political. Those who wish to debate my proposal should refrain from reminding me who "started it" or who is "more to blame" or whose rights are better. Wherever I have touched upon such questions, my intention has merely been to show how Palestinians *see* them, and *that* is a political *fact*, not a moral judgment.

Perhaps Pachter wants us to believe that his entire article is merely a paraphrase of authoritative Palestinian Arab positions. But nowhere does he distinguish his positions from those of the Palestinian Arabs, whether they are Philistines fighting Joshua and David, or pogrom instigators slaughtering civilians in Hebron and Safed in 1929, or the Nazi-minded Mufti calling for a holy war against the Jews. Besides, what kind of politics is it that eschews moral and juricical issues? Aristotle reminds us that the "political community . . . aims at the highest good."

Actually the article is replete with moral judgments and in every instance Pachter finds the Jews guilty. For example, in his stout defense of Bevin, Pachter says he "wondered why the Jews were turning against England, of all nations, which had fought Hitler. Gratitude is not a political word, but bitterness is!" How selective is this treatment of a historical moment. The Jews were certainly for England when it was embattled against Hitler. Jewish legions came from Palestine to fight side by side with the British against Hitler. But when the Labour government and its foreign secretary, Bevin, refused to allow the Jewish survivors of the death camps to sail for Palestine, it would have been amazing if the Jews felt anything but indignation about Bevin. Bevin happened to believe that the Arabs had national rights, but that the Jews did not. That may not be anti-Semitic, but it did not endear Bevin either to the victims of Hitler or to the Yishuv in Palestine.

Claiming immunity from criticism that touches on moral issues, Pachter bestows the contempt of quotation marks around the socialism of the kibbutzim. He does not distinguish his views from those of the Palestinian Arabs who view "the settlers" as "usurpers, colonizers, imperialists in person. . . ."

Recalling that the Irgun blew up the King David Hotel, Pachter summons up the passion of an Old Testament prophet to ask: "Do these people have a right to complain about terrorism?" With never a critical remark about the Arab wars of national liberation Pachter doesn't bother to note that the Jews were then fighting for their national existence, that the British were opposing them and preventing the Holocaust survivors from landing in Palestine; nor does he recall that the King David Hotel was British military headquarters; and that even so, the majority leadership of the Yishuv *condemned* the Irgun and its terrorism. "*These people*" to whom Pachter refers were refugees who barely escaped from the gas ovens; they had been starved and robbed and herded like animals and they were then trying to find succor in a land of Jewish origins and continuous Jewish habitation of some 4,000 years. The answer to the question is, yes "*these people*" have a right to condemn terrorism!

If a man from Mars could read Pachter's assertion that "Zionism has abandoned its earliest propaganda line . . . that a Jewish state would make its Arab citizens happy and contented," he would be astounded to visit with Arab citizens of the State of Israel. The man from Mars would discover they are free people, living at higher standards than Arabs in any of the Arab states, free to come and go,

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free to raise their children in their own religions and culture, free to express their views, even free to put up pictures of Nasser and Sadat which amazes some visitors to Israel.

Pachter wrote his article before conclusion of the recent Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Even so he dismisses whatever will happen as too late and besides it "will not divide Israel's enemies." Pachter guessed wrong on that one.

One can understand Pachter's reluctance to have his readers ask who "started it" as one reads his version of the origins of the war in 1948. Pachter does remind us that there was a U.N. Security Council resolution, and properly emphasizes that the resolution called for setting up both a Jewish state and an Arab state in Palestine. Reverting to the accusations that the Jews were "usurpers, colonizers, imperialists in person," Pachter concludes: "This is the background of the war of 1948 . . . ." But whatever happened to that Arab state of Palestine? To answer that one, Pachter would have had to mention a fact of history, and even if he wanted to make no moral judgment he would have to say that six Arab states launched a cruel war of aggression against Israel and in the process smashed up the decision to set up an Arab state in Palestine.

It is one thing to cite the tragedy of conflicting national claims of Jews and Arabs in Palestine. And surely it is true that there have been lost opportunities and blame on both sides. But Pachter has offered a completely biased, one-sided version of the Middle East crisis.

JOSEPH CLARK
New York City

HENRY PACHTER *Replies:*

This communication makes me sad; it does not respond to the question I have raised or to the proposals I have made but side-tracks the discussion into the irrelevant issue of whether I am a moralist. Let me assure my correspondent: of course I am a moralist; as a Jew I find it difficult to live down the massacre of Deir Yassin or the land-take policy of the Zionist policy-makers. Only recently, in fact on the day when I received this letter, did the Israeli government reconfirm its decision to settle Jewish communities in areas of the plain of Galilee where Arabs now live in comparatively close settlements. This is colonialization in its most literal sense, and the Israeli government should not wonder why so many Third World delegations at the U.N. voted, only one week later, to equate Zionism with racism. As more than one African ambassador explained to us: they are unable to make the fine, I am tempted to say Talmudic, distinctions that the sophisticated speakers from Israel and the U.S. (and some contributors to socialist magazines) make between colonialization and colonialism, imperialism, racism, and Zionism; for obviously, to them this is not a matter of scientific definitions but one of actions.

This letter saddens me because it shows once again how insensitive representatives of one nationalism can be to the sensibilities of another. Zionists in particular seem to be incapable of comprehending what other people say, or even of reading plain words. I have enumerated a dozen "conquerors" of Palestine and stated emphatically that the Palestinians are being exploited by big-power policies; but Joseph Clark is able to hear only that I "make strong moral judgments always pointing to the guilt of the Jews".

The contrary is true. I have pleaded to deemotionalize and deideologize the issues and to seek *political* solutions that avoid such moral questions as "who is right" and "who started it." To emphasize and make plainer what this means, I have tried—vainly, it seems—to show that there are sensibilities, feelings of righteousness and of offended pride, as well as emotional ties and different understandings of justice on either side. Obviously, these sentimental obstacles to rational compromises have to do with the respective memories of the tribe and those who wish peace must try both, to understand and to circumvent these atavisms. I deplore that my Aristotelian friend Joe Clark does not see the difference between a moral judgment and a judgment about moral judgments. I was trying to say that coexistence is incompatible with righteousness.

This is why this letter makes me so sad: if even socialists are incapable of swallowing tribal memories and react to reasonable proposals with indignant outcries of tribal prejudice—what can we expect of governments that must cater to the mob's instincts? Joseph Clark actually makes his own the Likud drivel about "continuous Jewish habitation (of Palestine) of some 4,000 years" (will he please give Manhattan back to the Indians?) and the argument that "survivors of the death camps" have a right to displace other people from their home country; the argument is neither logical nor moral nor socialist. The "survivors of the death camps" ought to have been received with open arms in the land of opportunity for all; but the American Jews preferred to give them a country that did not belong to them rather than share their own. The next time Clark offers me a country in which some of my ancestors—the Khazars—may have lived 200 years ago, let it be the Crimea; the climate agrees better with me and the strategic interest of the U.S. in that location would be more obvious.

I fear for the survival of Israel if her statesmen should continue in the same attitudes of self-righteousness that have been reflected in articles and letters published in this magazine. The *status quo* (and I mean the frontiers of 1948–67) cannot be defended by claims (ever so justified) or by guns, but only by a generous policy based on a generous understanding of, and respect for, the perceptions of Israel's neighbors.

Every nation must pay a price for peace, and Israel's price must be, first among other concessions, the abandonment of exceptionalism, the absurd claim that the misfortunes of Jews elsewhere or the actions of other governments have given Israel the right to disregard the rules of conduct that ought to be respected by all nations. □

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MOVIES

(continued from page 94)

feel some obligation to weave a whole cloth with such threads.

And what of Lily Tomlin, surely the most sympathetic person in the movie and the most nearly human? We're made to like her, I think, because she loves and is deeply responsible to her two deaf children. Apart from her inexplicable role as a white woman singing with a black choir, however, what are we to make of the scene at a suburban party where she babbles about young men maimed in motorcycle accidents and a woman who got a blow on the head and now may lose an eye? Perhaps she can live so gallantly with her damaged children and her innocuous, obese husband because, to use the movie's idiom, she grooves on disaster. What do we know of her when she gracefully leaves the motel room of the rock singer who has finally seduced her, and kisses him while he talks on the telephone to a girlfriend in New York? Is she a fool and a willing victim? Or does she triumph over those who want to make her so? How tiresome to be told repeatedly that we must accept confusion because life is complex! Life comes to seem far less confused and more complex in a movie like Bergman's *Cries and Whispers* when we're told more about what has made it so.

Keith Carradine plays the restless musician who can't stay in the same woman's bed or care long about a woman who's just left his. It's ostensibly his life that produces those fetching lyrics, "I'm Easy" and "It Don't Worry Me." But they speak equally well for the mindlessness and moral limpness of the film itself. At the end of the movie, an idolized woman has been killed in a crowded public place, and after a few moments of confusion Barbara Harris takes the mike and triumphantly replaces Barbara Jean as the country western female star. She sings "It don't worry me./ You may say, I ain't free./ It don't worry me." We see the audience milling, children clapping, bodies moving gently in rhythm; it's become a happy picnic scene—ice cream, balloons, and soda pop. Not a sign of distress. No one seems even to recognize that something horrible has just happened. And I don't believe it. *Nashville* may be Altman's America, but it isn't mine nor is that of my friends. Ours is richer and far more dangerous. □

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